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Landowners in the Lower Mississippi Valley or Delta may be willing to consider 
alternative land uses for some acreage, particularly for marginal agricultural lands.  Recreational 
hunting, fishing, and wildlife watching opportunities on private land for public use may be a 
possible way to provide income to landowners and restore marginal lands as a contributor to the 
local economy.  Previous studies have identified that landowners often chose not to engage in 
recreational leasing due to liability concerns.  Thus, an institutional change that reduces liability 
risk to landowners may increase the amount of private land available for public recreation and 
reduce transaction costs associated with liability mitigation.  These possibilities were examined 
using primary data obtained from a mailed questionnaire sent to agricultural landowners in the 
Delta region of Arkansas and Louisiana.   
 About 14% of landowners indicated that they would be willing to allow fee-based 
recreation under the current institutional environment.  If the Arkansas and Louisiana 
recreational use statutes were amended giving greater liability protection to landowners, the 
number of landowners that would be willing to allow fee-based recreation on their lands would 
increase to over 20% in Arkansas and nearly 24% of owners in Louisiana.  Clearly, an 
institutional change that reduces the liability risk to landowners can increase the potential 
amount of private land that could be used for fee-based recreation, again particularly so for 
Louisiana.   Over 40% of landowners have land that is marginal for agricultural purposes with 
the average ownership of marginal land being slightly more than 100 acres.  Owners of marginal 
land were particularly responsive to an institutional change providing greater liability protection.  
  
 xiv
 Risk averse landowners were more unlikely and risk seeking landowners were more 
likely to allow fee-based recreation under the current institutional environment.  Following an 
institutional change it was observed that risk preference was no longer a significant predictor of 
the willingness to allow fee-based recreation indicating that the element of risk was diminished.  
Transaction costs associated with liability are evident and amending the recreational use statute 
appears to produce a reduction in expected WTA reflecting a transaction cost savings to 









CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The Lower Mississippi Valley or Delta, which encompasses parts of Arkansas and 
Louisiana, has been dominated by agriculture over the better part of two centuries. However, 
there are a number of factors, such as increasing demand for environmental amenities and 
downward price pressure from growing world trade of agricultural commodities, which may 
entice agricultural landowners to consider other land uses for some acreage in the Delta, 
particularly for marginal agricultural lands. Given the problems with agricultural profitability 
combined with increasing demand for recreational sites, some landowners may consider 
alternative sources of income, such as commercially developing wildlife, fish and habitat 
resources, and charging for recreational access (Schenck et al., 1987; Thomas et al., 1989). 
Marginal agricultural lands that are no longer utilized in an income generating capacity could be 
utilized in such an alternative entrepreneurial application. Marginal agricultural land is land that 
will produce barely enough products to pay the cost of production (Ise, 1940). Removing 
marginal farm lands from agricultural applications has been encouraged by the U.S. Federal 
Government through incentive programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program, Grassland 
Reserve Program, and the Wetland Reserve Program (2002 Farm Bill). Many of these lands are 
no longer utilized in a productive capacity that would contribute to the local economy.   
1.1. Research Problem 
 Recreational hunting, fishing, and wildlife watching opportunities on private land for 
public use may be a possible way to provide income to landowners and restore marginal lands as 
a contributor to the local economy. Additionally, such an enterprise can draw recreationists from 
outside the local economy benefiting local business. According to the 2001 National Survey of 
Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife Associated Recreation, expenditures on wildlife-associated 
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recreation by state residents and nonresidents in Arkansas and Louisiana amounted to$1.3 billion 
and $1.5 billion, respectively. Clearly, the ability to attract recreationists could benefit small 
local economies in the Delta region. The 2001 survey also revealed that the number of residents 
and nonresidents that fished, hunted, or watched wildlife was 1.4 million in Arkansas and nearly 
1.6 million in Louisiana. However, the amount of public land available for recreation is limited. 
There are approximately 746 million acres of public land in the United States; yet, the vast 
majority of the public land is in the western United States (Copeland, 1998).  This is problematic 
for public outdoor recreation, particularly in the eastern United States, where there is only 9 
percent of the nation’s public land and 78 percent of the population (Langer, 1989).  It has long 
been recognized that the solution to the lack of public land for recreation is increasing access to 
private lands for public outdoor recreation (Copeland, 1998; Wright et al., 2002).   
1.2. Justification 
Given that the outlook for outdoor recreation is ever increasing demand with no or 
limited change in the amount of public land, private land must become more available if the 
supply of recreational opportunities is to meet demand (Langer, 1989). Even though wildlife is 
held in trust by individual state governments, the access to enjoy wildlife is a clear right of 
control that is exercised by the landowner.  Landowners control the wildlife habitat granting 
them de facto control over wildlife (Benson, 2001). Marion (1989) noted that there is a trend 
toward reduction in free public access to private lands for recreation and suggested that this was 
due to increasing urbanization, a growing number of recreationists, increasing property damage 
resulting from trespassers, and the recognition on the part of landowners that providing access to 
private land for recreation can generate income. Leopold (1930), the father of U.S. wildlife 
habitat management, recommended that the private landowner should be encouraged to pursue 
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potential profits from access fees since this would ultimately benefit wildlife by promoting 
wildlife habitat management on private land.  
 Given the demand for outdoor recreation and the limited availability of public land, the 
potential may exist for private landowners in rural areas to develop fee-based recreational access 
on private land. What factors serve as incentives or disincentives to the landowner regarding 
public use of private land? In addition, what form of wildlife based recreational enterprise would 
or do landowners prefer? There are several options. Landowners can operate individually, 
cooperatively with other landowners, or contract management to an outfitter that can serve as a 
broker between landowners and recreationists. The potential willingness of landowners to use 
marginal agricultural lands for fee-based recreational applications in the Delta region and the 
factors that may influence that decision is an area deserving of more research.    
1.3. Objectives 
 The primary objective of this study is to understand the attitudes and perceptions of 
landowners in the Lower Mississippi River Delta regarding 1) fee-based wildlife-associated 
recreation, 2) to determine what management organizational form landowners prefer to manage 
and market fee-based recreation: independent, cooperative, or outfitter, and 3) how liability 
concerns and other possible disincentives collectively influence landowners’ access decisions. 
Using a survey and econometric techniques, the study will seek to identify land and landowner 
characteristics that may have a positive or negative effect on a landowner’s probability of 
choosing to offer fee-based recreation and the choice of organizational form to manage and 




CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Fee-Based Recreation and Landowners 
 Landowners that prefer to manage fee-based recreation may choose to lease their lands to 
an individual hunter or group of hunters for a specified period of time such as hunting season or 
year, or offer permit hunting where land access is granted for a day in exchange for a fee. 
Recreational leasing may not be practical for some landowners since wildlife habitat 
management on private land is often limited by tract size (Hrivnak, 1995).  
 Seymour (1985) discussed the concept of resource-controlled recreation cooperatives that 
develop and market recreational opportunities. Cooperation among local landowners allows for 
improved wildlife habitat management by increasing the manageable land area (Benson et al., 
1999). This cooperation could also be extended to marketing and management of fee-based 
recreation. Using a cooperative management model would allow landowners to collectively 
engage in a fee-based recreational enterprise that could result in economies of both scale and 
scope.  The concept of using landowner cooperatives for natural resource management and 
marketing over traditional forms of business organization of proprietorship, partnership, and 
corporations was advanced by Yarrow (1989). Advantages of landowner cooperatives for 
wildlife and timber include formation of a larger manageable land base, increased recreational 
opportunities for the public, increased income to landowners, greater awareness of the value of 
wildlife, and increased investment in wildlife habitat management on private lands. 
Disadvantages of landowner cooperatives are inability of landowners to agree on objectives and 
the efforts required for landowners to coordinate management activities. Yarrow (1989) 
concluded that the cooperative approach may not be applicable where there is insufficient 
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interest, interest and objectives of landowners conflict, there is local resistance, and individual 
tracts of land are large enough for individual management.  
 A third option that landowners may prefer is the use of outfitters, which can serve as 
intermediaries between recreationists and landowners. Sun et al. (2005) in a study of hunting 
outfitters operating in Mississippi found that nearly half of their land base was leased from other 
landowners. Payment to landowners by outfitters is generally either an annual fee or a percentage 
of the outfitter’s gross revenue.  
2.2. Landowner Liability  
 Generating additional income for landowners by allowing recreational activities brings 
with it the possibility of legal action as landowners may be sued if bodily injury results to a 
recreational user of the property (Copeland, 1998). If a recreationist is injured while on private 
property, it is possible that a lawsuit will be filed by the injured party against the landowner.  The 
level of duty owed by the landowner to the injured party depends on whether the person enters 
the premises as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee (Copeland, 1998). “An invitee is one who enters 
the premises upon business which concerns the occupier, and upon his invitation express or 
implied, the latter is under an affirmative duty to protect them, a licensee is one who has 
permission to enter upon the land of another, but comes for his own purposes rather than for any 
purpose or interest of the possessor of the land, and a trespasser is one who enters or remains 
upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so, created by the possessor’s 
consent or otherwise” (Direnfeld-Michael, 1987). A recreationist that is allowed access to private 
property by the landowner for free is a licensee, but if a fee is charged by the landowner then the 
recreationist is considered to be an invitee (Copeland, 1998). A landowner who charges a fee for 
the recreational use of his or her property owes special legal duties to the invitee, since the 
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invitee enters the land under the implied representation that reasonable care has been taken by 
the landowner to make the property safe for recreational use (Copeland, 1998). 
 The need for greater access to private land for public recreation and the concern that 
private landowners have over liability was recognized by the Council of State Governments and 
addressed when they drafted a model Recreational Use Statute in 1965 (Kozlowski and Wright, 
1989). The idea behind the model act was if landowners were protected from liability more 
landowners would allow recreational use of their property which would reduce the need and 
expense to state governments to provide recreation areas to the public (Wright et al., 2002). State 
legislatures have passed recreational use statutes designed to encourage landowners to open up 
their lands to the public promising private landowners immunity from lawsuits over accidental 
injury to recreational users while on a landowner’s property (Copeland, 1998). Most state 
recreational use statutes insulate landowners from liability if access is granted without a charge. 
However, there are an increasing number of states allowing landowners to charge a fee and retain 
the liability protection (Wright, 1989; Wright et al., 2002). Today all 50 states have adopted 
recreational use statutes that are intended to encourage landowners to make their lands available 
for public recreational use by providing greater liability protection to the landowner (Wright et 
al., 2002).  
    However, liability issues or at least perceived liability continue to be a major concern to 
landowners. Ruff and Isaac (1987) noted that one of the primary reasons why woodland owners 
in Wisconsin owning 20 acres or more do not lease their land for hunting was fear of personal 
injury lawsuit, and only 3 percent of Wisconsin’s landowners actually leased land for hunting. 
This is interesting considering that Wisconsin’s recreational use statute (Wisc. Stat. § 895.52) 
allows property owners to collect fees for recreational activities not exceeding a total of $2,000 
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each year. This may indicate that landowners are not aware of the liability protections afforded to 
them by state recreational use statutes. Marion (1989) noted that liability remains to be a major 
area of confusion on the part of landowners. Kaiser and Wright (1985) reported that recreational 
use statutes have been “splendidly ineffective” in increasing public access to private lands.  
Owen et al. (1985) surveyed private forest landowners in Arkansas owning more than 1,000 
acres about public use policies. Owen et al. (1985) reported that hunting was the most common 
public use of private land; however, several of the survey respondents expressed concern about 
user liability. The authors pointed to a 1965 code amended in 1983 and noted that the state law 
provides liability protection. Owen et al. (1985) concluded that much of the remaining fear 
expressed by landowners may be more perceived than real. Heberlein and Davis (1987) in their 
study of hunter participation and fee access hunting recognized the importance and need for 
further research in the area of institutional issues associated with fee hunting that included legal 
liability for landowners. 
 Even with the liability protection afforded to landowners by state recreational use 
statutes, there remains a significant gap between landowners’ perceptions regarding liability and 
the reality of liability (Wright et al., 2002). In their survey of recreation use statutes Wright et al. 
(2002) observed that researchers have clearly identified that landowners are concerned about 
liability but have only documented that it is perceived as a problem. Wright et al. (2002) 
indicated that a better understanding is needed of how liability and various other disincentives 
collectively influence landowners’ access decisions. Mozumder et al. (2004) suggested that the 
necessary institutions for hunters and landowners may not be in place to promote recreational 
leasing, and that institutional changes that facilitate more exchanges would shift the supply curve 
outward. The effects of institutional change on landowner leasing behavior can be explored by 
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asking if landowners would allow recreational access and/or leasing if liability was limited by 
state law. The Louisiana recreational use statute (La. R.S. § 9:2791) does not extend liability 
protection if a fee is charged for access.  Arkansas’ recreational use statute (Ark. State. Ann. § 
18-11-301) also does not extend liability protection if a fee is charged for access; yet, the term 
“charge” is defined to be “an admission fee for permission to go upon or use the land,” but does 
not include “cash paid to reduce or offset costs and eliminate losses from recreational use.” The 
Louisiana and Arkansas recreational uses statutes are similar in that both do not allow for the 
charging of an access fee intended to generate a financial return to the landowner.  
It would be interesting to see how landowner leasing policies may change by expanding 
the liability protection of recreational use statutes to allow for the charging of a fee intended to 
generate a return to the landowner. Investigating the effect of such an institutional change can 
provided insight into landowner leasing behavior and possible effects on the supply of available 
recreational land.  
2.3. Risk Preference 
One factor that may influence the behavior of landowners regarding fee based recreation 
is that of risk preference, given that there is an inherent element of risk associated with recreation 
and liability. Daniel Bernoulli, an eighteenth century mathematician, was the first to formalize an 
understanding of risk aversion in his explanation of the St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli, 1954). 
Bernoulli sought to explain why some individuals would not pay to play a simple game where a 
coin is flipped and the player is paid when the head side of the coin appears. The reward is 2n 
units when the head appears on the nth flip of the coin. When this game is played with an infinite 
number of tosses the expected value of the St. Petersburg paradox game is infinite. With an 
expected value of infinity one would expect players to gamble large sums of money; thus, the 
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paradox is why some will not accept the gamble. Bernoulli argued that the gamble is not 
accepted since players were less interested in the money reward than in the utility of those 
rewards, and he hypothesized that due to the diminishing marginal utility of income the game has 
a finite expected value of unity even though it has an expected money value of infinity (Pearce, 
1999).  
 The concepts developed by Bernoulli were expounded upon by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) to demonstrate the hypothesis that individuals make choices in conditions of 
uncertainty based on expected utility. The work by von Neumann and Morgenstern provide the 
first axiomatic treatment for examining decisions under conditions of uncertainty forming the 
basis of modern expected utility theory (Hardaker et al., 1997 and Nicholson, 2002). Empirical 
studies addressing risk rely on two basic approaches to measure risk-attitudes. The two major 
approaches that have been developed to elicit risk preference include 1) techniques based upon 
expected utility theory and 2) methods of direct elicitation of risk preference (Pennings and 
Garcia, 2001).  
Expected utility theory models usually involve the estimation of a single valued utility 
function, which include the von Neumann-Morgenstern, the modified von Neumann-
Morgenstern, and the Ramsey approaches (Officer and Halter, 1968), and models of decision 
making under risk as a choice between different alternatives. Expected utility analysis and the 
derived utility function can be used to make inferences about the risk preference of the individual 
as the shape or curvature of the utility function can be used as measure or indicator of risk 
preference. Hardaker et al. (1997) demonstrate graphically the three risk preferences based upon 
a simple function in terms of the second derivative demonstrating the utility derived from wealth 
 10
where 0)( <′′ WU implies risk averse, 0)( =′′ WU implies risk neutral, and 0)( >′′ WU implies 
risk seeking (See Figure 1). 
Results of risk preference elicitation techniques based upon expected utility theory have 
been mixed and are often attributed to interviewer bias, hypothetical nature of questions, and 




Figure 2.1. Risk attitudes and the shape of the utility function depicting risk averse, risk neutral, 
and risk seeking. 
 
   An alternative method to elicit risk preference is that of direct risk preference elicitation. 
This method does not require the specification of a functional form for the utility function and 
thus avoids some of the problems associated with using expected utility hypotheses as the 
underlying theory. One method of direct risk preference elicitation is the self-rank method where 
respondents are asked to indicate their risk attitude or preference. Kastens and Featherstone 
(1996) utilize a 10 point risk attitude scale and five point Likert self-assessment scale to gauge 
risk preference where respondents are asked to rate their risk preference. Cardona (1999) and 
















respondents are asked to characterize themselves relative to other investors as taking on 
substantial levels of risk, tend to avoid substantial levels of risk, or neither seek nor avoid risk in 
their investment decisions. A number of studies have compared the various direct elicitation 
techniques with mixed results regarding consistency among elicitation procedures (Schurle and 
Tierney, 1990; Bard and Barry, 2001; Fausti and Gillespie, 2000). A recent study by Fausti and 
Gillespie (2006) compared mail survey results for five commonly used methods to elicit risk 
preference and examined the consistency of the elicitation procedures. Fausti and Gillespie 
(2006) noted that a simpler elicitation method (such as the self-rank risk preference question) 
performs relatively well and may be a better choice for elicitation of risk when mail survey 
respondents are not offered rewards or incentives for spending time to correctly answer 
questions.  
2.4. Contingent Valuation of Lease and Fee Recreation 
Landowners that are currently leasing land or allowing some form of permit based access 
can be surveyed to determine lease values directly. However, the level of incentives needed by 
landowners not leasing land can not be assessed by looking only at revealed preference (i.e., 
existing lease prices). Contingent valuation can be used to assess landowners’ perceived values 
for recreational leasing. The contingent valuation method is a simple nonmarket valuation 
technique that was originally proposed by Ciriancy-Wantrup (1947), who suggested that the 
prevention of soil erosion generated an extra market benefit to the public that could be valued by 
eliciting individual’s willingness to pay. The first empirical use of contingent valuation was 
Davis (1963) in estimating willingness to pay of goose hunters. Contingent valuation method has 
since been used widely and for a variety of non-market applications (Venkatachalam, 2004).  
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The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) convened a panel of 
experts to access the reliability of the contingent valuation method following criticisms of the 
government’s use of the method in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster. A summary of the 
NOAA panel report (Arrow et al., 1993) findings and recommendations can be found in Randall 
(1997) and in Bishop (1998). The panel concluded that contingent valuation studies convey 
useful information for judicial and administrative decisions provided they are carefully designed 
and implemented (Loomis, 1999). The report conveyed to some that all contingent valuation 
studies need to adhere to the set of standards they proposed, which has had a negative impact on 
contingent valuation studies due to the higher cost of attaining these standards (Loomis, 1999; 
Carson, et al., 2001).  
The four common elicitation techniques used in contingent valuation studies include the 
bidding game, payment card, open-ended, and dichotomous choice approach (Boyle et al., 1996; 
Venkatachalam, 2004). All of these approaches have certain drawbacks. The bidding game 
approach is often criticized for starting point bias that can influence the respondent’s stated 
willingness to pay. The starting point initiates the bidding process, and a bias exists when the 
initial bid, as stated by the interviewer, affects the finial bid of the respondent (Bishop and 
Heberlein, 1990). The payment card approach, proposed by Mitchell and Carson (1981), presents 
a range of values for the respondent to choose their maximum willingness to pay, yet the 
approach may be affected by range and centering bias. Range bias can occur when the payment 
card range is too large or too small affecting the willingness to pay mean and standard deviation, 
and centering bias results when respondents exhibit a tendency to pick the middle value (Gardner 
et al., 2003). An alternative that avoids the biases previously described is the open-ended 
approach where the respondent is asked for their maximum willingness to pay value. However, 
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the open-ended approach is subject to protest bids and higher non-responses. Protest bids include 
both zero bids and positive bids that represent outliers in the distribution of responses 
(Jorgensen, et al., 1999). The dichotomous choice technique randomly assigns each respondent a 
specific dollar amount and asks them whether or not they would be willing to accept that amount 
(Bishop and Heberlein, 1990). 
Open-ended contingent valuation questions can be appropriate if the respondent is 
familiar with the good being valued and has a reasonable understanding of its value. Kealy and 
Turner (1993) found that there was no statistical difference between results derived from open-
ended and dichotomous choice questions for a private good but there was a significant difference 
in the case of a public good. Mitchell and Carson (1989) found that open-ended questions work 
well in situations where respondents are familiar with paying for the good. Ultimately, the choice 
of elicitation technique in a contingent valuation study depends on the nature of the good being 
valued, survey cost, statistical technique used, and the nature of the survey respondents 
(Venkatachalam, 2004). 
 The contingent valuation method has been used to assess the willingness to pay for hunting 
opportunities (Goodwin et al., 1993; Adams et al., 1989; Berrens and Adams, 1989; Fried et al., 
1995; Hussain et al., 2004). Most studies of leasing of private lands for public access focus only 
on observable leasing behavior (Ruff and Isaac, 1987; Marion, 1989; Schenck; 1987; Owen et 
al., 1985, Jones et al., 2005). Mozumder et al. (2004) lamented there was not yet enough 
empirical studies that estimate hunters’ willingness to pay for private hunting lease or 
landowners’ willingness to accept compensation to allowing hunting. Wright et al. (2002) 
recommended that contingent valuation methods be used to determine the level of incentives 
required by landowners to overcome disincentives to leasing land for public recreational access 
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(Wright et al., 2002). Also, disincentives both perceived and real can be explored, which may 
indicate a need for landowner education about liability and recreation that could improve public 
access to private lands. For example, if landowners were better informed about liability and the 
income potential of fee-based recreation the amount of private land available for public 
recreation may increase. This would benefit the public seeking recreational opportunities, private 
landowners seeking additional income, and local economies by the expenditures of out of area 
recreationists.  
Using an open-ended style contingent valuation question to assess landowner valuation of 
leasing should produce acceptable results. However, in the case of absentee landowners or 
passive landowners the results may not be as acceptable since some landowners may be less 
familiar with the revenue generating potential of their land. Alternatively, farmers and other non-
passive landowners should have a greater awareness of their land’s ability to generate revenue.  
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CHAPTER 3. ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Theoretical Basis of Landowner Access Decision 
 
A landowner’s decision to allow fee-based recreational access is not purely determined 
by revenue generation, since there are certain non-monetary benefits to the landowner. A 
primary non-monetary benefit of owning land is the exclusive use value from which that 
landowner derives utility. Thus, a utility function can better explain the landowner’s access 
decision than a profit function. 
The landowner’s utility function for land usage not currently used for income generating 
purposes (e.g., fallow or marginal agricultural, bottomland forests) that could be used for fee-
based recreation is: 
UA = U(exclusive use of land) 
UB = U(collecting of fees for recreational access) 
A more formal representation is of the utility generated for individual i from allowing or not 
allowing recreational access is: 
iAiAiA VU ,,, εη −=    
iBiBiB VU ,,, εη −=  
where η is the total acreage of marginal land owned by each landowner, V is the deterministic 
per acre utility associated with allowing or not allowing fee-based recreational access, and ε  is 
the error term . A possible specification for the deterministic utility functions (VA,i and VB,i) 
associated with the two uses for marginal land could be: 
),(, EAfV iA =  
),,(, LCPfV iB =  
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where E represents the value to the landowner of having exclusive property rights, A denotes 
altruism associated with granting free access, P is the fee charged for recreational access to the 
property, C is the cost associated to make the property usable for recreational access, and L is the 
liability faced by the landowner that results from allowing recreational access. The cost 
associated to make the property usable for recreational access (C) could include the cost of 
recreational lease insurance to offset liability risk; however, the liability concern may still serve 
as a disincentive and have a negative impact on the landowner’s utility.   
 Let Y represent the decision to allow recreational access (Y = 1 if allow recreational 
access, Y = 0 if recreational not allowed). The landowner’s total utility from unused marginal 
land is then  
iAiB VYYVV ,, )1( −+=  
)],()[1()],,([ EAfYLCPfYV −+=  
The landowner’s objective function is to maximize the utility from unused marginal land. 
Max )],()[1()],,([ EAfYLCPfYV −+=  
Taking the derivative of the objective function with respect to Y indicates how utility is 




It is assumed that P, A, and E have a positive effect on utility while C and L have a negative 
effect on utility. If C and L were reduced then P could be less in value ceteris paribus and 
maximize utility from allowing recreational access. If A and E were larger in value then P would 
have to be greater in value ceteris paribus to maximize utility by allowing recreational access. 
For each landowner there may exist an indifference or transition price (P) such that the 
landowner is indifferent between allowing and not allowing fee-based recreational access. Thus 
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the utility associated with collecting of fees for recreational access is greater than the utility of 
maintaining exclusive use of land.  
 The potential for a law suit, whether real or perceived, creates a disincentive for fee-
based recreation to the landowner and an opportunity cost. To mitigate the disincentive of 
liability the landowner may incur costs associated with seeking legal information, consulting 
lawyers, having contracts drafted to protect property rights and reduce liability, and/or securing 
commercial liability insurance. All of these actions create a transaction cost for fee-based 
recreation. The transaction cost could be reduced through institutional change. If the Louisiana 
legislature amended the recreational use statute to allow the charging of an access fee and also 
retain the liability protection accorded to free access granting landowners, then the transaction 
cost could be reduced. Nineteen other states have amended their recreational use statutes to allow 
landowners to charge a fee and retain liability protection. Amending the recreational use statute 
in Louisiana would be an example of institutional change that facilitated transactions between 
private landowners and recreationists. If such an institutional change occurred and the 
transaction cost to the landowner were reduced, then the access price should reflect that savings 
to the landowner. So if L were reduced in magnitude then P would also be reduced where utility 
is maximized. This could be observed by comparing the mean willingness to accept value for the 





CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Data and Methods   
This study utilizes primary data obtained from a mail survey questionnaire. The target 
population for the study is agricultural landowners in the Delta region of Arkansas and 
Louisiana. The following counties and parishes are included in the Delta. Arkansas counties are 
as follows: Arkansas, Chicot, Clay, Craighead, Crittenden, Cross, Desha, Greene, Jackson, 
Jefferson, Lawrence, Lee, Lincoln, Lonoke, Mississippi, Monroe, Phillps, Poinsett, Prairie, St. 
Francis, and Woodruff. Louisiana parishes are as follows: Catahoula, Concordia, East Carroll, 
Franklin, Madison, Morehouse, Richland, Tensas, and West Carroll. A mailing list of 
agricultural landowners in the Delta region of Arkansas and Louisiana was obtained from the 
United States Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency under the provisions of the 
Freedom of Information Act. The U.S.D.A Farm Service Agency responded to the Freedom of 
Information Act request and supplied 35,657 names and mailing address for the previously 
defined Delta counties and parishes of Arkansas and Louisiana. This list was reduced to 29,245 
of usable contacts after limiting the list to individuals and removing of duplicate records. A 
mailing list of 5,000 landowners was randomly selected and questionnaires were mailed with 
2,500 each being Arkansas or Louisiana landowners. 
4.2. Survey Design 
The questionnaire instrument involves the use of a mail survey developed according to 
the tailored design method (Dillman, 2000). Questions will focus on current land uses, 
landowner access policies, and landowner attitudes and perceptions regarding the potential for 
allowing fee-based recreational access. The survey will seek to determine the current level of 
recreational leasing and the revenue per acre it generates. For those landowners that do not 
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practice recreational leasing, they will be asked to indicate why they have not or do not allow 
fee-based recreational access. Previous studies have identified that landowners often chose not to 
engage in recreational leasing due to liability concerns. The importance of liability as a factor in 
landowner access policies will be assessed. Landowners will also be asked to indicate their 
knowledge of the recreational use statute and how possible changes in the use statute would 
impact their access policies. Would an institutional change increase the amount of private land 
available for public recreation?  Another limiting factor for allowing fee-based recreational 
access on marginal land is acreage limitations. Given that some landowners may only have small 
tracts of land available for recreational uses, they may be interested in alternatives to offering 
recreational access independently. Thus, landowners will be allowed to indicate their preferred 
organizational form to manage and market recreational access from the options of independently, 
cooperatively, or by means of a recreational broker (i.e., outfitter). For those landowners that 
currently do not offer recreational leasing of their land, contingent valuation questions will be 
asked to determine the level of incentive required to allow such usage of their land. A contingent 
valuation question will be used to estimate landowner willingness to accept (WTA) to allow 
recreational access. An open-ended style question will ask landowners to indicate the dollar 
value per acre they require to allow public recreational use of their land. Thus, the survey will 
include an open-ended WTA question that will ask landowners to indicate the dollar value per 
acre they would require to allow recreational access. Additional questions will address land 
tenure and usage and landowner demographics.  
Possible landowner concerns over the risk of liability associated with allowing 
recreational access necessitates an assessment of landowner risk preference. Information on 
landowner risk preference may be a useful variable in understanding recreational access 
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decisions. Therefore, the survey instrument will include an elicitation of landowner risk 
preference. The mail survey instrument used in this study will attempt to assess landowner risk 
preference by using a self-rank risk preference elicitation method that asks respondents to 
indicate if the tend to avoid, take on, or neither seek nor avoid risk in their investment decisions.  
In accordance with the Tailored Design Method (Dillman, 2000) and to achieve a higher 
response rate, the survey will be preceded by a pre-notice letter and followed by a reminder 
postcard. Additionally, a replacement survey will be sent to all non respondents. The survey will 
be pre-tested to refine and improve the survey on a sample of Delta landowners. This was 
conducted at the conclusion of a LSU AgCenter sponsored field day. The survey instrument was 
distributed to all in attendance and thirty-five surveys were completed.   
4.3. Survey Analysis and Empirical Models 
 Analysis of possible relationships between dependent and independent variables will be 
investigated using qualitative choice and limited dependent variables models. A number of the 
dependent variables of interest are essentially yes or no responses, such as the decision to allow 
recreational access.  
4.3.1. Binary Probit 
When the dependent variable involves only two values, a Binary Probit model can be 
used to examine how various independent variables (Xi) influence the probability of observing a 
certain outcome (Yi = 1) in a binomial dependent variable. The general form of this relationship 















The decision to allow recreational access can be modeled as a binary variable (Y1=1, 0 
otherwise). A Binomial Probit model can be used to examine how the yes or no decision to allow 
public access is influenced by landowner characteristics. It is hypothesized that landowner 
liability concerns and understanding are important determinants of the access decision. A second 
Binomial Probit model will be used to examine the access decision following a hypothetic 
institutional change. This will be examined using responses to a second access question that will 
include a hypothetical scenario. The question will examine how the access decision changes if 
the recreational use statute were amended to allow fee-based access and also allow landowners to 
retain liability protection.  The probability of a yes/no choice will be examined for the following 
scenarios (Table 2). 
Table 4.1. Applications of the binomial probit model investigating the probability of a yes/no 
choice under six scenarios for the dependent variable. 
Choice State RUS 
current law Arkansas modified law 
current law Louisiana modified law 
current law 
Yes/No 
Combined with state dummy variable modified law 
 
4.3.2. Multinomial Logit  
Some landowners may be interested in offering fee-based recreation using organizational 
forms other than an independent approach. Possible reason why some landowners may prefer 
using differing organization forms may be insufficient land base, time, or capital resources. The 
survey will allow respondents to select from three types of organizational forms for managing 
and marketing fee-based recreation. The options for organizational forms will include 
independently, cooperatively, or through an outfitter. A Multinomial Logit model can allow for 
an understanding of which landowner characteristics influence the probability to decide to offer 
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recreation independently, cooperatively, or through a recreation broker (i.e., outfitter). The 
Multinomial Logit (MNL) model indicates the probability that individual i will choose category j 
given explanatory variables (Xi). The basic framework of the analysis is provided by the random 
utility model which assumes that landowners maximize their utility by choosing among discrete 
alternatives for the management of recreational access. The Multinomial Logit model can be 


















     for j=1,….,J-1 
Where Yi is the dependent variable and J is the number of alternatives. The parameter estimates 
for explanatory variables are given by the vector βj and Pr[Yi=j] indicates the probability of 
landowner i choosing alternative j. The model is estimated using three alternatives that include 
cooperatively (j=1), independently (j=2), or through a recreation broker (j=3). The reference 











where dij=1 if landowner i chooses alternative j and dij=0 if not for the J+1 possible outcomes 
(Greene, 2003). 
The multinomial logit model is used to investigate the significance of various factors on 
an individual landowner’s choice of management organizational form to supervise recreational 
access. Possible independent variables that are hypothesized to influence a landowners choice 
may be absentee landowner, personal land use, liability concern, distance of land from home, 
risk preference, and demographic variables. A direct interpretation of the MNL model parameter 
estimates is not straightforward since the effect of xi on the choice is a nonlinear function in the 
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model parameter βj (Franses and Paap, 2001). Therefore, the results of the MNL model will be 
interpreted using the odds ratio and will be calculated by contrasting each category with the 
reference category. The odds ratio of category j versus category l given xi specified as Ωj|l(x) is 

























=Ω  for l =1, …, J-1 
where j is one of the three possible choices and l is the reference category and the corresponding 
log odds ratio is 
 )()(ln | ljiilj xx ββ −=Ω  
The effect of x on the logit of outcome j versus outcome l is referred to as the contrast and is the 
difference between βj and βl. The interpretation of the contrast can be expressed as a unit change 
in x that results in a change of βj - βl units of the logit of outcome j versus outcome l holding all 
other variables constant.  The probability of choosing among the three options will be examined 
for Louisiana landowners, Arkansas landowners, and for all landowners with a state dummy 
variable.    
4.3.3. Tobit Model and Willingness to Accept  
Responses to the open-ended willingness to accept (WTA) question will produce a 
continuous variable; however, the variable will also be censored since some respondents will not 
allow fee-based recreational access. Thus, the survey data may have a number of zero values for 
the WTA question since landowners not willing to allow fee-based recreation will be recorded as 
a zero value indicating an unwillingness to accept compensation to allow recreational access. 
Including censored observations as zero values in a standard OLS regression model results in 
biased parameter estimates and simply deleting the censored observations can result in a lost of 
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efficiency in estimation (Franses and Paap, 2001). Thus, to avoid such problems this study 
employs a Tobit censored regression model.  
 The relationship between a censored dependent variable and explanatory variables can be 
investigated using a Tobit model. In the Tobit model the censored variable Yi is 0 if the 
unobserved latent variable yi* is positive. The censored regression model or Tobit model and its 


















where yi* represents the WTA value of the ith landowner to allow recreational access and it can 
be interpreted as the value that maximized the landowner’s utility. Values of zero for landowners 
not willing to allow recreational access are not observed as are negative values. Thus the yi is 
observed WTA value for landowners willing to allow recreational access which is censored at 
zero. Survey response to the open-ended willingness to accept question will be modeled as a 
function of independent variables (Xi) representing landowner attributes and land uses. Using 
Tobit censored regression allows for information on landowners not willing to accept 
compensation for recreational access to be included in the model that would otherwise not be 
included.  























The two terms on the right hand side of the equation correspond to the classical regression for 
nonlimit observations and the relevant probabilities for the limit observations, respectively 
(Greene, 2003). Possible independent variables hypothesized to influence a landowners choice 
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may be absentee landowner, personal land use, liability concern, distance of land from home, 
risk preference, past leasing, and demographic variables. The influence of explanatory variables 
on the willingness to accept value  will be examined for the following scenarios (Table 2). 
 
Table 4.2. Applications of the Tobit model for willingness to accept (WTA) under six possible 
scenarios for the dependent variable. 
Choice State RUS 
current law Arkansas modified law 
current law Louisiana modified law 
current law 
WTA 




 CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
5.1. Survey Responses and Empirical Data 
 The survey followed a modified version of the Tailored Design Method (Dillman, 2000) 
to maximize survey response rates.  The process involved four contacts that included a pre-
notification postcard, first mailing of a survey questionnaire, a thank you reminder postcard, and 
a replacement questionnaire sent to all first mailing non-respondents.  The pre-notification 
postcard was sent on July 9, 2007 and was followed by the survey questionnaire that was mailed 
on July 13.  The thank you reminder postcard was mailed a week later on July 20.  All non 
respondents were sent a replacement questionnaire on August 6, 2007.  Surveys received by 
August 24 were tabulated and included in the sample data set.  The final response rate for 
Arkansas landowners was 19.4% and  26.9% for Louisiana landowners yielding an overall 
response rate of 23.1% (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1. Survey response rates from Arkansas and Louisiana Delta landowners. 
 State  
 Louisiana Arkansas Total 
Sample Size for desired level of precision 369 377 746 
Surveys mailed 2,500 2,500 5,000 
First mailing surveys returned 488 343 831 
Second mailing surveys returned 184 142 326 
Total surveys returned 672 485 1157 
First mailing response rate 0.1952 0.1372 0.1662 
Second mailing response rate 0.0736 0.0568 0.0652 
Total response rate (%) 26.88% 19.40% 23.14% 
 
Survey responses for both Arkansas and Louisiana respondents were noted and 
summarized by question.  The response information summarized by question for both Arkansas 
and Louisiana survey versions (See Appendix G and Appendix H).  Also, responses to each 
survey question are depicted graphically indicating responses from both Arkansas and Louisiana 
landowners. (See Appendix I).  A number of statistical tests were conducted to look for 
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relationships and differences between survey questions, regional responses, and first and second 
mailings.  These test included chi-square tests for categorical variable associations, t-tests for 
significant differences between Arkansas and Louisiana responses (Appendix J), and t-test for 
significant differences between first and second mailings for Arkansas and Louisiana responses 
(Appendix J) 
5.2. Descriptive Analysis 
 Within this section responses to each of the survey questions are reported and graphs are 
also presented to aid in the presentation of the results for select questions involving multiple 
response categories.  In addition, t-tests were conducted to determine if there is statistically 
significant difference between Arkansas and Louisiana respondents.  The following descriptive 
analysis reports survey responses by each of the six sections of the survey instrument for both 
Arkansas and Louisiana respondents. 
 5.2.1. Demographics  
 
The majority of survey respondents were male with Arkansas having a higher percentage 
of male respondents at just over 71% (n = 474) while Louisiana respondents were nearly 52% 
male (n = 616).  There was a significant difference at the 5% level between the gender response 
for Arkansas and Louisiana respondents   The average age of survey respondents was also 
significantly different at the 10% level with the average age of Arkansas respondents (n = 464) at 
63.3 years and Louisiana respondents (n = 603) at 61.2 years with a standard deviation in years 
of 13.6 and 14, respectively.  The ethnic background for the vast majority of respondents was 
Caucasian as indicated by 95.5% of Arkansas respondents (n = 468) and by just over 94.2% of 
Louisiana respondents (n = 616) indicating they are Caucasian.  The next largest ethnic group 
was African American at 3.6% for Arkansas and 3.3% for Louisiana.   When respondents 
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indicated their primary occupation, the majority selected the retired option with 37% of Arkansas 



















































































Figure 5.1. Question 51. Choose one category that most closely describes your primary 
occupation. (n=1088) (AR n=472) (LA n=616) (†, ‡, and * indicates statistically significant 
differences between mean values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively) 
 
The next most common occupation was farming with Arkansas reporting 21.8% and Louisiana 
reporting nearly 14% as farming as their primary occupation (Figure 5.1).   The average house 
size was similar for both Arkansas and Louisiana respondents.  The mean number of individuals 
living in a respondents household was 2.08 for Arkansas (n = 407) and 2.13 for Louisiana (n = 
606) with associated standard deviations of 0.96 and 1.01, respectively.   
The highest educational level attained by survey respondents varied by state (Figure 5.2).  
The majority of Arkansas respondents indicated that they had completed high (25.9%), some 
college but no degree (25%), or had completed a bachelor degree (24.2%), while the majority of 
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Louisiana respondents indicated they had completed high school (29.8%), completed a bachelor 






























Figure 5.2. Question 53. Indicate your highest level of education attained. (n=1081) (AR n=471) 
(LA n=610) (* indicates statistically significant differences between mean values at the 10% 
level) 
Of all the demographic questions the question relating to household income was the most 
commonly omitted by survey respondents; however, over 900 respondents answered the question 
(Figure 5.3).  The most common responses of the ten household income options for Arkansas 
respondents was 21.5% indicating $50 to $74.9 thousand and 20.76% in the $100 to $199.9 
thousand range.  For Louisiana respondents the first most common responses was also $50 to 
$74.9 thousand at 19.7%, yet next highest percentage response option was for $35 to $49.9 


















































Figure 5.3. Question 54. Which best describes your annual household income? (n=904) (AR 
n=395) (LA n=509) (‡ and * indicates statistically significant differences between mean values 
at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively) 
 
 
5.2.2. Recreational Use and Land Access Practices 
 
 The majority of respondents indicated that they use their land for their recreational 
purposes with 55.7% of Arkansas (n = 485) and nearly 60% of Louisiana (n = 631) respondents 
answering yes.  When asked to indicate specific recreational activities, various hunting 
categories and ATV riding were the most common (Figure 5.4).  The top three most common 
recreational activities for which survey respondents use their own land differed by state. The 
most common activities for Arkansas respondents was hunting small game (63%), hunting 
migratory bird or waterfowl (53.7%), and hunting big game (52.25), while Louisiana respondents 
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indicated that they used their land for hunting big game (69.4%), hunting small game (63%), and 
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Figure 5.4. Question 2. Do you or any members of your household use your land for any of the 
following recreational purposes? (n=1116) (AR n=485) (LA n=631) (†, ‡, and * indicates 
statistically significant differences between mean values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively) 
 
T-test results for the response categories of hunting big game, hunting small game, hunting 
migratory bird or waterfowl, hunting dove and ATV riding indicate that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the mean value for Arkansas and Louisiana respondents. 
Allowing individuals who are not part of the respondents’ immediate household to use 
their land for recreational purposes is apparently a common practice as 55.7% of Arkansas (n = 
485) and 56.3% of Louisiana (n = 632) respondents indicated that they have granted access.  
When the respondents were asked to classify these individuals 80.8% of Arkansas and 73.9% of 
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Louisiana respondents allowed friends to use their land, which was significantly different at the 
5% level of significance, while only 11.4% of Arkansas and 10.4% of Louisiana respondents had 
allowed individuals they did not know personally to use their land for recreational purposes 
(Figure 5.5).  Common responses for the other category were allowing people who rented or 

























Figure 5.5. Question 4. Please indicate which of the following types of individuals you have 
allowed access to your land for recreational purposes? (n=627) (AR n=271) (LA n=356) (‡ 
indicates statistically significant differences between mean values at the 5% level) 
 
When respondents were asked if they have ever leased their land for hunting or recreational 
access only 11.5% and 11.2% of Arkansas (n = 485) and Louisiana (n = 632) landowners had 
ever leased their land for recreational uses.  
Landowners that have leased their land for hunting or recreational access were asked to 
provide information about revenue and acres leased.   Arkansas landowners (n=11) allowing big 
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game hunting (e.g., deer and/or turkey) reported average lease revenues of $1,362.10 and an 
average 270.8 acres being leased, which is about $5 per acre per year.  Louisiana landowners 
(n=35) on average collected about $7.90 per acre leasing about 344.5 acres on average with lease 
revenues of $2,719.21.   Migratory bird or waterfowl hunting has an average lease value of $20 
per acre with about 430 acres being leased on average for Arkansas landowners (n=28), while 
Louisiana landowners (n=17) generated a higher per acre rate of $34.60 by leasing an average of 
328 acres.  Lease for small game and dove hunting were much less common.  Small game 
reported by Arkansas respondents (n-=2) has an average per acre lease value of $3 and lease size 
of 240 acres.  One Louisiana respondent indicated leasing for small game but did not report any 
values.  Dove hunting in Arkansas (n=2) has an average value per acre lease value of $26 per 
acre with an average of 140 acres leased, and only one respondent in Louisiana reported dove 
leasing at a revenue of $2,000  for 30 acres which is about $67 per acre.  A number of Arkansas 
and Louisiana respondents selected the “other” category for recreation leasing typically listing it 
as big game and waterfowl hunting combined or unspecified hunting.  For Arkansas landowners 
(n=9) the average per acre revenue was about $9.75 with an average acreage of 1,156, and the 
average per acre lease rate was $14 for Louisiana (n=12) with about 630 acres being leased for 
recreational hunting.  
 5.2.3. Risk and Liability Issues  
 The vast majority of landowners are very concerned about liability issues associated with 
allowing people onto their land.  When respondents were asked how much they disagree or agree 
with the statement “I am very concerned about the liability issues associated with allowing 
people on my land,” 75% of Arkansas and 80% of Louisiana respondents indicated that they 
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Figure 5.6. Question 7. I am very concerned about the liability issues associated with allowing 
people on my land. (n=1112) (AR n=482) (LA n=630) († indicates statistically significant 
differences between mean values at the 1% level) 
 
Landowners were asked how much they disagree or agree with the statement “It is possible to 
obtain a written agreement from anyone coming onto my land that would protect me from 
liability.”  The majority of respondents, 41.3% for Arkansas and 40.2% for Louisiana, indicated 
that they were not sure if they disagreed or agreed with the statement (Figure 5.7).  When 
landowners were asked how much they disagree or agree with the statement “If my liability 
concerns were eased I would be much more likely to allow people to use my land for recreational 
purposes,” 44% of Arkansas and 41% of Louisiana respondents indicated that they strongly 
disagreed or somewhat disagreed. (Figure 5.8). 
Respondents continually indicated that they are unsure about liability, insurance, and 
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Figure 5.7. Question 8. It is possible to obtain a written agreement from anyone coming onto my 
land that would protect me from liability. (n=1112) (AR n=482) (LA n=630) (‡ indicates 
statistically significant differences between mean values at the 5% level) 
 
are required by state law to post their land with “no trespassing” signs to protect themselves from 
liability associated with trespassers, 56% of Arkansas (n = 485) and 46.4% of Louisiana (n = 
631) respondents indicated they were unsure, 31.6% of Arkansas and 22.19% of Louisiana 
selected true, and 12.4% of Arkansas and 31.4% of Louisiana respondents selected false.  The 
means values for Arkansas and Louisiana respondents for this question were significantly 
different at the 5% level of significance.  The sizable difference between Arkansas and Louisiana 
respondents selecting false reflects the fact that law regarding the posting of “no trespassing” 
signs was recently changed in Louisiana so that Louisiana landowners do not have to post their 
land to protect themselves from liability associated with trespassers.     
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Figure 5.8. Question 9. If my liability concerns were eased I would by much more likely to allow 
people to use my land for recreational purposes. (n=1113) (AR n=483) (LA n=630) († and * 
indicates statistically significant differences between mean values at the 1% and 10% levels, 
respectively) 
 
landowners from liability claims that may result from recreational use of their land so long as 
they do not charge a fee, 73.7% of Arkansas (n = 483) and 66.2% of Louisiana (n = 631) 
respondents indicated that they were unsure, less than 8% of Arkansas and Louisiana 
respondents knew it to be true, and 19.3% of Arkansas and of Louisiana 25.9% respondents 
incorrectly indicated the statement to be false.  There was a statistically significant difference 
between Arkansas and Louisiana respondents selecting the unsure category. 
Respondents appeared to be better informed about the availability of insurance.  When 
landowners were asked to indicate whether it is true or false that liability insurance is available 
specifically for private landowners who charge a fee for recreational access, 66.1% of Arkansas 
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(n = 480) and 61.8% of Louisiana (n = 631) respondents indicated that they were unsure, 30.9% 
of Arkansas and 34.5% Louisiana respondents correctly selected true, and 2.91% of Arkansas 
and of Louisiana 3.66% respondents indicated the statement to be false. 
Landowners responding to the survey were asked to characterize themselves regarding 
risk in their financial decisions.  Respondents were asked the following question and given three 
response options. “Compared to other landowners you know, how would you characterize 
yourself?  I tend to take on substantial levels of risk in my financial decision.  I tend to avoid risk 
when possible in my financial decisions.  I neither seek nor avoid risk in my financial decisions.”  
The vast majority of respondents indicated they were risk averse at 72% for Arkansas and 75.5% 
for Louisiana (Figure 5.9).  Less than 8% of respondents indicated they are risk seekers and 
19.5% of Arkansas and 15.8% of Louisiana respondents indicated they are risk neutral.     
 5.2.4. Marginal Lands 
 
Ownership of land that was considered to be marginal for agricultural purposes was 
slightly more common among Louisiana landowners as 40.1% of Arkansas (n = 484) and 44.6% 
of Louisiana (n = 632) landowners indicated they own marginal land. The average number of 
acres considered to be marginal by landowners was 108.7 acres for Arkansas (n = 192) and 106.8 
for Louisiana (n = 274) with standard deviations of 169.5 acres and 176.6 acres, respectively.  
When comparing the acreage of marginal land to total land it was observed that Louisiana 
landowners consider more of their land to be marginal for agriculture than do Arkansas 
landowners.  Louisiana landowners believed that 33.3% of their total land was marginal while 
Arkansas landowners only considered 25.2% of their land to be marginal.  When landowners 
were asked how many miles their nearest tract of marginal land is from their home, the average 
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Figure 5.9. Question 13. Compared to other landowners you know, how would you characterized 
yourself? (n=1096) (AR n=477) (LA n=619) 
 
deviations of 248.5 acres and 230.6 acres, respectively.  Landowners were asked to describe their 
marginal land by selecting from four land classifications.  The most common classification for 
marginal land was forested or wooded areas with as indicated by 79.5% of Arkansas and 81.2% 
of Louisiana respondents (Figure 5.10).  Arkansas respondents differed from Louisiana 
respondents as to describing their marginal land as used for row crops or hay production as 
indicated by 38.97% of Arkansas and 23.8% of Louisiana landowners, which was statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance.    
Respondents were asked to describe their current land management practice if any 
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Figure 5.10. Question 17. Could any of the following land classifications be used to describe all 
or part of you marginal land? (n=477) (AR n=195) (LA n=282) (Showing percentage of 
respondents selecting each category) († indicates statistically significant differences between 
mean values at the 1% level) 
 
and Louisiana respondents followed by leasing the land as reported by 23.1% and 21.63 of 
Arkansas and Louisiana question respondents. There was a statistically significant difference at 
the 5% level of significant between Arkansas and Louisiana landowners that used hired 
professional to manage their land with the practice apparently being more common in Arkansas. 
When asked on average how often do you visit or check on your marginal land, the most 
common response was weekly as selected by 46.7% and 44.1% or Arkansas and Louisiana 
respondents with the percentage declining as the time option increased (Figure 5.12).  
Landowners were asked what dollar amount they could get per acre if they were to sell their 






























Figure 5.11. Question 18. Which of these best described your current land management?  
(n=477) (AR n=195) (LA n=282) (‡ indicates statistically significant differences between mean 
values at the 5% level) 
 
Louisiana landowners.  The mean response for Arkansas landowners (n = 154) was $1,368.50 
with a standard deviation of $957, and the mean response for Louisiana landowners (n = 193) 
was $1,277.41 with a standard deviation of $902.33.   
 5.2.5. Fee Based Recreational Use of Land 
Landowners were asked if they would be willing to allow people to pay them a fee to 
access their land for recreational purposes.  Only 14.2% of Arkansas (n = 485) and 14.1% of 
Louisiana (n=632) landowners indicated they would allow recreational access with the remainder 
indicating no.  Respondents indicating they would allow recreational access were then asked how 
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Figure 5.12. Question 19. On average how often do you visit or check on your marginal land? 
(n=476) (AR n=195) (LA n=281) 
 
land for recreational purposes.  The mean response was $279.25 for Arkansas (n = 56) and 
$175.99 for Louisiana (n = 69) with standard deviations of $1.349.05 and $551.30, respectively 
which was significantly different at the 5% level of significance.  Each respondent was then 
asked to indicate how certain they are, on a scale of 0% to 100%, about the dollar value they 
specified to allow fee-based recreational access (Figure 5.13).  The most common response was 
the 50% with certainty level with the 80% and 100% certainty level being the second most 
common for Louisiana and Arkansas respondents, respectively.     
For respondents that indicated they were less than 80% certain about accepting the dollar 
value, they were asked to provide a dollar amount that they would be at least 80% of accepting.  
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Figure 5.13. Question 23. How certain are you that you would accept the dollar value you 
indicated in the previous question? (Question 22)? (n=125) (AR n=56) (LA n=69) 
 
of $88.65, and the mean dollar value for Louisiana respondents (n = 36) was $163.72 with a 
standard deviation of $362.69.  These values were used to adjust willingness to accept values for 
analysis that respondents were at least 80% certain of accepting.      
Survey participants were presented with a hypothetical describing a change to state law.  
The current Arkansas and Louisiana recreational use statute was described and respondents were 
asked if current law were changed to allow landowners to charge a fee for recreational use of 
their land and keep the liability protection afforded to free access granting landowners would 
they then allow people to pay them a fee for recreational use of their land.  The number of 
respondents saying yes was 20.62% of Arkansas respondents (n = 485) and 23.93% of Louisiana 
respondents (n = 632).  When asked how much money per acre they would be willing to accept if 
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the law was amended, the mean was $210.11 for Arkansas (n = 87) and $132.76 for Louisiana (n 
= 126) with associated standard deviations of $1,083.57 and $430.79.  Again, respondents were 













Figure 5.14. Question 27. How certain are you that you would accept the dollar value you 
indicated in the previous question? (n=213) (AR n=87) (LA n=126) 
 
The most common response was 80% certainty with 100% and 50% certainty being the second 
most common response for Arkansas and Louisiana respondents, respectively.  Respondents 
selecting a certain level less than 80% were again asked to consider a dollar value they would be 
at least 80% sure of accepting.  The mean dollar value for Arkansas respondents (n = 33) was 
$369.64 with a standard deviation of $792.59, and the mean dollar value for Louisiana 
respondents (n = 50) was $106.92 with a standard deviation of $191.63, and these mean values 
were significantly different at the 5% level of significance. 
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For respondents indicating that they would allow fee-based recreation, they were asked to 
estimate how many acres of land they would be willing to use for such purposes.  The mean 
number of acres was 259.3 for Arkansas (n = 94) and 256.6 for Louisiana (n = 137) with an 
associated standard deviation of 419.3 and 494.4 acres, respectively.  Respondents indicating that 
they would allow fee-based recreation were asked to indicate the types of recreational uses that 
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Figure 5.15. Question 30. Which of the following recreational activities would you NOT allow 
on you land? (n=247) (AR n=96) (LA n=151)  
 
The most common two activities that landowners would not allow were ATV riding as indicated 
by 53.1% of Arkansas and 53% of Louisiana respondents and camping as indicated by 39.58% 
of Arkansas and 32.67% of Louisiana respondents.  The vast majority of landowners indicated a 
preference for managing fee-based recreation independently at 58.8% for Arkansas and 57% for 
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Louisiana respondents as opposed to using an outfitter or managing cooperatively with other area 



















Figure 5.16. Question. 31. If you are interested in offering recreational opportunities on your 
land, which of the following management formats would you prefer? (n=241) (AR n=97) (LA 
n=144) 
 
5.2.6. Current Land Uses 
 
 Respondents were asked if they had ever worked with their adjacent or local landowners 
in any way such as fence maintenance or crop dusting.  Only 28.4% of Arkansas (n = 482) and 
25.8% of Louisiana (n = 629) respondents had worked with their adjacent or local landowners.  
Of the respondents having worked with other landowners, 96.4% of Arkansas (n = 138) and 95% 
of Louisiana (n = 162) respondents indicated that they found such cooperation to be effective.  
Landowners were also asked if they had ever been involved with a cooperative.  More Arkansas 
landowners (31.3%, n = 482) than Louisianan landowners (14.2%, n = 629) indicated that they 
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have participated with a cooperative, which was significantly different at the 1% level of 
significance, and of that number 91.5% of Arkansas (n = 152) and 96.6% of Louisiana (n = 87) 
landowners indicated that their involvement was beneficial to them.         
 Participation in government conservation programs such as the Conservation Reserve 
Program and Wetland Reserve Program appear to be more common among Louisiana 
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Figure 5.17. Question 36. Have you ever enrolled land in a government conservation program 
such as the Conservation Reserve Program or Wetland Reserve Program? (n=1109) (AR n=480) 
(LA n=631) († indicates statistically significant differences between mean values at the 1% 
level) 
 
 Arkansas respondents on average own more individual tracts of land than do Louisiana 
landowners.  The mean number of tracts was 2.68 for Arkansas landowners (n = 462) with a 
standard deviation of 3.85, and the mean number of tracts was 2.07 for Louisiana landowners (n 
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= 608) with a standard deviation of 2.08.  The difference in the mean number of tracts is 
significantly different at the 1% level of significance.  More Louisiana landowners (43.2%, n = 
613) indicated that their nearest tract of non-residential land was adjacent to their primary 
residence as compared to Arkansas landowners (34.5%, n = 473), which was significantly 
different at the 1% level of significance.  Landowners indicated that their nearest tract of land not 
adjacent to their primary residence was 86.8 miles on average for Arkansas landowners (n = 465) 
with a standard deviation of 255.7 while the average distance was 70.3 miles for Louisiana 
landowners (n = 602) with a standard deviation of 238.1 miles.  The mean volume of land owned 
was greater for Arkansas respondents than for Louisiana and significantly different at the 5% 
level of significance.  The mean total acreage was 432.1 for Arkansas (n = 465) and 324.8 for 
Louisiana (n = 601) with standard deviations of 835.5 and 634.1, respectively.  The length of 
landownership was similar with the average being 27.4 years for Arkansas (n = 474) and 28 for 
Louisiana (n = 610) with an associated standard deviation of 31.4 and 22.6 years, respectively. 
 The most common ownership structure was single ownership with joint ownership being 
second most common (Figure 5.18).  Single ownership was indicated by 53.1% of Arkansas 
respondents followed closely by 45.4% for joint ownership, while single ownership was 
indicated by 64.2% of Louisiana respondents with only 36.9% of Louisiana respondents also 
indicating they owned land through joint ownership. 
 The manner in which landowners acquired their land was very similar across states with 
55.8% of Arkansas respondents indicating that they had acquired land by purchasing it and an 
additional 46.1% of Arkansas respondents indicating they had acquired land through inheritance 
(Figure 5.19).  As noted this was also characteristic of Louisiana landowners as 55.2% of 
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Figure 5.18. Question 42. How is the ownership of your land organized? (n=1105) (AR n=482) 
(LA n=623) (Showing percentage of respondents selecting each category) († and ‡ indicates 
statistically significant differences between mean values at the 1% and 5% levels) 
 
Very few respondents indicated that they had acquired land through marriage or other means.  
Respondents that selected other indicated that the land was gifted to them.       
More Arkansas landowners (81.7%, n = 485) indicated they used at least some of their 
land for agricultural production of row crops as compared with Louisiana landowners (57.4%, n 
= 631) which was significantly different at the 1% level of significance.  The types of 
agricultural row crops historically produced on land owned by survey respondents varied by state 
and the majority were significantly different. (Figure 5.20). 
Of the Arkansas respondents the top three most common row crops were soybeans 
(89.5%), wheat (63%), and rice (59.3%).  Among Louisiana respondents the most common row 
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Figure 5.19. Question 43. How did you acquire the majority of you non residence, non 
commercial land? (n=1100) (AR n=477) (LA n=623) (Showing percentage of respondents 
selecting each category) 
 
respondents indicated that they had leased at least some of their land for agricultural uses with 
respondents from both states indicating at similar affirmative rates at 66.8% for Arkansas (n = 
482) and 67.4% for Louisiana (n = 632).  
 Landowners were asked to indicate if they owned land for any number of specific 
reasons.  They were asked to select any that applied to them and indicate if they owned land for 
any other reasons not listed (Figure 5.21).  The most common reasons for owning land given by 
Arkansas respondents were leasing to others (36.2%), to provide a place for wildlife (29.1%), 
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Figure 5.20. Question 45. Which of the following agricultural crops are historically produced on 
your land? (n=764) (AR n=400) (LA n=364) (Showing percentage of respondents selecting each 
category) († indicates statistically significant differences between mean values at the 1% level) 
 
Louisiana respondents indicated that they owned land to provide a place for wildlife (32.9%), for 
timber production (31.4%), and for leasing to others (29.8%).  Some of the most common 
reasons that were listed by respondents for the other category were farming and to provide a 
source of income.  The least common reason selected for owning land was the same for both 
Arkansas and Louisiana respondents which was to provide recreational access for others as 
indicated 4.96% and 4.3% of Arkansas and Louisiana respondents, respectively.   
5.3. Cross-Reference Analysis 
A cross-reference analysis was used to examine possible relationships between various 
categorical variables.  This analysis utilized the chi-square test to determine if a statistically 


















































Figure 5.21. Question 47. Do you own land for any of the following reasons? (n=1116) (AR 
n=484) (LA n=632) (Showing percentage of respondents selecting each category) († and ‡ 
indicates statistically significant differences between mean values at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively) 
 
As noted in the descriptive analysis 14.2% and 14.1% of Arkansas and Louisiana 
landowners indicated that they would be willing to allow fee-based recreation.  Additionally, if 
the recreational use statue were modified the percentage of Arkansas and Louisiana landowners 
willing to allow fee-based recreation was 20.62% and 23.9%, respectively.  The decision to 
allow fee-based recreation could be associated with a number of possible factors.  Associations 
between the decision to allow recreation by Arkansas landowners under the current recreational 
use statue and other categorical variables was examined (Table 5.2) 
Results indicate failure to reject the null hypothesis of no association between the decision to 
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Table 5.2. A summary of chi-square tests for landowners that would allow recreation under 
Arkansas' current Recreational Use Statute cross-referenced with other variables.  
Variables  Obs. DF 
Chi-
square Probability  
Landowners that would allow Recreation under Arkansas' current 
Recreational Use Statute by:          
Possible to obtain a written agreement that would protect me from 
liability.  478 4 8.5809 0.072 * 
If  liability concerns  eased, much more likely to allow recreation 477 4 63.0448 0.000 † 
Liability insurance is available for landowners who charge a fee for 
recreational access. 480 1 7.1409 0.008 † 
Compared to other landowners, how would you characterize yourself 
regarding risk? 470 2 18.6269 0.000 † 
Would you consider any of your land to be "marginal" for agricultural 
purposes?  484 1 16.5676 0.000 † 
Have you ever worked with any of your adjacent or local landowners in 
any way?  482 1 4.5379 0.033 ‡ 
Have you ever been involved with a cooperative?  482 1 8.4772 0.004 † 
Have you ever enrolled land in a government conservation program?           
      yes 478 1 14.0019 0.000 † 
      I don’t know what these are 480 1 6.5338 0.011 ‡ 
How is the ownership of your land organized?          
      corporation 482 1 13.2099 0.000 † 
      limited liability corporation 482 1 23.6745 0.000 † 
      joint ownership 482 1 2.7515 0.097 * 
      single ownership 482 1 0.7635 0.382  
How did you acquire the majority of you non residential land?           
      inherited  477 1 0.0463 0.830  
      by marriage 477 1 0.0517 0.820  
      by purchasing 477 1 3.8864 0.049 ‡ 
      other 477   0.5106 0.475  
Which best describes your annual household income? 387 9 23.2591 0.006 † 
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 
10% level,   
 
allow fee-based recreation and the following variables.  There was an association with the belief 
that it was possible to obtain a written agreement that would protect landowners that were unsure 
or somewhat agree and the decision to allow fee-base recreation.  The chi-square test suggested 
that there was a strong association with the decision to allow fee-base recreation and with the 
easing of liability concerns, risk preference and the ownership of marginal land and the decision 
to allow fee-base recreation.  An association was also indicated if landowners had experience 
with cooperatives, working with adjacent landowners, having enrolled land in government 
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programs or being unfamiliar with such programs, and household income.  Lastly, there was also 
an association with certain land ownership structures and the manner in which land was 
acquired.    
Associations between the decision to allow recreation by Louisiana landowners under the 
current recreational use statue and other categorical variables was examined (Table 5.3) 
Table 5.3. A summary of chi-square tests for landowners that would allow recreation under 
Louisiana’s current Recreational Use Statute cross-referenced with other variables.  
Variables  Obs. DF 
Chi-
square Probability  
Landowners that would allow Recreation under Arkansas' current 
Recreational Use Statute by:          
Possible to obtain a written agreement that would protect me from 
liability.  628 4 9.8203 0.044 ‡ 
If  liability concerns  eased, much more likely to allow recreation 628 4 69.7133 0.000 † 
Liability insurance is available for landowners who charge a fee for 
recreational access. 629 1 22.2772 0.000 † 
Compared to other landowners, how would you characterize yourself 
regarding risk? 610 2 38.2884 0.000 † 
Would you consider any of your land to be "marginal" for agricultural 
purposes?  632 1 12.3693 0.000 † 
Have you ever worked with any of your adjacent or local landowners in 
any way?  629 1 6.0216 0.014 † 
Have you ever been involved with a cooperative?  629 1 3.3484 0.067 * 
Have you ever enrolled land in a government conservation program?           
      yes 627 1 30.0472 0.000 † 
      I don’t know what these are 626 1 0.4917 0.483 ‡ 
Is your nearest tract of non-residential land adjacent to your primary 
residence?  613 1 6.5924 0.010 † 
How is the ownership of your land organized?          
      corporation 623 1 0.3344 0.953  
      limited liability corporation 623 1 14.4884 0.000 † 
      joint ownership 623 1 1.4887 0.222 † 
      single ownership 623 1 1.5086 0.219  
How did you acquire the majority of you non residential land?           
      inherited  623 1 0.3482 0.555  
      by marriage 623 1 0.0907 0.763  
      by purchasing 623 1 1.2506 0.263 † 
      other 623 1 0.8401 0.359  
Indicate your highest level of education attained. 559 6 13.3117 0.038 ‡ 
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 
10% level,   
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Results indicate all of the same associations for Louisiana landowners under the current 
recreational use statue that were observed for Arkansas landowners with only two exceptions.  
For Louisiana landowners there is a strong association between allowing fee-based recreation 
and landowners’ nearest tract of non-residential land being adjacent to their primary residence.  
Also, for Louisiana landowners, there is an association between education and the decision to 
allow fee-based recreation and not with income as was the case for Arkansas landowners.    
 To examine any possible association that may exist between the decision to allow fee-
based recreation under a modified recreational use statute and other variables in the survey the 
chi-square test was conducted for both Arkansas and Louisiana respondents (Table 5.4 and 5.5).   
Table 5.4. A summary of chi-square tests for landowners that would allow recreation under an 
amended Arkansas Recreational Use Statute cross-referenced with other variables.  
Variables  Obs. DF 
Chi-
square Probability  
Landowners that would allow under an amended Louisiana 
Recreational Use Statute by:     
Possible to obtain a written agreement that would protect me from 
liability.  475 4 10.7278 0.030 ‡ 
If  liability concerns  eased, much more likely to allow recreation 474 4 85.2645 0.000 † 
Liability insurance is available for landowners who charge a fee for 
recreational access. 477 1 6.3556 0.012 † 
Compared to other landowners, how would you characterized yourself 
regarding risk? 482 1 303.5195 0.000 † 
Would you consider any of your land to be "marginal" for agricultural 
purposes?  481 1 21.6704 0.000 † 
Would you be willing to let people pay you a fee to access your land 
for recreational purposes? 482 1 303.5195 0.000 † 
Have you ever worked with any of your adjacent or local landowners in 
any way?  479 1 7.0909 0.008 † 
Have you ever been involved with a cooperative?  479 1 14.2425 0.000 † 
Have you ever enrolled land in a government conservation program?           
      yes 475 1 13.8804 0.000 † 
      I don’t know what these are 477 1 7.4096 0.006 † 
How is the ownership of your land organized?          
      corporation 479 1 10.4942 0.001 † 




Table 5.4 (continued) 
Variables  Obs. DF 
Chi-
square Probability  
      limited liability corporation 479 1 17.3606 0.000 † 
      joint ownership 479 1 0.8961 0.344  
      single ownership 479 1 0.0099 0.921  
Your gender (female = 1, male=0) 471 1 2.9383 0.087 * 
Which best describes your annual household income? 385 9 19.4351 0.022 ‡ 
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% 
level 
 
There is a strong association between the decision to allow fee-based recreation by Louisiana 
landowners under the modified recreation use statute and the decision to allow it under the 
current use statute.  All of the associations that exist for Louisiana landowners and the decision 
to allow fee-based recreation as noted previously remain, with one omission.  There was no 
significant association with the belief that it was possible to obtain a written agreement that 
would protect landowners from liability.    
Table 5.5. A summary of chi-square tests for landowners that would allow recreation under an 
amended Louisiana Recreational Use Statute cross-referenced with other variables.  
Variables  Obs. DF 
Chi-
square Probability  
Landowners that would allow under an amended Louisiana 
Recreational Use Statute by:          
If  liability concerns  eased, much more likely to allow recreation 625 4 91.8746 0.000 † 
Liability insurance is available for landowners who charge a fee for 
recreational access. 626 1 24.0223 0.000 † 
Compared to other landowners, how would you characterize yourself 
regarding risk? 607 2 25.9469 0.000 † 
Would you consider any of your land to be "marginal" for agricultural 
purposes?  629 1 18.3037 0.000 † 
Would you be willing to let people pay you a fee to access your land 
for recreational purposes? 629 1 311.2199 0.000 † 
Have you ever worked with any of your adjacent or local landowners in 
any way?  626 1 3.4915 0.062 * 
Have you ever been involved with a cooperative?  626 1 3.5131 0.061 * 
Have you ever enrolled land in a government conservation program?           
      yes 624 1 34.6005 0.000 † 
      I don’t know what these are 623 1 0.1516 0.697  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% 
level  
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
Variables  Obs. DF 
Chi-
square Probability  
Is your nearest tract of non-residential land adjacent to your primary 
residence?  610 1 3.8484 0.050 ‡ 
How is the ownership of your land organized?          
      corporation 620 1 0.3684 0.544  
      limited liability corporation 620 1 9.5681 0.002 † 
      joint ownership 620 1 0 0.995  
      single ownership 620 1 1.1008 0.294  
How did you acquire the majority of you non residential land?           
      inherited  620 1 0.704 0.401  
      by marriage 620 1 0.3903 0.532  
      by purchasing 620 1 2.6248 0.105 * 
      other 620 1 1.5946 0.207  
Indicate your highest level of education attained. 596 6 12.738 0.047 ‡ 
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% 
level  
 
5.4. First and Second Mailing Respondents 
Independent sample t-tests was used to compare the mean responses of first and second 
mailing responses to see if there was a significant difference.  T-tests were performed for both 
Arkansas and Louisiana respondents (Appendix J).  Of particular interest are any differences in 
responses to the demographic questions.  There were only four demographic questions that were 
significantly different between first and second mailings for Louisiana respondents. (Table 5.6).    
Table 5.6. A summary of t-tests for differences between mean values of demographic variables 
for first and second mailings sent to Louisiana landowners. 
 first mailings second mailings    
Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean 
Std. 
Dev. t-value  p-value  
healthcare 438 0.0479 0.2139 178 0.0112 0.1057 2.1832 0.0294 ‡ 
high school graduate 437 0.2632 0.4409 173 0.3815 0.4872 -2.8992 0.0039 † 
graduate or professional degree 437 0.1968 0.3980 173 0.1272 0.3341 2.0343 0.0424 ‡ 
$100K to $149.9K 373 0.1689 0.3752 136 0.1103 0.3144 1.6252 0.1047 * 
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 
10% level  
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For Arkansas respondents the number of differences in responses to the demographic questions 
that were significantly different between first and second mailings was higher (Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7. A summary of t-tests for differences between mean values of demographic variables 
for first and second mailings sent to Arkansas landowners. 
 first mailings second mailings    
Variables  obs mean 
Std. 
Dev. obs mean 
Std. 
Dev. t-value  p-value  
Your age in years 329 62.1155 13.7935 135 66.141 12.7807 -2.9155 0.0037 † 
African American 334 0.0269 0.1622 134 0.0597 0.2378 -1.7138 0.0872 * 
healthcare 336 0.0387 0.1931 136 0.0000 0.0000 2.3346 0.0200 ‡ 
less than high school 336 0.0625 0.2424 135 0.1407 0.3490 -2.7709 0.0058 † 
high school graduate 336 0.2262 0.4190 135 0.3407 0.4757 -2.5786 0.0102 † 
bachelor degree 336 0.2798 0.4496 135 0.1481 0.3566 3.0386 0.0025 † 
graduate or professional degree 336 0.1637 0.3705 135 0.0741 0.2629 2.5622 0.0107 † 
less than $10K 290 0.0069 0.0829 105 0.0286 0.1674 -1.7042 0.0891 * 
$15K to $24.9K 290 0.0862 0.2812 105 0.1810 0.3868 -2.6610 0.0081 † 
$75K to $99.9K 290 0.1207 0.3263 105 0.0571 0.2332 1.8325 0.0676 * 
$100K to $149.9K 290 0.2310 0.4222 105 0.1429 0.3516 1.9128 0.0565 * 
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 
10% level  
 
5.5. Willingness to Accept and Transaction Cost  
To improve the quality of the willingness to accept analysis, survey respondents were 
asked to gauge their certainty as to the value they indicated they would be willing to accept.  If 
respondents indicated less than 80% certainty, they were asked to indicate a dollar value they 
would be at least 80% certain of accepting.  The willingness to accept values for both contingent 
valuation questions in the survey instrument were adjusted to reflect values that respondents are 
at least 80% certain of accepting.  Survey response for the willingness to accept questions had 
values that ranged from $5 to $10,000 per acre; however, values in the several thousand dollars 
were uncommon occurrences.  Outliers were identified as values that were greater than the mean 
WTA value plus the two standard deviations.   
 It was hypothesized that an institutional change that reduced the liability to landowners 
willing to allow fee-based recreation would reduce the transaction cost associated with liability 
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borne by the landowner.  The mean willingness to accept values were compared by state and by 
response category to examine if a hypothetical institutional change could reduce the transaction 
cost associated with fee-based recreation (Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8. Willingness to accept (WTA) values by state and by variable indicating level of 
significance for difference between mean values by state and indicating change by variable. 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Variables  obs mean 
Std. 





Current RUS WTA 64 $107.98 $187.89 53 $97.36 $83.46 0.3815 0.7035  
Amended RUS WTA 122 $91.58 $154.35 80 $115.91 $149.24 -1.1101 0.2683  
Amended only RUS WTA 58 $61.74 $69.58 25 $160.20 $222.99 -3.0555 0.003 †
Change for Ammended   -$16.40 -$33.54   $18.55 $65.78      
Change for Ammended only   -$46.24 -$118.31   $62.84 $139.53      
† indicates significant differences between mean values at the 1% level  
 
The change in mean willingness to accept if negative may be attributable to reduced transaction 
cost associated with liability mitigation that is achieved by an institutional change.  The change 
was negative for Louisiana respondents; however, the change in willingness to accept was 
positive for Arkansas.  A more telling indicator of possible reduced transaction costs is obtained 
by examining the change in willingness to accept for respondents willing to allowing fee-based 
recreation under both the current and modified recreational use statues (Table 5.9).   
Table 5.9. Willingness to accept (WTA) values by state and by variable for respondents 
answering both of the WTA questions associated with the current and amended recreational use 
statute by state indicating level of significance for difference between mean values by state and 
indicating change by variable. 
  Louisiana Arkansas   
Variables  obs mean 
Std. 
Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value 
 p-
value 
Current RUS WTA 63 $109.30 $189.10 53 $97.36 $83.46 0.426 0.6709 
Amended RUS WTA 63 $104.63 $166.51 53 $98.87 $72.36 0.2227 0.8241 
Change in WTA  -$4.67 -$22.59  $1.51 -$11.10   
 
The change in mean willingness to accept again is negative for Louisiana and positive for 
Arkansas; however, the change in standard deviation for Arkansas is negative.   
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5.6. Econometric Results 
5.6.1. Variable Definitions 
There are five variables that are of interest as dependent variables for this analysis.  These 
include the yes/no decision to allow fee-based recreation under the current and modified 
recreational use statutes, the willingness to accept compensation to allow fee-based recreation 
under the current and modified recreational use statutes, and landowners’ preferred management 
regime to manage for fee-based recreation.    
ACCESSCUR is a dummy variable for the yes or no decision to allow fee-based recreation under 
the current recreational use statute.  Respondents were asked “would you be willing to let 
people pay you a fee to access your land for recreational purposes?”   
ACCESSAMEND is a dummy variable for the yes or no decision to allow fee-based recreation 
under the amended recreational use statute.  Respondents were asked if they would allow 
fee-based recreation if the current law were changed to allow landowners to charge a fee 
and keep the liability protection afforded to landowners that allow use of their land for 
free. 
WTACURRENT is a continuous variable for the open-ended willingness to accept question 
relating to the yes/no question to allow fee-based recreation under the current recreational 
use statute.  Respondents were asked how much money per acre they would be willing to 
accept each year to allow someone to lease your land for recreational uses.   
WTAAMENDED is a continuous variable for the open-ended willingness to accept question 
relating to the yes/no question to allow fee-based recreation under the amended 
recreational use statute.  The question asked how much how much money per acre they 
would be willing to accept each year to allow someone to lease your land for recreational 
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uses if current law changed to allow landowners to charge a fee and avoid liability claims 
related to recreational use of their land. 
MGTCHOICE is a categorical variable indicating the respondents preferred management choice 
for fee-based recreational use of their land.  The choices were coded as 1 = 
independently, 2 = cooperatively, 3 = outfitter, and 4 = no choice for all respondents not 
willing to offer fee-based recreation.   
 The previously described dependent variables may be influenced by a number of possible 
explanatory or independent variables.  These variables include categorical variables coded as 
dummy variables and continuous variables. 
STATE is a dummy variable indicating if a respondent owns land in Louisiana or Arkansas.  The 
variables are coded as 1 = Louisiana and  0 = Arkansas.  The effect of state on the 
decision to allow fee-based recreation is unknown; however, it is possible that landowner 
views may differ by state.  
PERSONALUSE is a dummy variable indicating if landowners or members of their household 
use their land for recreational purposes.  It is hypothesized that landowners who use their 
land for personal recreational use would be less willing to lease their lands for recreation.  
FRIENDSFAMILY is a dummy variable indicating if landowners allow individuals who are not 
part of their household to use their land for recreational purposes.  A negative 
relationship is expected between use by FRIENDSFAMILY and the decision to allow 
fee-based recreation.  
LEASEDREC is a dummy variable indicating if landowners have ever leased their land for 
recreational access or use.  A positive relationship is expected between previous leasing 
of land for recreation and the decision to allow fee-based recreation. 
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LIABILITYCONCERN  is a categorical variable for landowner concern regarding liability 
issues associated with allowing people on their land.  Response options included strongly 
disagree, somewhat disagree, not sure, somewhat agree, and strongly agree.  A negative 
relationship is expected with liability concern and the decision to allow fee-based 
recreation.      
WRITTENAGREE is a categorical variable for landowner belief that it is possible to obtain a 
written agreement from anyone coming onto their land that would protect them from 
liability.  Response options included strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, not sure, 
somewhat agree, and strongly agree.  Landowners that believe that a written agreement 
protects them form liability may be more likely to allow fee-based recreation access.  
CONCERNEASED is a categorical variable indicating how much more likely landowners would 
be willing to allow people to use their land for recreational purposes if their liability 
concerns were eased.  Response options included strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, 
not sure, somewhat agree, and strongly agree.  A negative relationship is expected 
between the decision to allow fee-based recreation and disagreeing with liability concerns 
eased. 
NOTRESSPASS is a dummy variable indicating whether landowners are sure or unsure about 
state law dealing with the posting of land with “no trespassing” signs.  Perhaps 
landowners that are more sure of the legal issues associated land access would be more 
likely to allow fee-based recreational access.      
RUSPROTECTS is a dummy variable indicating whether landowners are sure or unsure about 
state recreational use statute.  A negative relationship is expected between being unsure 
about the recreational use statute and the decision to allow fee-based recreational access.   
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INSURACEKNOW is a dummy variable indicating whether landowners are sure or unsure about 
the availability of commercial liability insurance for private landowners who charge a fee 
for recreational use of their land.  A negative relationship is expected between being 
unsure and the decision to allow fee-based recreational access.    
RISKPREFERENCE is a categorical variable for landowner risk preference.  Respondents were 
asked to characterize themselves regarding risk in their financial decisions as compared 
to other landowners they know.  Response options included tend to take to take on 
substantial levels, tend to avoid, neither seek nor avoid risk in my financial decisions.  A 
negative relationship is expected between being risk averse and the decision to allow fee-
based recreational access.    
MARGINALLAND is a dummy variable for ownership of land that is marginal for agricultural 
purposes.  It is hypothesized that owners of marginal land would be more likely to allow 
fee-based recreational access.   
MARGINALACRES is a continuous variable for the number of acres that are marginal for 
agricultural purposes.  It is hypothesized that owners of larger amounts marginal land 
would be more likely to allow fee-based recreational access.       
LANDOWNERCOOPER is a dummy variable indicating if respondents have ever cooperated or 
worked with any of their adjacent or local landowners in any way.  A positive effect is 
expected between the choice of using a cooperative form of fee-based recreational 
management and past cooperation with local landowners.     
COOPERATIVE is a dummy variable indicating if landowners have ever been involved with a 
cooperative.  A positive effect is expected between the choice of using a cooperative 
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form of fee-based recreational management and past involvement with agricultural 
cooperatives. 
CONSERVATION is a dummy variable indicating if landowners have ever enrolled land in a 
government conservation program such as the Conservation Reserve Program or Wetland 
Reserve Program.  A positive effect is expected between the decision to allow fee-based 
recreational access and involvement in alternative land application such as land 
conservation programs. 
TRACTS is a continuous variable for the number of separate tracts of non-residential land that is 
owned.  A positive effect is expected between the number tracts owned and the decision 
to allow fee-based recreation.  
ADJACENT is a dummy variable indicating if a respondent’s nearest tract of non residential 
land is adjacent to their primary residence.  A negative effect is expected between land 
being adjacent to a primary residence and the willingness to allow fee-based recreation.  
DISTANCE is a continuous variable for the number of miles the landowners’ primary residence 
is from their nearest tract of land not adjacent to their primary residence.  A positive 
effect is expected between distance from home and the decision to allow fee-based 
recreation.  
TOTALACREAGE is a continuous variable for the total number of all tracts of land.  Larger 
landowners may be more willing to generate revenue to help offset property taxes.  Thus, 
a positive effect is expected between total acres and allowing fee-based recreation. 
YEARSOWNERSHIP is a continuous variable for the number of years respondents have been a 
land owner.  A negative effect is expected between allowing fee-based recreation and the 
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length of time an individual has been a landowner given that longer tenured landowners 
may be less willing to adopt new practices.  
OWNERSHIP is a categorical variable indicating how the ownership of respondents land is 
organized.  Response options included land ownership organized as a corporation, limited 
liability corporation, joint ownership, and single ownership. Certain ownership categories 
of single ownership is expected to have a positive effect while the joint ownership is 
expected to be negative reflecting multiple parities to decision making.   
ACQUIRE is a categorical variable indicating how landowners acquired the majority of their 
non-residential land.  Response options included acquiring land by inheritance, marriage, 
purchasing, and by other means that the respondent could list.  Inheritance is expected to 
have a negative effect and purchasing a positive effect each reflect less or more 
involvement with land interest.  
ROWCROPS is a dummy variable indicating if land is used for agricultural production of row 
crops.  A negative relationship is expected between land allowing fee-based recreation 
and having productive land.  
COTTON is a dummy variable indicating if land is used for cotton production.  A chi-square test 
suggested that there was a strong association with the decision to allow fee-based 
recreation and with cotton production.  
LEASEDFORAG is a dummy variable indicating if land has ever been leased for agricultural 
uses.  The effect may be negative since landowners are already generating revenue from 
their land through agricultural applications.    
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HAYLAND is a dummy variable indicating if land is owned for hay production.  It is expected 
to have a negative effect on allowing fee-based recreation since the land is used for a 
specific purpose of producing hay.   
LIVESTOCKLAND is a dummy variable indicating if land is owned for raising livestock.  A 
negative effect is expected since most recreational activities involve hunting and firearms 
near livestock may be undesirable.   
GENDER is a dummy variable indicating if the respondent is male or female.  The effect of 
gender is unknown.  
AGE is a continuous variable for age by number of years.  The effect of age is unknown; 
however, older landowners may be less willing to adopt new practices.  
ETHNIC is a dummy variable indicating landowners’ ethnic background.  The effect of ethnicity 
is unknown.    
OCUPATION is a dummy variable indicating if landowners’ primary occupation is farming.  It 
is expected that farmers may be less willing to allow recreation is since they already use 
their land to generate revenue.  
EDUCATION is a categorical variable indicating respondents’ level of education.  Response 
options range from less than high school to graduate level education.  It is expected that 
better educated respondents may be more willing to allow fee-based recreation following 
an institutional change.   
INCOME is a categorical variable indicating respondents’ level of annual household income.  
Response options range from less than $10,000 to $200,000 or more.  The effect of 
income is unknown. 
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 5.6.2. Description of Variables 
The previously defined variables were used in a number of econometric models including 
probits, tobits, and multinomial logits.  These dependent and independent variables are further 
described and their mean and standard deviation values are presented in table 5.10. 
5.6.3. Probit Model for Decision to Allow Access 
 Probit models were used to analyze the probability for the yes/no decision to allow fee-
based recreation under both the current and a modified recreational use statutes for Louisiana, 
Arkansas, and for both regions combined.  Probit parameter estimates and marginal effects for 
the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the current recreational use statue for 
Arkansas and Louisiana landowners are presented in table 5.11.  Results indicate that the 
estimated coefficient for STATE is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and suggests that the 
decision to allow fee-based recreation is influenced by location of landownership.  The marginal 
effect for STATE implies that Louisiana landowners have a 4% lower probability of allowing 
fee-based recreation. The two variables indicating landowner disagreement 
(CONCERNEASED2) or agreement (CONCERNEASED3) with the statement “If my liability 
concerns were eased I would be more likely to allow recreational use of my land” are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level and are negative and positive in sign, respectively.  Being unsure 
about the availability of commercial liability insurance (INSURACEKNOW) has a negative 
effect on the decision to allow fee-based recreation, is significant at the 0.01 level, and 
landowners induce a decrease in the event probability of allowing fee based recreation by 0.07.  
The two dummy variables for risk preference given by RISKPREFERENCE1, indicating risk 
seeking behavior, and RISKPREFERENCE2, indicating risk averse behavior, have both a 
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Table 5.10. Description of variables. 
Variable  Description Combined Arkansas Louisiana 







ACCESSCURRENT Access allow under current RUS (1=yes) 0.141 0.349 0.142 0.350 0.141 0.348 
WTACURRENT Willingness to accept allow under current RUS 12.427 82.725 10.485 40.666 13.918 104.066 
ACCESSAMEND Access allow under amended RUS (1=yes) 0.221 0.415 0.201 0.401 0.237 0.426 
WTAAMENDED Willingness to accept allow under amended RUS 18.098 82.997 16.625 64.990 19.229 94.555 
MGTCHOICE 
Management choice (1=independently, 2=cooperatively, 
3=outfitter) 1.676 0.853 1.691 0.882 1.667 0.836 
Independent Variable       
STATE Landownership in state (1=Louisiana, 0=Arkansas) 0.566 0.496 0 0 1 0 
PERSONALUSE Land is used for personal recreational use (1=yes) 0.574 0.495 0.557 0.497 0.588 0.493 
FRIENDSFAMILY Land is used for recreation by family or friends (1=yes) 0.560 0.497 0.557 0.497 0.563 0.496 
LEASEDREC Land has been leased for recreational use (1=yes) 0.114 0.318 0.115 0.320 0.112 0.316 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 Liability concern over recreational use, disagree (1=yes) 0.106 0.308 0.105 0.307 0.106 0.308 
LIABILITYCONCERN1 Liability concern over recreational use, not sure (1=yes) 0.111 0.314 0.138 0.345 0.090 0.287 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 Liability concern over recreational use, agree (1=yes) 0.775 0.418 0.744 0.437 0.799 0.401 
WRITTENAGREE2 Written agreement protects from liability, disagree (1=yes) 0.254 0.436 0.260 0.439 0.250 0.433 
WRITTENAGREE1 Written agreement protects from liability, not sure (1=yes) 0.405 0.491 0.410 0.492 0.400 0.490 
WRITTENAGREE3 Written agreement protects from liability, agree (1=yes) 0.332 0.471 0.318 0.466 0.343 0.475 
CONCERNEASE2 Liability concern eased, allow recreation, disagree (1=yes) 0.418 0.493 0.435 0.496 0.405 0.491 
CONCERNEASE1 Liability concern eased, allow recreation, not sure (1=yes) 0.250 0.433 0.289 0.454 0.220 0.415 
CONCERNEASE3 Liability concern eased, allow recreation, agree (1=yes) 0.321 0.467 0.260 0.439 0.369 0.483 
NOTRESSPASS Protection from liability requires me to post, unsure (1=yes) 0.507 0.500 0.562 0.497 0.464 0.499 
RUSPROTECTS Protected from recreational liability if free, unsure (1=yes) 0.693 0.461 0.735 0.442 0.661 0.474 
INSURACEKNOW Insurance exists for allowing recreation, unsure (1=yes)  0.638 0.481 0.663 0.473 0.618 0.486 
RISKPREFERENCE1 substantial levels of risk in my financial decisions (1=yes) 0.072 0.259 0.071 0.258 0.073 0.260 
RISKPREFERENCE2 I tend to avoid risk in my financial decisions (1=yes)  0.740 0.439 0.721 0.449 0.754 0.431 
RISKPREFERENCE3 I neither seek nor avoid risk in financial decisions (1=yes)  0.174 0.380 0.195 0.397 0.158 0.365 
MARGINALLAND Any land "marginal" for agricultural purposes? (1=yes)  0.427 0.495 0.401 0.491 0.446 0.497 
MARGINALACRES Number of acres marginal for agricultural purposes 44.870 123.947 43.029 119.057 46.283 127.649 
LANDOWNERCOOOPER Ever worked with your adjacent or local landowners (1=yes) 0.269 0.444 0.284 0.452 0.258 0.438 
COOPERATIVE  Ever been involved with a cooperative (1=yes) 0.216 0.412 0.313 0.464 0.141 0.349 
CONSERVATION Enrolled land in a government conservation program (1=yes) 0.395 0.489 0.326 0.469 0.447 0.498 
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Table 5.10. (continued) 
Variable  Description Combined Arkansas Louisiana 







TRACTS Number of separate tracts of non-residential land 2.329 2.991 2.675 3.855 2.066 2.077 
ADJACENT Non-residential land adjacent to primary residence (1=yes) 0.394 0.489 0.345 0.476 0.432 0.496 
DISTANCE Number of miles to nearest tract of land  77.505 245.964 86.809 255.732 70.319 238.110 
TOTALACRE Total acreage of all tracts of land 371.597 739.426 432.069 853.537 324.809 634.085 
YEARSOWNERSHIP Number of years you have been a land owner 27.698 26.791 27.298 31.340 28.010 22.637 
OWNERSHIP1 Ownership of land organized as corporation (y=1) 0.020 0.140 0.031 0.174 0.011 0.105 
OWNERSHIP2 Ownership of land organized as LLC (y=1) 0.036 0.187 0.039 0.195 0.034 0.181 
OWNERSHIP3 Ownership of land organized as joint ownership (y=1) 0.406 0.491 0.454 0.498 0.369 0.483 
OWNERSHIP4 Ownership of land organized as single ownership (y=1) 0.594 0.491 0.531 0.500 0.642 0.480 
ACQUIRE 1 Acquire non-residential land by inheritance (y=1) 0.465 0.499 0.461 0.499 0.467 0.499 
ACQUIRE 2 Acquire non-residential land by marriage (y=1) 0.030 0.171 0.034 0.180 0.027 0.163 
ACQUIRE 3 Acquire non-residential land by purchasing (y=1) 0.555 0.497 0.558 0.497 0.552 0.498 
ACQUIRE 4 Acquire majority of non-residential land by other (y=1) 0.007 0.085 0.006 0.079 0.008 0.089 
ROWCROPS land for agricultural production of row crops (y=1) 0.679 0.467 0.816 0.387 0.574 0.495 
COTTON land for cotton production (y=1) 0.403 0.490 0.334 0.472 0.457 0.499 
LEASEDFORAG leased any of your land for agricultural uses 0.671 0.470 0.668 0.471 0.674 0.469 
HAYLAND Own land for hay production (y=1) 0.182 0.386 0.130 0.337 0.222 0.416 
LIVESTOCKLAND Own land for raising livestock (y=1) 0.171 0.377 0.128 0.335 0.204 0.403 
GENDER Gender (female=1) 0.323 0.468 0.289 0.454 0.349 0.477 
AGE Age in years 62.487 13.656 63.287 13.617 61.872 13.666 
ETHNIC Ethnic background: Caucasian (1=yes) 0.942 0.234 0.938 0.241 0.945 0.229 
OCUPATION1 Primary occupation: farming (1=yes)  0.174 0.379 0.218 0.413 0.140 0.347 
OCUPATION2 Primary occupation: business (1=yes)  0.108 0.311 0.117 0.321 0.102 0.303 
OCUPATION3 Primary occupation: self-employed (1=yes)  0.095 0.293 0.076 0.266 0.109 0.312 
EDUCATION1 Education: high school graduate or less (1=yes) 0.339 0.474 0.334 0.472 0.343 0.475 
EDUCATION2 Education: some college to college graduate (1=yes)  0.461 0.499 0.495 0.500 0.435 0.496 
EDUCATION3 Education: graduate or professional degree (1=yes)  0.155 0.362 0.134 0.341 0.171 0.377 
INCOME1 Less than $25K (1=yes)  0.113 0.316 0.107 0.310 0.117 0.322 
INCOME2 Income $25K to $75K (1=yes)  0.359 0.480 0.344 0.476 0.370 0.483 




Table 5.11.  Probit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
current recreational use statute for Arkansas and Louisiana landowners. 
ACCESSCUR Coef. Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 
STATE -0.32647‡ 0.14628 -0.04970 0.02304 -2.230 0.026 
PERSONALUSE -0.01882 0.16069 -0.00277 0.02373 -0.120 0.907 
FRIENDSFAMILY -0.09596 0.15733 -0.01427 0.02368 -0.610 0.542 
LEASEDREC 0.00706 0.19808 0.00104 0.02935 0.040 0.972 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 -0.34230 0.31268 -0.04144 0.03050 -1.090 0.274 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 -0.10293 0.22537 -0.01579 0.03602 -0.460 0.648 
WRITTENAGREE2 0.13159 0.17133 0.02023 0.02746 0.770 0.442 
WRITTENAGREE3 0.19921 0.14615 0.03080 0.02372 1.360 0.173 
CONCERNEASED2 -0.60773† 0.19027 -0.08439 0.02422 -3.190 0.001 
CONCERNEASED3 0.68004† 0.15657 0.11756 0.03207 4.340 0.000 
NOTRESSPASS 0.29411‡ 0.13860 0.04343 0.02081 2.120 0.034 
RUSPROTECTS 0.11914 0.15050 0.01698 0.02075 0.790 0.429 
INSURACEKNOW -0.41604† 0.13699 -0.06624 0.02344 -3.040 0.002 
RISKPREFERENCE1 0.50374‡ 0.23380 0.09863 0.05840 2.150 0.031 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -0.39239† 0.15956 -0.06605 0.03009 -2.460 0.014 
MARGINALLAND 0.35164† 0.14018 0.05358 0.02208 2.510 0.012 
MARGINALACRES 0.00058 0.00047 0.00009 0.00007 1.240 0.216 
LANDOWNERCOOPER 0.11971 0.13973 0.01828 0.02217 0.860 0.392 
COOPERATIVE  0.03757 0.15305 0.00561 0.02318 0.250 0.806 
CONSERVATION 0.40186† 0.13354 0.06270 0.02207 3.010 0.003 
TRACTS 0.01623 0.02155 0.00239 0.00319 0.750 0.451 
ADJACENT -0.15803 0.13387 -0.02273 0.01894 -1.180 0.238 
DISTANCE -0.00012 0.00028 -0.00002 0.00004 -0.450 0.655 
TOTALACREAGE 0.00011 0.00009 0.00002 0.00001 1.180 0.239 
YEARSOWNERSHIP 0.00275 0.00248 0.00040 0.00037 1.110 0.267 
OWNERSHIP1 0.49090 0.38641 0.09826 0.09900 1.270 0.204 
OWNERSHIP2 0.45450* 0.28048 0.08828 0.06899 1.620 0.105 
OWNERSHIP3 -0.22864* 0.13100 -0.03253 0.01807 -1.750 0.081 
ACQUIRE1 0.38950* 0.21407 0.05902 0.03361 1.820 0.069 
ACQUIRE2 -0.01948 0.39332 -0.00283 0.05636 -0.050 0.961 
ACQUIRE3 0.25324 0.22062 0.03651 0.03129 1.150 0.251 
ROWCROPS -0.14531 0.19450 -0.02220 0.03088 -0.750 0.455 
COTTON 0.24722 0.16328 0.03749 0.02567 1.510 0.130 
LEASEDFORAG -0.01885 0.14976 -0.00279 0.02223 -0.130 0.900 
HAYLAND -0.07261 0.20294 -0.01034 0.02798 -0.360 0.721 
LIVESTOCKLAND -0.13575 0.20261 -0.01879 0.02641 -0.670 0.503 
GENDER -0.18909 0.15062 -0.02647 0.02015 -1.260 0.209 
AGE -0.00586 0.00486 -0.00086 0.00071 -1.200 0.228 
ETHNIC 0.02718 0.27710 0.00393 0.03937 0.100 0.922 
OCUPATION1 -0.13797 0.19001 -0.01902 0.02457 -0.730 0.468 
OCUPATION2 -0.24286 0.21720 -0.03125 0.02425 -1.120 0.263 
OCUPATION3 0.09783 0.20545 0.01522 0.03374 0.480 0.634 
EDUCATION1 0.20019 0.14892 0.03090 0.02414 1.340 0.179 
EDUCATION3 0.36201‡ 0.17588 0.06308 0.03542 2.060 0.040 
INCOME1 -0.85401† 0.28161 -0.07835 0.01569 -3.030 0.002 
INCOME3 -0.20061 0.13768 -0.02834 0.01876 -1.460 0.145 
CONSTANT -1.04126‡ 0.49849   -2.090 0.037 
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 938; Chi-square = 56.66; 
Log-L= -278.93375; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R-squared: 0.315 
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positive and negative effect on landowner access decisions and both are significant at the 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively.  The coefficient for MARGINALLAND is positive in sign and 
significant at the 0.01 level indicating that ownership of marginal land has a positive effect on 
the probability of allowing fee-based recreation.  Marginal landowners have a 5.4% higher 
probability of allowing fee-based recreation.  Ownership of the land as a limited liability 
corporation is positive in sign and significant at the 0.10 level, while joint ownership is negative 
in sign and significant at the 0.10 level indicating that fee-based recreation is more likely if land 
is owned as a LLC and less likely if land is owned jointly as compared with single ownership of 
land.  Land acquired through inheritance has a positive effect and is significant at the 0.10 level.  
EDUCATION3 has a positive relationship with the probability of allowing fee-based recreation 
while INCOME1 has a negative relationship.   
Probit parameter estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under 
the current recreational use statue for Louisiana landowners are presented in table 5.12.  The 
dummy variables indicating if landowners disagree or agree with allowing recreational use of 
their land if their liability concerns were eased are significant at the 0.05 level and are negative 
and positive in sign for disagree and agree, respectively.  The variable representing if landowners 
are unsure about the availability of commercial liability insurance (INSURACEKNOW) is 
negative in sign and significant at the 0.10 level.  The marginal effect implies that landowners 
that are unsure about the availability of commercial liability insurance have a 5% lower 
probability of allowing fee-based recreation.  The variable for landowners indicating that they 
are risk averse (RISKPREFERENCE2) has a negative effect on the probability of allowing fee-
based recreation and is significant at the 0.01 level.  MARGINALLAND and CONSERVATION 
are both positive in sign and significant at the 0.05 level indicating positive effect on the  
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Table 5.12.  Probit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
current recreational use statute for Louisiana landowners. 
ACCESSCUR Coef. Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 
PERSONALUSE -0.093507 0.221599 -0.012353 0.029679 -0.42 0.673 
FRIENDSFAMILY 0.080768 0.213254 0.010409 0.027174 0.38 0.705 
LEASEDREC 0.023169 0.274595 0.003055 0.036689 0.08 0.933 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 -0.388816 0.476823 -0.040141 0.038075 -0.82 0.415 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 0.078379 0.375110 0.009839 0.045367 0.21 0.834 
WRITTENAGREE2 0.360093 0.237933 0.053686 0.040244 1.51 0.13 
WRITTENAGREE3 0.311215 0.203367 0.043767 0.031002 1.53 0.126 
CONCERNEASED2 -0.67924‡ 0.284530 -0.081479 0.030880 -2.39 0.017 
CONCERNEASED3 0.486406‡ 0.226416 0.068780 0.035831 2.15 0.032 
NOTRESSPASS 0.283615 0.190248 0.037708 0.026279 1.49 0.136 
RUSPROTECTS 0.032826 0.201386 0.004242 0.025799 0.16 0.871 
INSURACEKNOW -0.33424* 0.197762 -0.045890 0.028806 -1.69 0.091 
RISKPREFERENCE1 0.301500 0.333392 0.047304 0.062010 0.9 0.366 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -0.77701† 0.225991 -0.135883 0.049129 -3.44 0.001 
MARGINALLAND 0.477448‡ 0.195757 0.064758 0.027421 2.44 0.015 
MARGINALACRES -0.000241 0.000665 -0.000031 0.000086 -0.36 0.717 
LANDOWNERCOOPER 0.226347 0.198820 0.031968 0.030538 1.14 0.255 
COOPERATIVE  -0.146936 0.247039 -0.017667 0.027417 -0.59 0.552 
CONSERVATION 0.416684‡ 0.190247 0.055903 0.026633 2.19 0.029 
TRACTS -0.025994 0.047352 -0.003384 0.006149 -0.55 0.583 
ADJACENT -0.42865‡ 0.191252 -0.053972 0.023972 -2.24 0.025 
DISTANCE -0.000423 0.000377 -0.000055 0.000049 -1.12 0.262 
TOTALACREAGE 0.000294* 0.000155 0.000038 0.000020 1.89 0.058 
YEARSOWNERSHIP 0.000929 0.004335 0.000121 0.000564 0.21 0.83 
OWNERSHIP1 -0.226444 0.851523 -0.024909 0.077808 -0.27 0.79 
OWNERSHIP2 0.189810 0.389312 0.028124 0.065314 0.49 0.626 
OWNERSHIP3 0.007583 0.185743 0.000989 0.024264 0.04 0.967 
ACQUIRE1 0.252032 0.303739 0.033418 0.041007 0.83 0.407 
ACQUIRE2 0.160295 0.554645 0.023336 0.089610 0.29 0.773 
ACQUIRE3 0.192070 0.310752 0.024613 0.039156 0.62 0.537 
ROWCROPS -0.415796 0.325248 -0.057451 0.047964 -1.28 0.201 
COTTON 0.470485 0.313448 0.063031 0.043931 1.5 0.133 
LEASEDFORAG -0.021367 0.207201 -0.002797 0.027263 -0.1 0.918 
HAYLAND -0.258995 0.251751 -0.030387 0.026630 -1.03 0.304 
LIVESTOCKLAND 0.018172 0.254865 0.002384 0.033685 0.07 0.943 
GENDER -0.167212 0.207152 -0.020912 0.024983 -0.81 0.42 
AGE -0.000861 0.007308 -0.000112 0.000951 -0.12 0.906 
ETHNIC -0.148494 0.372592 -0.021332 0.058824 -0.4 0.69 
OCUPATION1 0.100250 0.289564 0.013777 0.041891 0.35 0.729 
OCUPATION2 0.269369 0.288588 0.040879 0.050373 0.93 0.351 
OCUPATION3 0.466254* 0.264091 0.079097 0.056177 1.77 0.077 
EDUCATION1 0.175392 0.205421 0.023843 0.029140 0.85 0.393 
EDUCATION3 0.464431‡ 0.242182 0.075453 0.047225 1.92 0.055 
INCOME1 -0.65335* 0.366203 -0.058458 0.021959 -1.78 0.074 
INCOME3 -0.35624* 0.199143 -0.042628 0.022113 -1.79 0.074 
CONSTANT -1.253742 0.787720   -1.59 0.111 
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 531; Chi-square = 145.80; 
Log-L= -153.88486; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R-squared: 0.3215 
 
probability of allowing recreational use of their land if they own marginal agricultural land or 
have land in a government conservation program.  The probability of allowing fee-based 
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recreation is 6.5% higher for marginal landowners and 5.5% higher for landowners participating 
in a government conservation program.  Having land adjacent to their primary residence has a 
negative effect and is significant at the 0.05 level, while owning more land has a positive effect 
and is significant at the 0.10 level.  The estimated coefficient for OCUPATION3 (i.e., self-
employed) is positive and significant at the 0.10 level possibly indicating that entrepreneurial 
minded landowners are more likely to allow fee-based recreational use of their land.   
EDUCATION3 has a positive effect on the probability of allowing fee-based recreation and is 
significant at the 0.05 level.  The coefficients for INCOME1 and INCOME3 are both 
significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level and are negative in sign indicating that 
landowners from these two income groups are less likely to allow fee-based recreation as 
compared with landowners from the middle income group.       
 Probit parameter estimates and marginal effects for the decision to allow fee-based 
recreational access under the current recreational use statue for Arkansas landowners are 
presented in table 5.13.  As noted in the previous two models the variables indicating if 
landowners disagree (CONCERNEASED2) or agree (CONCERNEASED3) with allowing 
recreational use of their land if their liability concerns could be eased has a negative effect for 
landowners that disagree and a positive effect if landowners agree and is significant that 0.05 and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  The parameter estimate for RUSPROTECTS is positive in sign while 
the estimate for INSURACEKNOW is negative and both are significantly different from zero at 
the 0.10 level of significant.  For Arkansas landowners, being unsure about the recreational use 
statute has a positive effect on the probability of allowing fee-based recreation; however, being 
unsure about the availability of commercial liability insurance has a negative effect.  The 
marginal effects for these two variables indicates that landowners that are unsure about the 
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Table 5.13.  Probit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
current recreational use statute for Arkansas landowners. 
ACCESSCUR Coef. Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 
PERSONALUSE -0.18693 0.29227 -0.01904 0.03016 -0.640 0.522 
FRIENDSFAMILY -0.06757 0.29756 -0.00680 0.03036 -0.230 0.820 
LEASEDREC 0.27050 0.35821 0.03206 0.04948 0.760 0.450 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 -0.39129 0.53476 -0.03021 0.03098 -0.730 0.464 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 -0.28569 0.34659 -0.03239 0.04407 -0.820 0.410 
WRITTENAGREE2 -0.37280 0.32121 -0.03271 0.02539 -1.160 0.246 
WRITTENAGREE3 0.29047 0.27932 0.03198 0.03375 1.040 0.298 
CONCERNEASED2 -0.64442‡ 0.32246 -0.06225 0.03126 -2.000 0.046 
CONCERNEASED3 1.03316† 0.28876 0.15743 0.06130 3.580 0.000 
NOTRESSPASS 0.31480 0.24586 0.03085 0.02466 1.280 0.200 
RUSPROTECTS 0.50438* 0.30325 0.04166 0.02192 1.660 0.096 
INSURACEKNOW -0.44726* 0.24180 -0.05104 0.03198 -1.850 0.064 
RISKPREFERENCE1 1.07982‡ 0.46969 0.21461 0.14284 2.300 0.022 
RISKPREFERENCE2 0.17056 0.30538 0.01601 0.02698 0.560 0.576 
MARGINALLAND 0.19269 0.25553 0.01984 0.02744 0.750 0.451 
MARGINALACRES 0.00222† 0.00085 0.00022 0.00009 2.600 0.009 
LANDOWNERCOOPER 0.05999 0.24863 0.00611 0.02593 0.240 0.809 
COOPERATIVE  0.41159 0.26030 0.04667 0.03280 1.580 0.114 
CONSERVATION 0.70792† 0.24075 0.08848 0.03771 2.940 0.003 
TRACTS 0.06879 0.05366 0.00687 0.00553 1.280 0.200 
ADJACENT 0.44509* 0.24684 0.05024 0.03090 1.800 0.071 
DISTANCE 0.00045 0.00041 0.00005 0.00004 1.100 0.271 
TOTALACREAGE -0.00003 0.00015 0.00000 0.00001 -0.180 0.856 
YEARSOWNERSHIP 0.00285 0.00354 0.00029 0.00036 0.810 0.420 
OWNERSHIP1 0.76289 0.63209 0.13135 0.16097 1.210 0.227 
OWNERSHIP2 0.97056* 0.51522 0.18730 0.15239 1.880 0.060 
OWNERSHIP3 -0.59174‡ 0.24433 -0.05801 0.02519 -2.420 0.015 
ACQUIRE1 0.72571* 0.43454 0.07948 0.05405 1.670 0.095 
ACQUIRE2 -0.22100 0.73376 -0.01856 0.05089 -0.300 0.763 
ACQUIRE3 0.47282 0.44385 0.04562 0.04257 1.070 0.287 
ROWCROPS -0.37447 0.35426 -0.04552 0.05124 -1.060 0.290 
COTTON 0.32015 0.25445 0.03490 0.03001 1.260 0.208 
LEASEDFORAG -0.31633 0.28384 -0.03475 0.03410 -1.110 0.265 
HAYLAND 0.85481* 0.52537 0.13995 0.12060 1.630 0.104 
LIVESTOCKLAND -1.32430‡ 0.56629 -0.06708 0.02172 -2.340 0.019 
GENDER -0.16568 0.27499 -0.01560 0.02472 -0.600 0.547 
AGE -0.01402 0.00900 -0.00140 0.00095 -1.560 0.119 
ETHNIC 0.89552 0.66204 0.04726 0.01902 1.350 0.176 
OCUPATION1 -0.43425 0.32519 -0.03553 0.02279 -1.340 0.182 
OCUPATION2 -1.23714† 0.46631 -0.06118 0.01855 -2.650 0.008 
OCUPATION3 -0.57195 0.44398 -0.03838 0.02027 -1.290 0.198 
EDUCATION1 0.10882 0.27043 0.01123 0.02906 0.400 0.687 
EDUCATION3 0.33253 0.31369 0.04045 0.04539 1.060 0.289 
INCOME1 -1.55317† 0.60124 -0.06424 0.01914 -2.580 0.010 
INCOME3 -0.04197 0.24120 -0.00416 0.02380 -0.170 0.862 
CONSTANT -2.18883‡ 0.90368   -2.420 0.015 
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 407; Chi-square = 166.00; 
Log-L= -97.397; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R-squared: 0.4601 
 
recreational use statute have a 4% higher probability of allowing fee-based recreation while 
landowners that are unsure about the availability of commercial liability insurance have a 5% 
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lower probability of allowing fee-based recreation.  Landowners that consider themselves to be 
risk seekers are 21.5% more likely than risk neutral landowners to allow fee-based recreation as 
indicated by the marginal effect for RISKPREFERENCE1 which is significant at the 0.05 level.  
The parameter estimate for MARGINALLAND is positive and significant at the 0.01 level 
indicating a positive relationship with owning marginal land and allowing fee-based recreation.  
Land ownership that is organized as a limited liability corporation (OWNERSHIP2) has a 
positive effect and it significant at the 0.10 level; however joint ownership (OWNERSHIP3) has 
a significant effect at the 0.50 level and has negative effect on the probability of a landowner’s 
decision to allow fee-based recreation.  Land that is acquired by inheritance has a positive effect 
and the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level.  The variables 
HAYLAND and LIVESTOCKLAND are both significant at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels and 
positive and negative in sign respectively.  Two of the demographic variables are significant at 
the 0.05 level (OCUPATION2 and INCOME1) and negative in sign.   
 The following three tables present probit parameter estimates for the probability of 
allowing fee-based recreation if recreational use statutes were amended to allow landowners to 
charge a fee for recreational access and retain the liability protection afforded to free access 
granting landowner as is allowed by the current Louisiana and Arkansas recreational use statutes 
(Tables 5.14, 5.15, and 5.16).   
Probit estimates for landowners from both states combined are presented in table 5.14.  
Notice that the variable for STATE is significant at the 0.10 level and positive in sign indicating 
that Louisiana landowners are more likely to allow fee-based recreation.  The marginal effect for 
STATE implies that Louisiana landowners have a 7.3% higher probability of allowing fee-based 
recreation under a modified recreational use statue.   The coefficient for ACCESSCUR is  
 75
Table 5.14.  Probit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
amended Recreational Use Statute for Arkansas and Louisiana landowners. 
ACCESSAMEND Coef. Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 
STATE 0.25330* 0.16119 0.07313 0.04571 1.570 0.116 
ACCESSCUR 3.64631† 0.40108 0.89950 0.01676 9.090 0.000 
PERSONALUSE -0.17542 0.16794 -0.05192 0.05002 -1.040 0.296 
FRIENDSFAMILY -0.02713 0.16885 -0.00796 0.04961 -0.160 0.872 
LEASEDREC 0.11919 0.21310 0.03611 0.06669 0.560 0.576 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 0.50327 0.31518 0.16789 0.11570 1.600 0.110 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 0.28312 0.25146 0.07744 0.06397 1.130 0.260 
WRITTENAGREE2 -0.04437 0.17985 -0.01289 0.05178 -0.250 0.805 
WRITTENAGREE3 0.07691 0.15489 0.02276 0.04627 0.500 0.620 
CONCERNEASED2 -0.56506† 0.17742 -0.15865 0.04708 -3.180 0.001 
CONCERNEASED3 0.44556† 0.16416 0.13729 0.05311 2.710 0.007 
NOTRESSPASS 0.20690 0.14661 0.06057 0.04298 1.410 0.158 
RUSPROTECTS -0.21271 0.15649 -0.06421 0.04870 -1.360 0.174 
INSURACEKNOW -0.12128 0.14787 -0.03594 0.04427 -0.820 0.412 
RISKPREFERENCE1 -0.04377 0.31371 -0.01263 0.08911 -0.140 0.889 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -0.10845 0.17539 -0.03241 0.05339 -0.620 0.536 
MARGINALLAND 0.35386‡ 0.15182 0.10520 0.04571 2.330 0.020 
MARGINALACRES -0.00118 0.00079 -0.00035 0.00023 -1.490 0.135 
LANDOWNERCOOPER -0.03698 0.15592 -0.01076 0.04507 -0.240 0.813 
COOPERATIVE  0.20247 0.17400 0.06183 0.05512 1.160 0.245 
CONSERVATION 0.32153‡ 0.13941 0.09622 0.04257 2.310 0.021 
TRACTS 0.03424 0.03435 0.01003 0.01008 1.000 0.319 
ADJACENT -0.10655 0.13921 -0.03093 0.04004 -0.770 0.444 
DISTANCE 0.00010 0.00024 0.00003 0.00007 0.410 0.685 
TOTALACREAGE 0.00014 0.00014 0.00004 0.00004 1.020 0.309 
YEARSOWNERSHIP -0.00213 0.00288 -0.00062 0.00085 -0.740 0.461 
OWNERSHIP1 -0.41863 0.58860 -0.10262 0.11637 -0.710 0.477 
OWNERSHIP2 -0.26300 0.41628 -0.06946 0.09768 -0.630 0.528 
OWNERSHIP3 -0.23848* 0.14424 -0.06836 0.04033 -1.650 0.098 
ACQUIRE1 0.05972 0.25529 0.01752 0.07504 0.230 0.815 
ACQUIRE2 0.16570 0.38787 0.05141 0.12682 0.430 0.669 
ACQUIRE3 0.02018 0.26234 0.00590 0.07666 0.080 0.939 
ROWCROPS 0.06153 0.20802 0.01786 0.05986 0.300 0.767 
COTTON 0.08762 0.17518 0.02580 0.05186 0.500 0.617 
LEASEDFORAG 0.03407 0.16126 0.00993 0.04678 0.210 0.833 
HAYLAND -0.21380 0.21477 -0.05926 0.05617 -1.000 0.319 
LIVESTOCKLAND 0.36413* 0.20625 0.11560 0.06992 1.770 0.077 
GENDER -0.01025 0.15223 -0.00300 0.04445 -0.070 0.946 
AGE 0.00724 0.00567 0.00212 0.00167 1.280 0.202 
ETHNIC 0.59796 0.37172 0.13719 0.06290 1.610 0.108 
OCUPATION1 -0.08261 0.19667 -0.02367 0.05512 -0.420 0.674 
OCUPATION2 -0.20204 0.22662 -0.05546 0.05799 -0.890 0.373 
OCUPATION3 -0.16974 0.25074 -0.04695 0.06515 -0.680 0.498 
EDUCATION1 -0.14013 0.15953 -0.04027 0.04495 -0.880 0.380 
EDUCATION3 -0.26530 0.19831 -0.07203 0.04971 -1.340 0.181 
INCOME1 -0.20292 0.24503 -0.05560 0.06237 -0.830 0.408 
INCOME3 0.17962 0.14967 0.05367 0.04546 1.200 0.230 
CONSTANT -2.65875† 0.64696   -4.110 0.000 
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 933; Chi-square = 568.16; 
Log-L= -239.20; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R-squared: 0.5429 
 
positive in sign and significant at the 0.01 level indicating that landowners allowing recreation 
under the current recreational use statue have a 90% higher probability of allowing recreation 
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under an amended recreational use statue.  Again, the dummy variables indicating if landowners 
disagree (CONCERNEASED2) or agree (CONCERNEASED3) with allowing recreational use 
of their land if their liability concerns were eased are significant at the 0.01 level and are 
negative and positive in sign for disagree and agree, respectively.  Having land that is considered 
to be marginal for agricultural purposes (MARGINALLAND) and having land in a government 
conservation program (CONSERVATION) both have a positive effect on the probability of 
allowing fee-based recreation and these two variables are significant at the 0.05 level.  The 
probability of allowing fee based recreation under an amended recreational use statue is 10.5% 
higher for marginal landowners and 9.6% higher for landowners participating in a government 
conservation program.  The coefficient for OWNERSHIP3 (i.e., joint ownership of land) is 
negative in sign and significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level of significance indicating a 
negative effect on the probability of allowing fee-based recreation for landowners that own land 
jointly as compared with single ownership landowners.  Under an amended recreational use 
statute owning land for livestock production (LIVESTOCKLAND) has a positive effect on the 
probability to allow fee-based recreational access and is significant at the 0.10 level with a 
marginal effect implying a 11.6% higher probability.   
Probit parameter estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under a  
modified recreational use statue for Louisiana landowners are presented in table 5.15.  Again, if 
landowners allowed recreation under the current use statute they would also be likely to allow 
access under a modified law as is indicated by ACCESSCUR being positive in sign and 
significant at the 0.01 level with a marginal effect indicating an 86.8% higher probability.  The 
two dummy variables that indicate if landowners disagrees (CONCERNEASED2) or agrees 




Table 5.15.  Probit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
amended Recreational Use Statute for Louisiana landowners. 
ACCESSAMEND Coef. Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 
ACCESSCUR 3.24197† 0.440187 0.868092 0.029223 7.360 0.000 
PERSONALUSE -0.171585 0.212467 -0.052391 0.065481 -0.810 0.419 
FRIENDSFAMILY 0.113663 0.214483 0.034035 0.063682 0.530 0.596 
LEASEDREC 0.063558 0.276840 0.019506 0.086443 0.230 0.818 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 0.072253 0.416813 0.022254 0.131015 0.170 0.862 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 0.215002 0.322644 0.061538 0.087324 0.670 0.505 
WRITTENAGREE2 -0.079261 0.231540 -0.023553 0.067709 -0.340 0.732 
WRITTENAGREE3 -0.074148 0.197148 -0.022164 0.058381 -0.380 0.707 
CONCERNEASED2 -0.62856† 0.236170 -0.179312 0.062294 -2.660 0.008 
CONCERNEASED3 0.38330* 0.214742 0.118667 0.068202 1.780 0.074 
NOTRESSPASS 0.099882 0.187082 0.030217 0.056817 0.530 0.593 
RUSPROTECTS -0.204836 0.198734 -0.063136 0.062643 -1.030 0.303 
INSURACEKNOW -0.142831 0.190677 -0.043518 0.058645 -0.750 0.454 
RISKPREFERENCE1 -0.106906 0.410501 -0.031135 0.115163 -0.260 0.795 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -0.311508 0.236488 -0.099270 0.078865 -1.320 0.188 
MARGINALLAND 0.37550‡ 0.193584 0.114330 0.059255 1.940 0.052 
MARGINALACRES -0.001052 0.000956 -0.000317 0.000289 -1.100 0.271 
LANDOWNERCOOPER -0.123564 0.206976 -0.036441 0.059584 -0.600 0.551 
COOPERATIVE  0.052979 0.256622 0.016207 0.079605 0.210 0.836 
CONSERVATION 0.280984 0.181879 0.085268 0.055544 1.540 0.122 
TRACTS -0.006128 0.049607 -0.001849 0.014966 -0.120 0.902 
ADJACENT -0.062809 0.176587 -0.018887 0.052923 -0.360 0.722 
DISTANCE -0.000473 0.000454 -0.000143 0.000136 -1.040 0.297 
TOTALACREAGE 0.00031* 0.000190 0.000093 0.000057 1.620 0.104 
YEARSOWNERSHIP -0.001733 0.004221 -0.000523 0.001273 -0.410 0.681 
OWNERSHIP1 -2.073588 1.599861 -0.231901 0.032751 -1.300 0.195 
OWNERSHIP2 -0.509130 0.504167 -0.125114 0.096016 -1.010 0.313 
OWNERSHIP3 -0.303876 0.191556 -0.088220 0.053316 -1.590 0.113 
ACQUIRE1 0.187048 0.332507 0.056712 0.101092 0.560 0.574 
ACQUIRE2 -0.453394 0.635552 -0.113751 0.126814 -0.710 0.476 
ACQUIRE3 0.194002 0.338737 0.057949 0.099993 0.570 0.567 
ROWCROPS 0.074300 0.279447 0.022308 0.083531 0.270 0.790 
COTTON -0.032246 0.266303 -0.009720 0.080205 -0.120 0.904 
LEASEDFORAG -0.127525 0.198968 -0.039076 0.061865 -0.640 0.522 
HAYLAND -0.43477* 0.265936 -0.119024 0.065237 -1.630 0.102 
LIVESTOCKLAND 0.369618 0.264460 0.119484 0.090432 1.400 0.162 
GENDER 0.175312 0.190302 0.053994 0.059580 0.920 0.357 
AGE 0.01464* 0.007739 0.004414 0.002323 1.890 0.059 
ETHNIC 0.84554* 0.512817 0.179991 0.067466 1.650 0.099 
OCUPATION1 0.205958 0.264847 0.065457 0.087957 0.780 0.437 
OCUPATION2 -0.049416 0.297296 -0.014692 0.087080 -0.170 0.868 
OCUPATION3 0.114996 0.298603 0.035836 0.095990 0.390 0.700 
EDUCATION1 -0.162749 0.197495 -0.048113 0.057225 -0.820 0.410 
EDUCATION3 -0.179449 0.243937 -0.051702 0.067054 -0.740 0.462 
INCOME1 -0.266425 0.296012 -0.073958 0.074683 -0.900 0.368 
INCOME3 0.046025 0.202344 0.013964 0.061708 0.230 0.820 
CONSTANT -2.68543† 0.920132   -2.920 0.004 
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 528; Chi-square = 300.32; 
Log-L= -155.225; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R-squared: 0.4917   
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were eased have a positive and negative effect on allowing fee-based recreation and are 
significant at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  Also, as noticed in the previous probit 
models, the coefficient for MARGINALLAND is positive in sign and is significantly different 
from zero at the 0.05 level with a marginal effect indicating a 11% higher probability of allowing 
fee-based recreation.  Owning more land (TOTALACREAGE) increases the probability of 
allowing fee-based recreational access and is significant at the 0.10 level of significance.  
Owning land for hay production (HAYLAND) is negative in sign and significant at the 0.10 
level.  Landowners that owned land for hay production have a 12% lower probability of allowing 
fee-based recreation.   Two of the demographic variables are significant, AGE and ETHNIC, 
which are both significant at the 0.10 level and positive in sign indicating landowners that are 
older or white are more likely to allow fee-based recreation under a modified recreational use 
statue that allows landowners to charge a fee and enjoy liability protection that is currently 
afforded to free access granting landowners.              
Probit model parameter estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access 
under a modified recreational use statue for Arkansas landowners are presented in table 5.16.  
The coefficient for the variable LEASEDREC is positive in sign and significant at the 0.10 level.  
This suggests that Arkansas landowners that have leased their land for recreation in the past 
would be inclined to do so again under a modified recreational use statute.  The variables 
indicating if landowners are not concerned with the liability issues associated with allowing 
people on their land (LIABILITYCONCERN2) and that landowners believe a written agreement 
can protect them from liability (WRITTENAGREE3) have a positive effect on allowing fee- 
based recreation and is significant at the 0.05 level.  Landowners that are not concerned with the 
liability issues associated with allowing people onto there land have a 20% higher probability of  
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Table 5.16.  Probit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
amended Recreational Use Statute for Arkansas landowners. 
ACCESSAMEND Coef. Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 
PERSONALUSE -0.67502 0.47787 -0.010102 0.011312 -1.410 0.158 
FRIENDSFAMILY -0.56381 0.50158 -0.008229 0.010261 -1.120 0.261 
LEASEDREC 1.12039* 0.61695 0.046299 0.053545 1.820 0.069 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 2.03584‡ 0.87008 0.200995 0.202332 2.340 0.019 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 0.71300 0.77829 0.006195 0.007667 0.920 0.360 
WRITTENAGREE2 -0.05175 0.47029 -0.000617 0.005467 -0.110 0.912 
WRITTENAGREE3 0.96124‡ 0.43415 0.023688 0.021997 2.210 0.027 
CONCERNEASED2 -1.12382‡ 0.47224 -0.018110 0.015277 -2.380 0.017 
CONCERNEASED3 1.00668‡ 0.40343 0.031895 0.029039 2.500 0.013 
NOTRESSPASS 0.67430* 0.37150 0.008502 0.009035 1.820 0.070 
RUSPROTECTS -0.49419 0.40198 -0.008624 0.012016 -1.230 0.219 
INSURACEKNOW 0.35190 0.35333 0.003703 0.004344 1.000 0.319 
RISKPREFERENCE1 0.45748 0.80940 0.009944 0.027413 0.570 0.572 
RISKPREFERENCE2 0.44753 0.49224 0.004333 0.004858 0.910 0.363 
MARGINALLAND 0.57606 0.47166 0.009240 0.012290 1.220 0.222 
MARGINALACRES -0.00596 0.00483 -0.000073 0.000083 -1.230 0.217 
LANDOWNERCOOPER -0.09610 0.35759 -0.001115 0.004036 -0.270 0.788 
COOPERATIVE  0.47509 0.38947 0.007833 0.010116 1.220 0.223 
CONSERVATION 1.02117† 0.37633 0.026087 0.020943 2.710 0.007 
TRACTS 0.13615 0.09047 0.001667 0.001687 1.500 0.132 
ADJACENT -0.19397 0.34170 -0.002211 0.004051 -0.570 0.570 
DISTANCE 0.00124† 0.00046 0.000015 0.000013 2.710 0.007 
TOTALACREAGE -0.00033 0.00048 -0.000004 0.000006 -0.680 0.494 
YEARSOWNERSHIP -0.01854 0.01345 -0.000227 0.000238 -1.380 0.168 
OWNERSHIP1 0.50407 1.51706 0.011914 0.060046 0.330 0.740 
OWNERSHIP2 1.01112 1.33527 0.045640 0.133138 0.760 0.449 
OWNERSHIP3 -0.47185 0.35035 -0.005893 0.006616 -1.350 0.178 
ACQUIRE1 -0.03228 0.68851 -0.000394 0.008347 -0.050 0.963 
ACQUIRE2 1.23470 0.79846 0.070571 0.108461 1.550 0.122 
ACQUIRE3 -0.34662 0.75128 -0.004554 0.011300 -0.460 0.645 
ROWCROPS 0.50571 0.67808 0.004273 0.005342 0.750 0.456 
COTTON 0.63659* 0.36613 0.011078 0.011028 1.740 0.082 
LEASEDFORAG 0.56188 0.45946 0.005690 0.006334 1.220 0.221 
HAYLAND 1.46992‡ 0.66730 0.084674 0.081836 2.200 0.028 
LIVESTOCKLAND -0.06217 0.58117 -0.000718 0.006347 -0.110 0.915 
GENDER -0.49250 0.42122 -0.004869 0.005560 -1.170 0.242 
AGE -0.01978 0.01450 -0.000242 0.000262 -1.360 0.173 
ETHNIC 1.38422 1.12573 0.005216 0.005345 1.230 0.219 
OCUPATION1 -0.47229 0.45327 -0.004263 0.004983 -1.040 0.297 
OCUPATION2 -0.69149 0.51390 -0.004759 0.005056 -1.350 0.178 
OCUPATION3 -2.00272‡ 0.85485 -0.006438 0.006429 -2.340 0.019 
EDUCATION1 -0.01807 0.43004 -0.000219 0.005176 -0.040 0.966 
EDUCATION3 -0.64519 0.53653 -0.004702 0.004871 -1.200 0.229 
INCOME1 -1.39614 0.95784 -0.006442 0.006454 -1.460 0.145 
INCOME3 0.15034 0.35216 0.001938 0.005130 0.430 0.669 
CONSTANT -3.7429‡ 1.7059   -2.190 0.028 
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 341; Chi-square = 83.55; 
Log-L= -55.034566; Prob>chi2 = 0.0004; Pseudo R-squared: 0.4315   
 
 
allowing fee-based recreation.  The variables indicating if landowners disagree  
(CONCERNEASED2) or agree (CONCERNEASED3) with allowing recreational use of their 
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land if their liability concerns were eased have a positive or negative effect on allowing fee-
based recreational use of their land and are both significant at the 0.05 level.  The coefficient for 
NOTRESSPASS is positive in sign and significant at the 0.10 level indicating that landowners 
who are unsure about trespass law are more likely to allow fee-based recreation under a modified 
recreational use statute.  This may indicate that landowners that are unsure about trespass law are 
comfortable enough with the liability protection of modified recreational use statute to allow fee-
based recreation.  As noted in previous models, having land in a government conservation 
program has a positive effect on the probability of allowing fee-based recreation and is 
significant at the 0.01 level.  The marginal effect for CONSERVATION indicates that the 
probability of allowing fee-based recreation is 2.6% higher for landowners participating in a 
government conservation program.  The coefficient for DISTANCE is positive in sign and 
significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance indicating that having land 
farther from the primary residence has a positive effect on allowing fee-based recreation.  
Landowners that produce cotton or have land in hay production are more likely to allow fee-
based recreation.   The marginal effect for HAYLAND indicates that landowners owning land 
for hay production have a 8.5% higher probability of allowing recreational uses of their land 
under a modified recreational use statute.  The only demographic variable that is significant is 
OCUPATION3 indicating that landowners that are self-employed are less likely to allow 
recreation under a modified recreational use statute.           
5.6.4. Tobit Model for Willingness to Accept Compensation to Allow Access 
Tobit models were used to analyze the potential relationship between landowners’ willingness to 
accept (WTA) compensation to allow fee-based recreational access and various explanatory  
variables under both the current and modified recreational use statutes for Louisiana, Arkansas, 
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and for both regions combined. 
Tobit parameter estimates for WTA associated with the decision to allow fee-based 
recreational access under the current recreational use statues for Arkansas and Louisiana 
landowners are presented in table 5.17.  Results indicate that the estimated coefficient for 
STATE is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and is negative in sign.  This suggests that the 
WTA to allow fee-based recreation is influenced by location (i.e., Louisiana or Arkansas) and 
that the expected WTA for Louisiana landowners is $7.18 lower than the WTA of Arkansas 
landowners.  The coefficient for WRITTENAGREE3 is positive in sign and significant at the 
0.10 level of significance and indicates that landowners believing that a written agreement can 
protect them from liability have an expected WTA that is $7.23 higher than landowners that are 
unsure.  The two variables indicating if landowners disagree (CONCERNEASED2) or agree 
(CONCERNEASED3) with allowing recreational use of their land if their liability concerns were 
eased are significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, indicating a decrease in WTA of $11.82 or an 
increase of $15.10 in expected WTA as compared with landowners that are unsure, respectively.  
Landowners allowing fee-based recreation that are unsure about the availability of commercial 
liability insurance for recreation decreases WTA by $10.44 and is significant at the 0.01 level.  
The two dummy variables for risk preference given by RISKPREFERENCE1, indicating risk 
seeker, and RISKPREFERENCE2, indicating risk averse, have both a positive and negative 
effect on landowner access decisions and are both significant at the 0.05 level.  This indicates 
that a landowner that is a risk seeker has a predicted WTA that is $15.48 greater than a risk 
neutral landowner, and a landowner that is risk averse has an expected WTA that is $10.11 lower 
than a risk neutral landowner.  Owning marginal land increases the predicted WTA by $7.61 and 
the variable coefficient for MARGINALLAND is significant at the 0.10 level.  Having land in a  
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Table 5.17.  Tobit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
current Recreational Use Statute for Arkansas and Louisiana landowners. 
WTACURRENT Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>|t| dF/dx 
Std. 
Err z P>|z| 
STATE -50.682* 30.528 -1.66 0.10 -7.182* 4.283 -1.68 0.09 
PERSONALUSE -0.951 33.211 -0.03 0.98 -0.133 4.659 -0.03 0.98 
FRIENDSFAMILY -26.230 31.797 -0.82 0.41 -3.701 4.461 -0.83 0.41 
LEASEDREC -55.199 44.663 -1.24 0.22 -7.331 6.266 -1.17 0.24 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 -70.181 66.313 -1.06 0.29 -9.151 9.303 -0.98 0.33 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 -24.502 48.938 -0.50 0.62 -3.505 6.866 -0.51 0.61 
WRITTENAGREE2 55.535 35.126 1.58 0.11 8.086* 4.928 1.64 0.10 
WRITTENAGREE3 50.248* 30.533 1.65 0.10 7.226* 4.283 1.69 0.09 
CONCERNEASED2 -85.673‡ 39.980 -2.14 0.03 -11.816‡ 5.609 -2.11 0.04 
CONCERNEASED3 102.451† 33.513 3.06 0.00 15.095† 4.702 3.21 0.00 
NOTRESSPASS 38.620 28.129 1.37 0.17 5.422 3.946 1.37 0.17 
RUSPROTECTS 1.526 30.191 0.05 0.96 0.214 4.235 0.05 0.96 
INSURACEKNOW -72.461† 28.425 -2.55 0.01 -10.444† 3.988 -2.62 0.01 
RISKPREFERENCE1 97.935‡ 44.958 2.18 0.03 15.477† 6.307 2.45 0.01 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -68.710‡ 33.831 -2.03 0.04 -10.107‡ 4.746 -2.13 0.03 
MARGINALLAND 53.716* 29.453 1.82 0.07 7.612* 4.132 1.84 0.07 
MARGINALACRES 0.112 0.094 1.19 0.23 0.016 0.013 1.19 0.23 
LANDOWNERCOOPER 30.306 28.412 1.07 0.29 4.332 3.986 1.09 0.28 
COOPERATIVE  23.029 31.278 0.74 0.46 3.288 4.388 0.75 0.45 
CONSERVATION 60.318‡ 28.269 2.13 0.03 8.606‡ 3.966 2.17 0.03 
TRACTS 4.201 3.478 1.21 0.23 0.589 0.488 1.21 0.23 
ADJACENT -9.463 27.356 -0.35 0.73 -1.324 3.838 -0.34 0.73 
DISTANCE -0.084 0.081 -1.04 0.30 -0.012 0.011 -1.04 0.30 
TOTALACREAGE 0.011 0.016 0.70 0.48 0.002 0.002 0.70 0.48 
YEARSOWNERSHIP 0.260 0.328 0.79 0.43 0.037 0.046 0.79 0.43 
OWNERSHIP1 63.312 67.440 0.94 0.35 9.666 9.461 1.02 0.31 
OWNERSHIP2 48.212 50.029 0.96 0.34 7.194 7.019 1.03 0.31 
OWNERSHIP3 -61.661‡ 27.103 -2.28 0.02 -8.507‡ 3.802 -2.24 0.03 
ACQUIRE1 58.121 44.263 1.31 0.19 8.221 6.210 1.32 0.19 
ACQUIRE2 21.109 72.121 0.29 0.77 3.043 10.118 0.30 0.76 
ACQUIRE3 40.652 45.734 0.89 0.37 5.667 6.416 0.88 0.38 
ROWCROPS -41.491 40.724 -1.02 0.31 -5.946 5.713 -1.04 0.30 
COTTON 74.300‡ 34.129 2.18 0.03 10.618‡ 4.788 2.22 0.03 
LEASEDFORAG 8.474 31.190 0.27 0.79 1.184 4.376 0.27 0.79 
HAYLAND -7.411 42.804 -0.17 0.86 -1.033 6.005 -0.17 0.86 
LIVESTOCKLAND -76.695* 44.519 -1.72 0.09 -10.103 6.246 -1.62 0.11 
GENDER -55.034* 31.613 -1.74 0.08 -7.516* 4.435 -1.69 0.09 
AGE -0.321 1.027 -0.31 0.76 -0.045 0.144 -0.31 0.76 
ETHNIC -5.063 56.450 -0.09 0.93 -0.715 7.919 -0.09 0.93 
OCUPATION1 2.506 39.857 0.06 0.95 0.352 5.591 0.06 0.95 
OCUPATION2 -7.507 42.354 -0.18 0.86 -1.045 5.942 -0.18 0.86 
OCUPATION3 -17.225 45.231 -0.38 0.70 -2.371 6.345 -0.37 0.71 
EDUCATION1 49.344 30.433 1.62 0.11 7.086* 4.269 1.66 0.10 
EDUCATION3 108.204† 36.140 2.99 0.00 16.864† 5.070 3.33 0.00 
INCOME1 -142.240† 58.049 -2.45 0.01 -17.319‡ 8.144 -2.13 0.03 
INCOME3 -42.569 28.852 -1.48 0.14 -5.876 4.048 -1.45 0.15 
CONSTANT -269.381† 108.010 -2.49 0.01 -37.791† 15.153 -2.49 0.01 
SIGMA 202.001 15.181       
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 938; Chi-square = 193.78; 
Log-L= -888.3663; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R-squared: 0.098 
 
government conservation program increased the predicted WTA by $8.61, as is indicated by the 
coefficient for CONSERVATION, which is significant at the 0.05 level.  The variable 
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OWNERSHIP3 is significant at the 0.05 level and is negative in sign, indicating that joint 
ownership of land reduces expected WTA by $8.51 as compared with single ownership of land.  
The coefficients for COTTON and LIVESTOCKLAND are both significant at the 0.05 level 
indicating that using land for cotton production increases WTA by $10.620 while owning land 
for raising livestock reduces WTA by $10.10.  Three of the demographic variables are 
significant.  Landowners that are women have a WTA that is $7.52 lower than men, which is 
significant at the 0.10 level.  Landowners that are more highly educated have WTA that is 
greater by $16.86 and landowners that have lower annual household income have an expected 
WTA that is $17.32 lower.       
Tobit parameter estimates for the WTA associated with the decision to allow fee-based 
recreational access under the current recreational use statue for Louisiana landowners are 
presented in table 5.18.  The parameter estimates for WRITTENAGREE2 and 
WRITTENAGREE3 are both positive in sign and significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels of 
significance, respectively.  Landowners that do not believe a written agreement can protect them 
from liability and landowners that do believe a written agreement can protect them from liability 
have an expected WTA that is $20.41 and $13.40 greater, respectively, than landowners that are 
not sure if a written agreement can protect them from liability.  The coefficient for 
CONCERNEASED2 is negative in sign and significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that 
landowners who agree to allow fee-based recreation that also indicated that they disagree with 
allowing recreational use of their land if their liability concerns were eased have an expected 
WTA that is lower by $20.12.  Also, landowners that consider themselves to be risk averse have 
a predicted WTA that is $18.65 lower than landowners that consider themselves to be risk 
neutral.  Owning marginal land increases expected WTA by $12.18 and is significant at the 0.05  
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Table 5.18.  Tobit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
current Recreational Use Statute for Louisiana landowners. 
WTACURRENT Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>|t| dF/dx 
Std. 
Err z P>|z| 
PERSONALUSE -25.585 51.826 -0.49 0.62 -3.204 6.447 -0.50 0.62 
FRIENDSFAMILY 39.472 49.530 0.80 0.43 4.873 6.161 0.79 0.43 
LEASEDREC -71.815 69.522 -1.03 0.30 -8.396 8.648 -0.97 0.33 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 -22.447 128.309 -0.17 0.86 -2.734 15.961 -0.17 0.86 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 60.117 111.656 0.54 0.59 7.161 13.890 0.52 0.61 
WRITTENAGREE2 148.880† 58.438 2.55 0.01 20.413† 7.270 2.81 0.01 
WRITTENAGREE3 103.216‡ 51.008 2.02 0.04 13.404‡ 6.345 2.11 0.04 
CONCERNEASED2 -167.206‡ 72.418 -2.31 0.02 -20.117‡ 9.009 -2.23 0.03 
CONCERNEASED3 49.832 54.148 0.92 0.36 6.279 6.736 0.93 0.35 
NOTRESSPASS 35.387 44.423 0.80 0.43 4.419 5.526 0.80 0.42 
RUSPROTECTS -4.850 47.362 -0.10 0.92 -0.604 5.892 -0.10 0.92 
INSURACEKNOW -33.895 48.115 -0.70 0.48 -4.251 5.985 -0.71 0.48 
RISKPREFERENCE1 107.077 73.948 1.45 0.15 14.936* 9.199 1.62 0.10 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -136.842‡ 56.809 -2.41 0.02 -18.651† 7.067 -2.64 0.01 
MARGINALLAND 96.698‡ 47.309 2.04 0.04 12.183‡ 5.885 2.07 0.04 
MARGINALACRES -0.002 0.143 -0.01 0.99 0.000 0.018 -0.01 0.99 
LANDOWNERCOOPER 73.716* 45.539 1.62 0.11 9.584* 5.665 1.69 0.09 
COOPERATIVE  -36.033 58.758 -0.61 0.54 -4.347 7.309 -0.59 0.55 
CONSERVATION 80.082* 47.350 1.69 0.09 10.049* 5.890 1.71 0.09 
TRACTS -10.551 11.412 -0.92 0.36 -1.313 1.420 -0.92 0.36 
ADJACENT -79.818* 45.516 -1.75 0.08 -9.822* 5.662 -1.73 0.08 
DISTANCE -0.155 0.120 -1.29 0.20 -0.019 0.015 -1.29 0.20 
TOTALACREAGE 0.059* 0.034 1.72 0.09 0.007* 0.004 1.72 0.09 
YEARSOWNERSHIP -0.156 1.177 -0.13 0.89 -0.019 0.146 -0.13 0.89 
OWNERSHIP1 -12.747 183.157 -0.07 0.95 -1.562 22.784 -0.07 0.95 
OWNERSHIP2 28.171 80.412 0.35 0.73 3.618 10.003 0.36 0.72 
OWNERSHIP3 -45.460 44.418 -1.02 0.31 -5.562 5.525 -1.01 0.31 
ACQUIRE1 105.965 73.837 1.44 0.15 13.364 9.185 1.45 0.15 
ACQUIRE2 68.442 118.502 0.58 0.56 9.225 14.741 0.63 0.53 
ACQUIRE3 96.623 75.687 1.28 0.20 11.884 9.415 1.26 0.21 
ROWCROPS -174.466‡ 88.129 -1.98 0.05 -22.695‡ 10.963 -2.07 0.04 
COTTON 185.150‡ 82.737 2.24 0.03 23.540‡ 10.292 2.29 0.02 
LEASEDFORAG 3.668 49.322 0.07 0.94 0.456 6.136 0.07 0.94 
HAYLAND -5.387 59.055 -0.09 0.93 -0.668 7.346 -0.09 0.93 
LIVESTOCKLAND -113.490* 65.055 -1.74 0.08 -13.134 8.093 -1.62 0.11 
GENDER -65.224 50.424 -1.29 0.20 -7.918 6.273 -1.26 0.21 
AGE 1.609 1.923 0.84 0.40 0.200 0.239 0.84 0.40 
ETHNIC -19.435 86.729 -0.22 0.82 -2.469 10.789 -0.23 0.82 
OCUPATION1 111.769* 68.859 1.62 0.11 15.405* 8.566 1.80 0.07 
OCUPATION2 92.661 67.418 1.37 0.17 12.610 8.387 1.50 0.13 
OCUPATION3 108.615* 61.827 1.76 0.08 15.054‡ 7.691 1.96 0.05 
EDUCATION1 78.418 49.501 1.58 0.11 10.076* 6.158 1.64 0.10 
EDUCATION3 144.384† 57.434 2.51 0.01 20.271† 7.145 2.84 0.01 
INCOME1 -76.477 80.481 -0.95 0.34 -8.882 10.012 -0.89 0.38 
INCOME3 -92.757* 48.810 -1.90 0.06 -11.144* 6.072 -1.84 0.07 
CONSTANT -579.998† 227.362 -2.55 0.01 -72.151† 28.283 -2.55 0.01 
SIGMA 221.144 22.448       
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 531; Chi-square = 120.73; 
Log-L= -476.95; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R-squared: 0.1123 
 
level.  The coefficient for LANDONWERCOOPER is significant at the 0.10 level and is positive 
in sign, indicating that landowners that have worked with adjacent or local landowners have a 
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predicted WTA that is $9.58 greater than landowners that have not worked with adjacent or local 
landowners.  Having land in a government conservation program has a positive effect on 
expected WTA and is significant at the 0.10 level indicating an increase in expected WTA of 
$10.05.  The coefficient for ADJACENT is significant at the 0.10 level and negative in sign 
indicating that landowners that have their nearest tract of non-residential land adjacent to their 
home have an expected WTA that is $9.82 lower than landowners not having land adjacent to 
their homes.  With each one acre increase in total acreage results in an increase in predicted 
WTA by $0.01 which is significant at the 0.10 level.  Landowners that indicated that they use 
their land for agricultural production of row crops reduces predicted WTA by $22.70 while 
having land used for cotton production increases WTA by $23.54, which are both significant at 
the 0.05 level of significance.  The coefficient for LIVESTOCKLAND is significant at the 0.10 
level and negative in sign indicating that owning land for livestock production reduces expected 
WTA by $13.13.  Four of the demographic variables are significant.  Landowners that consider 
their primary occupation to be either business or to be self-employed have an expected WTA that 
is $15.41 and $15.05 greater than other landowners and both are significant at the 0.10 level of 
significance.  The coefficients for EDUCATION3 and INCOME3 are both significant at the 0.10 
and 0.10 levels, respectively.  This indicates that landowners that are more highly educated have 
a predicted WTA that is greater by $20.27 that the WTA of  landowners that attended college 
(EDUCATION2) while landowners that have a higher annual household income have a WTA is 
lower by $11.14 as compared with landowners having a annual household income in the $25 to 
$75 thousand range (INCOME2).               
Tobit parameter estimates for WTA associated with the decision to allow fee-based 
recreational access under the current recreational use statue for Arkansas landowners are 
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presented in table 5.19.  The parameter estimate for WRITTENAGREE3 is positive in sign and 
significant at the 0.10 level, indicating that landowners believing that a written agreement can 
protect them from liability have an expected WTA that is $6.43 greater than landowners that are 
not sure about written agreements.  The coefficient for CONCERNEASED3 is positive in sign 
and significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that landowners who agree to allow fee-based 
recreation that also agree with allowing recreational use of their land if their liability concerns 
are eased, have predicted WTA that is $14.67 greater than landowners that are unsure over the 
easing of their liability concerns.  Arkansas landowners predicted WTA increases by $0.02 with 
each one acre increase in total marginal land owned and the coefficient for MARGINALACRES 
is significant at the 0.10 level.  Landowners that have worked with their adjacent or local 
landowners have an expected WTA that is greater by $6.68 than landowners not having this 
experience, which is significant at the 0.10 level.  The coefficient for CONSERVATION is 
significant at the 0.05 level and positive in sign suggesting that having land in a government 
conservation program results in a predicted WTA is $7.72 greater than landowners not having 
land in a such a program.  Each one unit increase in total number of tracts of land owned 
increases predicted WTA by $0.77 and is significant at the 0.05 level.  The coefficient for 
ADJACENT is significant at the 0.05 level and is positive in sign indicating that having land 
adjacent to the primary residence increases a landowner’s WTA by $8.68 as compared with 
landowners not having their nearest tract of non-residential land adjacent to their home.  The 
variables for organization of land ownership as a limited liability corporation (OWNERSHIP2) 
or as joint ownership (OWNERSHIP3) are both significant at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, 
respectively.  Landowners having land organized as a LLC or joint ownerships have a predicted  
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Table 5.19.  Tobit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
current Recreational Use Statute for Arkansas landowners. 
WTACURRENT Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>|t| dF/dx 
Std. 
Err z P>|z| 
PERSONALUSE -6.529 35.233 -0.19 0.85 -0.7803 4.2040 -0.19 0.85 
FRIENDSFAMILY -30.320 35.391 -0.86 0.39 -3.6533 4.2229 -0.87 0.39 
LEASEDREC -1.553 48.406 -0.03 0.97 -0.1848 5.7759 -0.03 0.97 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 -94.076 69.492 -1.35 0.18 -9.6579 8.2919 -1.16 0.24 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 -51.341 39.733 -1.29 0.20 -6.5120 4.7410 -1.37 0.17 
WRITTENAGREE2 -22.035 36.930 -0.60 0.55 -2.5756 4.4065 -0.58 0.56 
WRITTENAGREE3 51.512* 31.295 1.65 0.10 6.4345* 3.7341 1.72 0.09 
CONCERNEASED2 -24.476 36.533 -0.67 0.50 -2.9038 4.3591 -0.67 0.51 
CONCERNEASED3 108.400† 34.346 3.16 0.00 14.6689† 4.0982 3.58 0.00 
NOTRESSPASS 25.609 27.267 0.94 0.35 3.0407 3.2536 0.93 0.35 
RUSPROTECTS 19.982 33.006 0.61 0.55 2.3355 3.9383 0.59 0.55 
INSURACEKNOW -41.965 28.050 -1.50 0.14 -5.1697 3.3469 -1.54 0.12 
RISKPREFERENCE1 76.992 48.546 1.59 0.11 10.7061* 5.7926 1.85 0.07 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -25.663 34.347 -0.75 0.46 -3.1416 4.0983 -0.77 0.44 
MARGINALLAND 11.756 30.865 0.38 0.70 1.4091 3.6829 0.38 0.70 
MARGINALACRES 0.194* 0.103 1.89 0.06 0.0231* 0.0123 1.89 0.06 
LANDOWNERCOOPER -26.428 29.487 -0.90 0.37 -3.0845 3.5184 -0.88 0.38 
COOPERATIVE  53.639* 30.091 1.78 0.08 6.6828* 3.5904 1.86 0.06 
CONSERVATION 61.537‡ 27.689 2.22 0.03 7.7199‡ 3.3039 2.34 0.02 
TRACTS 6.483‡ 3.311 1.96 0.05 0.7736‡ 0.3951 1.96 0.05 
ADJACENT 69.142‡ 28.455 2.43 0.02 8.6745† 3.3953 2.55 0.01 
DISTANCE -0.012 0.078 -0.15 0.88 -0.0014 0.0093 -0.15 0.88 
TOTALACREAGE -0.006 0.013 -0.42 0.68 -0.0007 0.0016 -0.42 0.68 
YEARSOWNERSHIP 0.209 0.234 0.90 0.37 0.0250 0.0279 0.90 0.37 
OWNERSHIP1 55.744 56.892 0.98 0.33 7.4762 6.7884 1.10 0.27 
OWNERSHIP2 93.747* 55.036 1.70 0.09 13.6523‡ 6.5669 2.08 0.04 
OWNERSHIP3 -63.849‡ 27.588 -2.31 0.02 -7.5540‡ 3.2918 -2.29 0.02 
ACQUIRE1 27.711 51.976 0.53 0.59 3.3281 6.2019 0.54 0.59 
ACQUIRE2 -15.618 72.825 -0.21 0.83 -1.8063 8.6896 -0.21 0.84 
ACQUIRE3 -17.095 53.565 -0.32 0.75 -2.0502 6.3914 -0.32 0.75 
ROWCROPS -41.233 41.149 -1.00 0.32 -5.2132 4.9099 -1.06 0.29 
COTTON 48.523* 29.462 1.65 0.10 5.9939* 3.5154 1.71 0.09 
LEASEDFORAG 5.536 31.619 0.18 0.86 0.6578 3.7728 0.17 0.86 
HAYLAND 23.635 60.839 0.39 0.70 2.9293 7.2594 0.40 0.69 
LIVESTOCKLAND -82.573 59.575 -1.39 0.17 -8.7414 7.1085 -1.23 0.22 
GENDER -14.902 32.470 -0.46 0.65 -1.7536 3.8743 -0.45 0.65 
AGE -1.464 1.052 -1.39 0.17 -0.1746 0.1255 -1.39 0.16 
ETHNIC 112.694 80.834 1.39 0.16 11.0317 9.6451 1.14 0.25 
OCUPATION1 -50.181 41.071 -1.22 0.22 -5.6413 4.9006 -1.15 0.25 
OCUPATION2 -62.562 44.938 -1.39 0.17 -6.7636 5.3621 -1.26 0.21 
OCUPATION3 -389.157‡ 168.691 -2.31 0.02 -27.1581 20.1283 -1.35 0.18 
EDUCATION1 -5.256 31.133 -0.17 0.87 -0.6247 3.7148 -0.17 0.87 
EDUCATION3 52.623 35.718 1.47 0.14 6.8354 4.2620 1.60 0.11 
INCOME1 -221.989† 88.769 -2.50 0.01 -19.160* 10.5920 -1.81 0.07 
INCOME3 -8.414 28.421 -0.30 0.77 -0.9997 3.3912 -0.29 0.77 
CONSTANT -167.143* 97.051 -1.72 0.09 -19.944* 11.5802 -1.72 0.09 
SIGMA 121.784 13.527       
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 407; Chi-square = 141.22; 
Log-L= -374.38698; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R-squared: 0.1587    
 
WTA that is $13.65 greater and $7.55 lower than the WTA of single landowners, 
correspondingly.  The coefficient for COTTON is significant at the 0.10 level indicating that if 
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landowners use their land for cotton production their expected WTA increases by $5.99.  Two 
demographic variables, OCUPATION3 and INCOME1, have coefficients that are both negative 
in sign and significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  So landowners that consider 
themselves to be self-employed have a predicted WTA that is $27.17 lower than other 
landowners, and landowners that have annual household incomes of less that $25,000 have an 
expected WTA that is $19.16 lower that landowners with annual household incomes in the 
$25,000 to $75,000 range.    
 
Tobit parameter estimates for WTA associated with the decision to allow fee-based 
recreational access under an amended recreational use statue for Arkansas and Louisiana 
landowners are presented in table 5.20.  The coefficient for ACCESSCUR and WTACURRENT 
are both significant at the 0.01 level of significance and positive in sign.  Landowners allowing 
fee-based recreation under the current recreational use statute have an expected WTA that is 
$24.52 greater than landowners that did not allow fee-based recreation under the current 
recreational use statute.  Each $1 increase in WTA indicated under the current recreational use 
statue results in an increase of $0.17 for WTA under the modified use statute.  The coefficient 
for LIABILITYCONCERN2 is significant at the 0.05 level and positive in sign indicating that 
landowners not concerned with the liability issues associated with allowing people on their land 
have an expected WTA that is $15.83 greater than landowners that are not sure about their 
liability concerns.  Parameter estimates for CONCERNEASED2 (i.e., disagree with allowing 
recreational use of their land if their liability concerns were eased) and CONCERNEASED3 
(i.e., agree with allowing recreational use of their land if their liability concerns were eased) are 
significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.  Landowners that disagree with allowing 
recreational use of their land if their liability concerns were eased have a WTA that is $10.53  
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Table 5.20.  Tobit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
amended Recreational Use Statute for Arkansas and Louisiana landowners. 
WTAAMENDED Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>|t| dF/dx 
Std. 
Err z P>|z| 
STATE 13.740 18.766 0.73 0.46 2.530 3.4674 0.73 0.47 
ACCESSCUR 112.766† 21.689 5.20 0.00 24.516† 4.0075 6.12 0.00 
WTACURRENT 0.928† 0.098 9.45 0.00 0.171† 0.0181 9.45 0.00 
PERSONALUSE -27.825 20.306 -1.37 0.17 -5.190 3.7519 -1.38 0.17 
FRIENDSFAMILY 17.937 20.053 0.89 0.37 3.297 3.7052 0.89 0.37 
LEASEDREC 14.383 24.772 0.58 0.56 2.715 4.5770 0.59 0.55 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 75.729‡ 39.251 1.93 0.05 15.826‡ 7.2524 2.18 0.03 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 44.453 31.441 1.41 0.16 7.825 5.8093 1.35 0.18 
WRITTENAGREE2 -18.461 21.333 -0.87 0.39 -3.354 3.9416 -0.85 0.40 
WRITTENAGREE3 6.653 18.295 0.36 0.72 1.235 3.3803 0.37 0.72 
CONCERNEASED2 -57.976† 22.644 -2.56 0.01 -10.534† 4.1839 -2.52 0.01 
CONCERNEASED3 48.622‡ 20.145 2.41 0.02 9.280† 3.7221 2.49 0.01 
NOTRESSPASS 6.690 17.025 0.39 0.69 1.236 3.1456 0.39 0.69 
RUSPROTECTS -42.872‡ 17.838 -2.40 0.02 -8.191† 3.2959 -2.49 0.01 
INSURACEKNOW -20.236 17.075 -1.19 0.24 -3.778 3.1550 -1.20 0.23 
RISKPREFERENCE1 -58.502* 31.158 -1.88 0.06 -9.834* 5.7570 -1.71 0.09 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -29.757 20.154 -1.48 0.14 -5.660 3.7237 -1.52 0.13 
MARGINALLAND 29.924* 17.524 1.71 0.09 5.573* 3.2379 1.72 0.09 
MARGINALACRES 0.002 0.064 0.03 0.98 0.000 0.0118 0.03 0.98 
LANDOWNERCOOPER 0.701 17.704 0.04 0.97 0.130 3.2712 0.04 0.97 
COOPERATIVE  19.503 19.823 0.98 0.33 3.682 3.6626 1.01 0.32 
CONSERVATION 9.024 16.911 0.53 0.59 1.673 3.1246 0.54 0.59 
TRACTS 1.687 2.403 0.70 0.48 0.312 0.4440 0.70 0.48 
ADJACENT -12.330 16.558 -0.74 0.46 -2.267 3.0595 -0.74 0.46 
DISTANCE -0.002 0.033 -0.07 0.94 0.000 0.0061 -0.07 0.94 
TOTALACREAGE 0.005 0.011 0.44 0.66 0.001 0.0020 0.44 0.66 
YEARSOWNERSHIP -0.171 0.224 -0.76 0.45 -0.032 0.0413 -0.76 0.45 
OWNERSHIP1 0.862 47.969 0.02 0.99 0.160 8.8632 0.02 0.99 
OWNERSHIP2 -11.786 35.250 -0.33 0.74 -2.132 6.5131 -0.33 0.74 
OWNERSHIP3 -24.661 16.682 -1.48 0.14 -4.511 3.0823 -1.46 0.14 
ACQUIRE1 14.534 28.209 0.52 0.61 2.693 5.2121 0.52 0.61 
ACQUIRE2 18.045 44.729 0.40 0.69 3.448 8.2645 0.42 0.68 
ACQUIRE3 11.503 29.133 0.39 0.69 2.120 5.3829 0.39 0.69 
ROWCROPS -6.057 24.281 -0.25 0.80 -1.124 4.4864 -0.25 0.80 
COTTON 11.821 20.598 0.57 0.57 2.193 3.8059 0.58 0.57 
LEASEDFORAG 16.638 18.781 0.89 0.38 3.041 3.4702 0.88 0.38 
HAYLAND -2.395 25.130 -0.10 0.92 -0.441 4.6432 -0.10 0.92 
LIVESTOCKLAND -0.992 25.182 -0.04 0.97 -0.183 4.6528 -0.04 0.97 
GENDER -12.031 18.648 -0.65 0.52 -2.204 3.4455 -0.64 0.52 
AGE 0.728 0.660 1.10 0.27 0.135 0.1220 1.10 0.27 
ETHNIC 36.228 37.933 0.96 0.34 6.292 7.0089 0.90 0.37 
OCUPATION1 -1.570 23.606 -0.07 0.95 -0.290 4.3616 -0.07 0.95 
OCUPATION2 -44.978* 27.600 -1.63 0.10 -7.780 5.0996 -1.53 0.13 
OCUPATION3 -53.366* 28.744 -1.86 0.06 -9.082* 5.3110 -1.71 0.09 
EDUCATION1 -7.180 18.371 -0.39 0.70 -1.321 3.3945 -0.39 0.70 
EDUCATION3 -28.363 23.009 -1.23 0.22 -5.051 4.2514 -1.19 0.24 
INCOME1 18.299 28.808 0.64 0.53 3.479 5.3228 0.65 0.51 
INCOME3 33.183* 17.871 1.86 0.06 6.255* 3.3021 1.89 0.06 
CONSTANT -271.959† 71.925 -3.78 0.00 -50.249† 13.2895 -3.78 0.00 
SIGMA 148.454 8.284       
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 938; Chi-square = 344.22; 
Log-L= -1412.684; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R-squared: 0.1086 
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lower than landowners that are unsure, while landowners that agree with allowing recreational 
use of their land if their liability concerns were eased have a WTA that is $9.28 higher than 
landowners that are unsure about allowing recreational use of their land if their liability concerns 
were eased.  The coefficient for RUSPROTECTS is significant at the 0.05 level of significance 
and negative in sign indicating that that the expected WTA of landowners that are unsure about 
the recreational use statute is $8.19 lower.  Landowners allowing fee-based recreation under an 
amended recreational use statute that also consider themselves to be risk seekers have an 
expected WTA that is $9.83 lower than landowners considering themselves to be risk neutral, 
which is significant at the 0.10 level.  The coefficient for MARGINALLAND is positive in sign 
and significant at the 0.10 level indicating that owning marginal land increases the predicted 
WTA by $5.57 as compared with landowners not owning marginal land.  Landowners who 
consider their primary occupation to be either business or to be self-employed have an expected 
WTA that is $7.78 and 9.08 lower that other landowners and is significant at the 0.10 level.  The 
coefficient for INCOME3 is significant at the 0.10 level and positive in sign indicating that 
landowners who have a household income of $75K or more have a predicted WTA that is $6.26 
greater than landowners having a household income of $25 to $75 thousand.           
Tobit parameter estimates for WTA associated with the decision to allow fee-based 
recreational access under an amended recreational use statue for Louisiana landowners are 
presented in table 5.21.  The coefficeint for ACCESSCUR is significant at the 0.01 level 
indicating that landowners allowing fee-based recreation under the current Louisiana recreational 
use statute have an expected WTA that is $19.20 greater than landowners that did not allow fee-
based recreation under the current recreational use statute.  The coefficient for WTACURRENT  
is significant at the 0.01 level of significance and positive in sign indicating that for each $1  
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Table 5.21.  Tobit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
amended Recreational Use Statute for Louisiana landowners. 
WTAAMENDED Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| dF/dx 
Std. 
Err z P>|z| 
ACCESSCUR 86.793† 24.927 3.48 0.00 19.2071† 4.7892 4.01 0.00 
WTACURRENT 0.861† 0.099 8.66 0.00 0.1654† 0.0191 8.66 0.00 
PERSONALUSE -33.596 23.429 -1.43 0.15 -6.5607 4.5014 -1.46 0.15 
FRIENDSFAMILY 22.851 22.909 1.00 0.32 4.3548 4.4015 0.99 0.32 
LEASEDREC 8.672 29.536 0.29 0.77 1.6902 5.6747 0.30 0.77 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 71.113 51.198 1.39 0.17 15.5626 9.8366 1.58 0.11 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 69.092 43.491 1.59 0.11 12.1423 8.3559 1.45 0.15 
WRITTENAGREE2 -5.329 25.154 -0.21 0.83 -1.0180 4.8328 -0.21 0.83 
WRITTENAGREE3 -0.115 21.651 -0.01 1.00 -0.0221 4.1598 -0.01 1.00 
CONCERNEASED2 -61.630‡ 27.755 -2.22 0.03 -11.5512‡ 5.3326 -2.17 0.03 
CONCERNEASED3 29.113 24.595 1.18 0.24 5.6708 4.7254 1.20 0.23 
NOTRESSPASS -3.491 19.916 -0.18 0.86 -0.6703 3.8264 -0.18 0.86 
RUSPROTECTS -22.652 21.087 -1.07 0.28 -4.4199 4.0515 -1.09 0.28 
INSURACEKNOW -8.548 21.174 -0.40 0.69 -1.6484 4.0681 -0.41 0.69 
RISKPREFERENCE1 -35.239 37.610 -0.94 0.35 -6.3478 7.2260 -0.88 0.38 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -44.035* 24.881 -1.77 0.08 -8.9112* 4.7804 -1.86 0.06 
MARGINALLAND 30.694 20.483 1.50 0.14 5.9363 3.9353 1.51 0.13 
MARGINALACRES -0.012 0.076 -0.16 0.87 -0.0023 0.0145 -0.16 0.87 
LANDOWNERCOOPER -10.107 21.931 -0.46 0.65 -1.9216 4.2137 -0.46 0.65 
COOPERATIVE  -33.222 27.417 -1.21 0.23 -6.0622 5.2676 -1.15 0.25 
CONSERVATION 10.744 20.142 0.53 0.59 2.0678 3.8698 0.53 0.59 
TRACTS 0.528 5.205 0.10 0.92 0.1014 1.0000 0.10 0.92 
ADJACENT -15.049 19.857 -0.76 0.45 -2.8792 3.8150 -0.75 0.45 
DISTANCE -0.155* 0.091 -1.71 0.09 -0.0299* 0.0174 -1.71 0.09 
TOTALACREAGE 0.013 0.017 0.79 0.43 0.0025 0.0032 0.79 0.43 
YEARSOWNERSHIP -0.359 0.487 -0.74 0.46 -0.0690 0.0936 -0.74 0.46 
OWNERSHIP1 -119.011 104.503 -1.14 0.26 -18.0273 20.0779 -0.90 0.37 
OWNERSHIP2 -11.295 42.616 -0.27 0.79 -2.1208 8.1877 -0.26 0.80 
OWNERSHIP3 -34.806* 20.843 -1.67 0.10 -6.5355* 4.0046 -1.63 0.10 
ACQUIRE1 31.918 34.277 0.93 0.35 6.1734 6.5855 0.94 0.35 
ACQUIRE2 -18.500 61.634 -0.30 0.76 -3.4213 11.8417 -0.29 0.77 
ACQUIRE3 31.713 35.334 0.90 0.37 6.0468 6.7886 0.89 0.37 
ROWCROPS 16.762 31.525 0.53 0.60 3.2014 6.0568 0.53 0.60 
COTTON -19.640 30.014 -0.65 0.51 -3.7665 5.7664 -0.65 0.51 
LEASEDFORAG -15.250 21.581 -0.71 0.48 -2.9644 4.1463 -0.71 0.48 
HAYLAND -27.769 26.715 -1.04 0.30 -5.1647 5.1327 -1.01 0.31 
LIVESTOCKLAND -11.858 27.400 -0.43 0.67 -2.2454 5.2643 -0.43 0.67 
GENDER -1.630 21.233 -0.08 0.94 -0.3128 4.0794 -0.08 0.94 
AGE 1.710‡ 0.853 2.00 0.05 0.3286‡ 0.1640 2.00 0.05 
ETHNIC 50.611 44.289 1.14 0.25 8.8253 8.5093 1.04 0.30 
OCUPATION1 33.755 29.757 1.13 0.26 6.8536 5.7171 1.20 0.23 
OCUPATION2 -1.691 31.007 -0.05 0.96 -0.3239 5.9573 -0.05 0.96 
OCUPATION3 -14.785 30.611 -0.48 0.63 -2.7693 5.8812 -0.47 0.64 
EDUCATION1 -5.057 21.083 -0.24 0.81 -0.9681 4.0506 -0.24 0.81 
EDUCATION3 -25.956 26.540 -0.98 0.33 -4.8085 5.0991 -0.94 0.35 
INCOME1 16.165 31.286 0.52 0.61 3.1935 6.0109 0.53 0.60 
INCOME3 12.698 21.903 0.58 0.56 2.4631 4.2081 0.59 0.56 
CONSTANT -294.720† 100.293 -2.94 0.00 -56.6241† 19.2692 -2.94 0.00 
SIGMA 132.498 9.461       
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 531; Chi-square = 209.67; 





indicated under the current recreational use statue results in an increase of $0.17 for WTA under 
the modified use statute.  Parameter estimates for CONCERNEASED2 is significant at the 0.05 
level and negative in sign indicating that landowners that disagree with allowing recreational use 
of their land if their liability concerns were eased have a WTA that is $11.55 lower than 
landowners that are unsure about allowing recreational use of their land if their liability concerns 
were eased.  The coefficients for RISKPREFERENCE2, DISTANCE, and OWNERSHIP3 are 
all negative in sign and significant at the 0.10 level of significance.  Landowners considering 
themselves to be risk averse have an expected WTA that is $8.91 lower than risk neutral 
landowners. The greater the distance a landowners’ nearest tract of non-residential land is from 
their primary residence the lower their WTA, since with each one mile increase in distance 
results in a $0.03 reduction in the expected WTA.  If a landowner owns land jointly and allows 
fee-based recreation, the effect on predicted WTA is a reduction of $6.54 as compared with 
landowners that are single owners.  AGE was the only significant demographic variable, which is 
significant at the 0.05 level and is positive in sign indicating that with each one year increase in 
age increases the expected WTA by $0.33.      
 Tobit parameter estimates for WTA associated with the decision to allow fee-based 
recreational access under an amended recreational use statue for Arkansas landowners are 
presented in table 5.22.  The coefficients for ACCESSCUR and WTACURRENT are both 
positive in sign and significant at the 0.01 level of significance.  This suggests that landowners 
who allow fee-based recreation under the current recreational use statute have a WTA that is 
$23.80 greater than landowners that did not allow fee-based recreation under the current 
recreational use statute but indicated they would allow it under a modified use statute.  The result 
for WTACURRENT indicates that for each $1 increase specified for WTA under the current  
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Table 5.22.  Tobit estimates for the decision to allow fee-based recreational access under the 
amended Recreational Use Statute for Arkansas landowners. 
WTAAMENDED Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>|t| dF/dx 
Std. 
Err z P>|z| 
ACCESSCUR 140.983† 42.437 3.320 0.001 23.7948† 5.8836 4.04 0.00 
WTACURRENT 1.096† 0.272 4.030 0.000 0.1519† 0.0377 4.03 0.00 
PERSONALUSE -53.493 40.267 -1.330 0.185 -7.5147 5.5828 -1.35 0.18 
FRIENDSFAMILY 53.973 41.652 1.300 0.196 7.3975 5.7748 1.28 0.20 
LEASEDREC 64.864 47.117 1.380 0.169 9.9064 6.5326 1.52 0.13 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 127.217‡ 65.592 1.940 0.053 21.6779‡ 9.0940 2.38 0.02 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 11.910 50.036 0.240 0.812 1.6324 6.9373 0.24 0.81 
WRITTENAGREE2 -4.081 41.243 -0.100 0.921 -0.5639 5.7182 -0.10 0.92 
WRITTENAGREE3 74.792‡ 36.206 2.070 0.040 10.9926‡ 5.0198 2.19 0.03 
CONCERNEASED2 -86.657‡ 41.619 -2.080 0.038 -11.8469‡ 5.7702 -2.05 0.04 
CONCERNEASED3 100.649† 36.127 2.790 0.006 15.3998† 5.0088 3.07 0.00 
NOTRESSPASS 13.707 31.613 0.430 0.665 1.8958 4.3830 0.43 0.67 
RUSPROTECTS -101.868† 34.331 -2.970 0.003 -15.6364† 4.7599 -3.29 0.00 
INSURACEKNOW -23.029 30.791 -0.750 0.455 -3.2400 4.2690 -0.76 0.45 
RISKPREFERENCE1 -119.491‡ 57.580 -2.080 0.039 -13.8467* 7.9832 -1.73 0.08 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -30.144 36.774 -0.820 0.413 -4.2896 5.0985 -0.84 0.40 
MARGINALLAND 30.129 34.109 0.880 0.378 4.2213 4.7291 0.89 0.37 
MARGINALACRES 0.064 0.118 0.540 0.588 0.0089 0.0164 0.54 0.59 
LANDOWNERCOOPER -2.680 32.260 -0.080 0.934 -0.3708 4.4727 -0.08 0.93 
COOPERATIVE  39.589 33.645 1.180 0.240 5.6381 4.6647 1.21 0.23 
CONSERVATION 27.470 31.924 0.860 0.390 3.8792 4.4261 0.88 0.38 
TRACTS 2.761 3.094 0.890 0.373 0.3828 0.4290 0.89 0.37 
ADJACENT -16.863 31.507 -0.540 0.593 -2.3164 4.3683 -0.53 0.60 
DISTANCE 0.123† 0.046 2.640 0.009 0.0170† 0.0064 2.64 0.01 
TOTALACREAGE -0.009 0.016 -0.560 0.579 -0.0012 0.0022 -0.56 0.58 
YEARSOWNERSHIP -0.291 0.276 -1.050 0.292 -0.0404 0.0383 -1.05 0.29 
OWNERSHIP1 -12.380 64.575 -0.190 0.848 -1.6802 8.9530 -0.19 0.85 
OWNERSHIP2 51.495 66.401 0.780 0.439 7.8200 9.2061 0.85 0.40 
OWNERSHIP3 0.149 29.781 0.010 0.996 0.0207 4.1289 0.01 1.00 
ACQUIRE1 -26.706 54.815 -0.490 0.626 -3.6869 7.5998 -0.49 0.63 
ACQUIRE2 10.548 72.818 0.140 0.885 1.4898 10.0959 0.15 0.88 
ACQUIRE3 -36.828 56.858 -0.650 0.518 -5.1570 7.8831 -0.65 0.51 
ROWCROPS -22.709 47.082 -0.480 0.630 -3.2348 6.5277 -0.50 0.62 
COTTON 84.254† 32.868 2.560 0.011 12.3273† 4.5569 2.71 0.01 
LEASEDFORAG 83.996‡ 38.163 2.200 0.028 11.0973‡ 5.2911 2.10 0.04 
HAYLAND 60.278 56.829 1.060 0.290 9.1047 7.8791 1.16 0.25 
LIVESTOCKLAND 57.747 57.093 1.010 0.312 8.6804 7.9156 1.10 0.27 
GENDER -8.392 37.063 -0.230 0.821 -1.1556 5.1386 -0.22 0.82 
AGE -1.635 1.251 -1.310 0.192 -0.2266 0.1735 -1.31 0.19 
ETHNIC 98.451 92.295 1.070 0.287 11.7104 12.7962 0.92 0.36 
OCUPATION1 -64.118 43.754 -1.470 0.144 -8.3246 6.0662 -1.37 0.17 
OCUPATION2 -151.285† 60.643 -2.490 0.013 -17.2375‡ 8.4078 -2.05 0.04 
OCUPATION3 -217.145† 80.855 -2.690 0.008 -22.3181‡ 11.2102 -1.99 0.05 
EDUCATION1 -17.325 34.999 -0.500 0.621 -2.3755 4.8525 -0.49 0.62 
EDUCATION3 -34.683 42.561 -0.810 0.416 -4.5961 5.9008 -0.78 0.44 
INCOME1 -24.382 72.298 -0.340 0.736 -3.2609 10.0238 -0.33 0.75 
INCOME3 45.956 32.373 1.420 0.157 6.5137 4.4883 1.45 0.15 
CONSTANT -237.039‡ 103.623 -2.290 0.023 -32.8643‡ 14.3668 -2.29 0.02 
SIGMA 146.218 12.818       
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 407; Chi-square = 197.61; 
Log-L= -533.99; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R-squared: 0.1561 
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recreational use statue results in an increase of $0.16 for WTA associated with allowing fee-
based recreation under an amended use statute.  The parameter estimate for 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 is significant at the 0.05 level and positive in sign indicating that 
landowners not concerned with the liability issues associated with allowing people on their land 
have an expected WTA that is $21.68 greater than landowners that are not sure about their 
liability concerns.  The coefficient for WRITTENAGREE3 is positive and significant at the 0.05 
level of significance.  This result indicates that landowner who believe that a written agreement 
can protect them from liability have a WTA that is $10.99 higher than landowners who are 
unsure about written agreements.   
The parameter estimates for CONCERNEASED2 and CONCERNEASED3 are both 
significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels and negative and positive in sign, respectively.  
Landowners that disagree (CONCERNEASED2) with allowing recreational use of their land if 
their liability concerns were eased have a predicted WTA that is $11.85 lower than landowners 
that are unsure, while landowners that agree (CONCERNEASED2) would have an expected 
WTA that would be $15.40 higher than a landowner that are unsure about allowing recreational 
use of their land if their liability concerns were eased.  The parameter estimated for 
RUSPROTECTS is negative in sign and significant at the 0.01 level of significance.  This 
suggests that the expected WTA of landowners that are unsure about the recreational use statute 
is $15.64 lower than landowners indicating knowledge of the recreational use statute.  The 
coefficient for RISKPREFERENCE1 is significant at the 0.05 level of significance and negative 
in sign; thus, landowners describing themselves as risk seekers (RISKPREFERENCE1) have an 
expected WTA that is $13.85 lower than landowners that consider themselves to be risk neutral. 
The effect of DISTANCE is positive in sign and significant at the 0.01 level of significance 
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indicating that with each one mile increase in distance of the nearest tract of non-residential land 
increases the expected WTA by $0.017 per acre.  The coefficient for COTTON is significant at 
the 0.01 level and is positive in sign suggesting that land used for cotton production results in 
landowners having a WTA that is $12.33 greater than landowners not having used their land for 
cotton production.  Landowners that have leased their land for agricultural purposes 
(LEASEDFORAG), which is significant at the 0.05 level, have a predicted WTA that is $11.10 
greater than landowners not having leased their land for agricultural purposes.  The parameter 
estimates for OCUPATION2 and OCUPATION3 are both negative in sign and significant at the 
0.01 level.  This result implies that the WTA for landowners that consider their primary 
occupation to be business or self-employed would be $17.24 and $22.32 lower than other 
landowners that do not consider their primary occupation to be business or self-employed. 
5.6.5. Multinomial Logit Model for Choice of Management Format for Offering Fee-
Based Recreation 
 
  A multinomial logit model was used to analyze the probability of landowners specifying 
one of three management regimes for offering fee-based recreation.  The multinomial logit 
model requires the assumptions of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which means 
that adding or deleting choice alternatives does not affect the relative odds of choosing among 
the existing alternatives.  The Hausman test for IIA did not indicate a violation of the of the IIA 
assumption.  Multinomial logit parameter estimates and odds ratios for the choice between 
management regimes for managing fee-based recreation are presented in table 5.23.   
Cooperatively vs. Independently 
 The coefficients for RUSPROTECTS and GENDER are both negative in sign and 
significant at the 0.01 level of significance.  The result for RUSPROTECTS implies that the odds 
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Table 5.23.  Parameter estimates for the multinomial logit regression analysis of the choice between management regimes for fee-
based recreation.  
Variable Cooperatively vs. Independently Outfitter vs. Independently Cooperatively vs. Outfitter 
CHOICE Coef. Std. Err RRR Coef. Std. Err RRR Coef. Std. Err RRR 
WTACURRENT 0.0032  0.0024 1.0032 0.0023 0.0030 1.0023 0.0009 0.0031 1.0009 
WTAAMENDED -0.0016  0.0020 0.9984 -0.0023 0.0031 0.9977 0.0006 0.0034 1.0006 
STATE 0.2567  0.5241 1.2927 0.4186 0.4226 1.5198 -0.1618 0.5884 0.8506 
PERSONALUSE -0.0857 0.6123 0.9179 -0.6316 0.5139 0.5317 0.5459 0.7001 1.7262 
FRIENDSFAMILY 0.0173 0.5782 1.0175 0.6247 0.4988 1.8678 -0.6074 0.6715 0.5448 
LEASEDREC 0.5762 0.7350 1.7793 -0.3328 0.6090 0.7169 0.9090 0.8436 2.4818 
LIABILITYCONCERN2 -0.7349 1.5442 0.4795 -0.4348 1.0112 0.6474 -0.3001 1.7060 0.7408 
LIABILITYCONCERN3 0.7490 0.9435 2.1149 0.3123 0.7428 1.3666 0.4367 1.0773 1.5475 
WRITTENAGREE2 -1.0172 0.7372 0.3616 -0.8979* 0.5590 0.4074 -0.1193 0.8371 0.8875 
WRITTENAGREE3 -0.0491 0.5186 0.9521 -0.1395 0.4328 0.8698 0.0904 0.5962 1.0946 
NOTRESSPASS 0.7065 0.5281 2.0270 0.6026 0.4057 1.8269 0.1039 0.5914 1.1095 
RUSPROTECTS -1.5701† 0.5485 0.2080 -0.1992 0.4464 0.8194 -1.3709‡ 0.6277 0.2539 
INSURACEKNOW 0.2189 0.5032 1.2447 0.4824 0.4040 1.6199 -0.2635 0.5743 0.7684 
RISKPREFERENCE1 -0.8841 0.9001 0.4131 0.8791 0.6223 2.4086 -1.7632* 0.9756 0.1715 
RISKPREFERENCE2 -0.0759 0.5904 0.9269 0.0854 0.4977 1.0891 -0.1612 0.6710 0.8511 
MARGINALLAND -0.2177 0.5202 0.8043 -0.1460 0.4519 0.8642 -0.0718 0.6055 0.9307 
MARGINALACRES 0.0008 0.0017 1.0008 0.0023 0.0015 1.0023 -0.0016 0.0019 0.9984 
COOPERATIVE  -0.0548 0.5765 0.9467 0.6765 0.4327 1.9669 -0.7312 0.6263 0.4813 
CONSERVATION -0.2029 0.5196 0.8164 -0.1898 0.4087 0.8271 -0.0131 0.5866 0.9870 
TRACTS -0.1882 0.1436 0.8284 0.0298 0.0396 1.0303 -0.2180 0.1453 0.8041 
ADJACENT -1.0894* 0.5732 0.3364 -0.0801 0.4000 0.9231 -1.0093 0.6365 0.3645 
DISTANCE 0.0019* 0.0010 1.0019 0.0014 0.0009 1.0014 0.0005 0.0009 1.0005 
TOTALACREAGE -0.0002 0.0004 0.9998 -0.0001 0.0002 0.9999 -0.0001 0.0004 0.9999 
YEARSOWNERSHIP -0.0129 0.0148 0.9872 0.0074 0.0073 1.0074 -0.0203 0.0155 0.9799 
Q41 -0.0667 0.5700 0.9354 -0.0487 0.4658 0.9525 -0.0181 0.6474 0.9821 
ROWCROPS -0.7474 0.5145 0.4736 -0.1565 0.4394 0.8551 -0.5909 0.5994 0.5538 
GENDER -1.6792† 0.7051 0.1865 0.1356 0.4485 1.1452 -1.8148‡ 0.7689 0.1629 
AGE 0.0297 0.0210 1.0301 0.0199 0.0160 1.0201 0.0098 0.0231 1.0098 
ETHNIC -0.7139 1.3579 0.4897 -2.0287‡ 0.9578 0.1315 1.3148 1.3011 3.7239 
OCUPATION1 -0.4991 0.7435 0.6071 0.3641 0.5396 1.4392 -0.8632 0.8112 0.4218 
EDUCATION1 0.6071 0.5533 1.8351 0.2626 0.4457 1.3003 0.3445 0.6332 1.4113 
EDUCATION3 -0.0125 0.6493 0.9876 0.0277 0.5197 1.0281 -0.0402 0.7312 0.9606 
INCOME1 1.1038 0.8820 3.0156 -2.2990* 1.3537 0.1004 3.4028‡ 1.5011 30.0476 
INCOME3 -0.2349 0.5314 0.7907 0.0034 0.4236 1.0034 -0.2382 0.6085 0.7880 
CONSTANT -0.4741 2.0674  -1.5117 1.4177  1.0376 2.1970  
†, ‡, *, indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. N = 229; Chi-square = 85.44; Log-L= -175.331; Prob>chi2 = 0.0749; 
Pseudo R-squared: 0.19
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of choosing to manage for fee-based recreation cooperatively rather than independently is 
decreased by 0.21 if landowners are unsure about the recreational use statute.  Also, the odds of 
choosing to manage for fee-based recreation cooperatively rather than independently are 0.19 
less for females than males.  The parameter estimate for ADJACENT is significant at the 0.10 
level and negative in sign.  This suggests that landowners having their nearest tract non-
residential land adjacent to their primary residence decreases the odds of choosing to manage 
fee-based recreation cooperatively rather than independently by 0.34.  The effect of DISTANCE 
is positive and significant at the 0.10 level of significance suggesting that with each one unit 
increase in distance, the odds of choosing to manage for fee-based recreation cooperatively 
rather than independently is increased by 1.    
Outfitter vs. Independently 
 Parameter estimates for WRITTENAGREE2, ETHNIC, and INCOME1 are negative in 
sign and significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  For landowners that disagree 
that a written agreement can protect them from liability, the odds of choosing to manage for fee-
based recreation using an outfitter rather than choosing to offer fee-based recreation 
independently is decreased by 0.41 as compared to landowners that are unsure about written 
agreements.  The odds of white landowners choosing to use an outfitter rather than opting to 
manage independently is 0.13 less as compared to non-whites.  For landowners with annual 
household incomes of less than $25 thousand, the odds of choosing the outfitter management 
option over managing independently are decreased by 0.10 as compared with landowners with 
annual household incomes in the $25 to $75 thousand range. 
 Cooperatively vs. Outfitter 
 The coefficients for RUSPROTECTS, RISKPREFERENCE1, and GENDER are negative 
 98
in sign and significant at the 0.05, 0.10, and 0.05 levels, respectively.  The result for 
RUSPROTECTS indicates that the odds of choosing to manage for fee-based recreation 
cooperatively rather than using an outfitter are decreased by 0.23 for landowners who are unsure 
about the recreational use statute.  The odds of choosing to manage for fee-based recreation 
cooperatively rather than using an outfitter are 0.16 less for females than males indicating that 
females are more likely to prefer an outfitter.  For landowners with annual household incomes of 
less than $25 thousand, the odds are increased by 30.04 to choosing to manage for fee-based 
recreation cooperatively rather than using an outfitter as compared with landowners with annual 
household incomes in the $25 to $75 thousand range.  The result for RISKPREFERENCE1 
suggests that the odds of selecting the management option of cooperatively as opposed to 
outfitter are decreased by 0.17 if landowners consider themselves to be risking seekers as 
compared with landowners that consider themselves to be risk neutral. 
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION, SUMMARY, AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. Discussion of Descriptive Analysis Results 
6.1.1. Demographics 
The significant differences between Arkansas and Louisiana landowner educational 
levels indicate that Louisiana respondents are better educated than Arkansas respondents.  A 
higher percentage of Arkansas respondents have less than a high school education and more 
Louisiana respondents have attained a graduate or professional degree.  Arkansas respondents 
appear to have higher household incomes than Louisiana respondents as indicated by Arkansas 
respondents dominating income categories above $50 thousand and Louisiana respondents have 
higher percentages for nearly all of the income categories below $50 thousand.   
6.1.2. Recreational Use and Land Access Practices 
More than half of both Arkansas and Louisiana respondents have allowed individuals 
outside of their immediate households to use their land for recreational purposes; however, such 
access is not commonly allowed for individuals that landowners do not know personally, as just 
over 10% of landowners have allowed recreational access to individuals they do not know 
personally.  And when it comes to allowing fee-based recreational access, only 11.5% and 11.2% 
of all Arkansas and Louisiana respondents indicated they had accepted money to allow 
recreational use of their land.  
6.1.3. Risk and Liability Issues 
The vast majority of respondents indicated that they are very concerned about the liability 
issues associated with allowing people on their land.  This concern may explain in part why so 
few landowners have allowed recreational access to individuals they do not know personally.  
However, when asked if their liability concerns were eased would they be more inclined to allow 
recreational access, 26% of Arkansas and 36% of Louisiana landowners indicated that they either 
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somewhat or strongly agreed.  This Indicates that an institutional change may increase 
recreational access to private lands, particularly so for Louisiana.  However, over 40% 
respondents either somewhat or strongly disagreed with allowing recreational access if their 
liability concerns were eased indicating that liability concern may not be a major factor in the 
decision not to allow recreational access for some landowners. 
The results indicated that there exists a clear need for more landowner education.  When 
it came to having a knowledge of liability and legal issues, the vast majority of respondents 
either do not know or are unsure about matters regarding written agreements between 
landowners and land entrants, posting of “no trespassing” signs, state recreational use statutes, 
and the availability of liability insurance for fee-based recreation.   
Another possible factor that may influence the decision to allow fee-based recreation is 
that of risk preference.  Allowing recreational use of land introduces the risk associated with 
liability, and over 70% of respondents indicate that they are risk averse and that they tend to 
avoid risk in their financial decisions.  The implications are that many landowners may choose 
not to allow fee-based recreation because of the liability risk but it may also indicate that an 
institutional change reducing landowner liability may increase landowner willingness to allow 
fee-based recreation.    
6.1.4. Marginal Lands 
Fee-based recreation may be more attractive to respondents having land that they 
consider to be marginal for agricultural purposes, and more than 40% of respondents indicated 
ownership of marginal land.   There seems to be potential for developing such opportunities as 
results indicate a high volume of marginal land, particularly in Louisiana.  Louisiana respondents 
considered 33.3% of their lands to be marginal for agricultural purposes as compared with 
Arkansas landowners viewing 25.2% of their land as marginal on average.  About 80% of 
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respondents described their marginal land as forest or wooded areas, which would be ideal for 
certain types of wildlife associated fee-based recreation.   
6.1.5. Fee Based Recreational Use of Land 
When landowners were asked if they would be willing to allow fee-based recreation on 
their land, Arkansas and Louisiana landowners responded very similarly with 14.2% and 14.1% 
indicating yes, respectively.  An institutional change that reduces the liability risk to the 
landowner does seem to increase the responsiveness of landowners to allowing fee-based 
recreation.  When landowners were presented with a hypothetical scenario describing a change to 
the recreational use statute that would allow them to charge a fee for recreational access and keep 
the liability protection afforded to free access landowners, the number of landowners indicating a 
willingness to allow access increased to 20.6% for Arkansas and 24% for Louisiana. That is a 
45% increase for Arkansas respondents and a 70% increase for Louisiana.  Clearly, an 
institutional change that reduces the liability risk to landowners can increase the potential 
amount of private land that could be used for fee-based recreation, again particularly so for 
Louisiana.   The average amount of land that landowners would be willing to use for fee-based 
recreation was 259.3 acres for Arkansas and 256.6 for Louisiana landowners.  So under the 
current recreational use statute or with a modification to the Louisiana and Arkansas recreational 
use statute, the potential exists to make available a sizable amount land for public fee-based 
recreational use.  
It was interesting to note the various activities that landowners indicated that they would 
not allow on their land if they did allow fee-based recreation.  The top two banned activities were 
ATV riding and camping.  Not allowing ATV riding and camping may reflect concerns over 
liability associated with potential injury (i.e., accidental injury resulting from ATV riding) or this 
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may reflect landowner concerns for damage to property due to soil compaction from ATV riding 
or littering by campers.    
When this research project was first proposed, it was considered that a cooperative form 
of land management might be a possible way to allow landowners with marginal land or small 
tracts of land to pool their land resources together to increase their total volume of manageable 
land.  However, of the three management options presented to landowners, managing fee-based 
recreation cooperatively was the least favored option with the vast majority of landowners 
indicating a preference for managing for fee-based recreation independently followed by using 
an outfitter.  This lack of preference for the cooperative management option is interesting given 
that the over 25% of landowners have worked with their neighboring or adjacent landowners and 
over 95% indicated that it was a beneficial to them. 
6.1.6. Current Land Uses 
One interesting difference between Arkansas and Louisiana landowners was the level of 
participation in government conservation programs.  Having land, either currently or in the past, 
in programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program or Wetland Reserve Program were much 
more common among Louisiana (60%) than Arkansas (32.5%) landowners.  This suggests that 
Louisiana landowners in the Delta may have a greater willingness than Arkansas landowners to 
adopt non-agricultural uses of their land.       
While most landowners are single owners, 45 % of Arkansas and 37% of Louisiana 
landowners indicated they owned the land jointly.  Such joint owners of land responding to the 
survey may not be comfortable with allowing fee-based recreation since they may lack autonomy 
in the decision process.  In addition, there may be costs involved such as the cost of having to 
deal with their co-owners, the cost of bargaining and negotiating.  Alternative land uses may also 
not be as attractive to individuals that purchased land, which was indicated by over 55% of 
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respondents, with the assumption that they purchased the land for some specific purpose or use 
in mind.  However, 46% of respondents indicated that they acquired land through inheritance and 
may be more inclined to consider alternative uses of the land if it is not already used to generate 
revenue.       
Certain agricultural commodities tended to be more common in each state.  For example, 
in the northeast section of Louisiana cotton and corn were more common while in delta counties 
of Arkansas commodities such as rice, soybeans, and wheat were more common.  Also, 
agricultural production of row crops was much more common for Arkansas landowners, 81.7%, 
as compared to as compared with Louisiana landowners, 57.4%.  This difference suggests that 
more Louisiana landowners might be willing to consider alternative land uses since nearly half 
are not using their land for agriculture.   
6.2. Discussion of First and Second Mailing Respondents 
The potential for non-response bias is always a concern for survey data.  This results 
when people who respond to a survey are different from sampled individuals that did not respond 
in a way relevant to the study (Dillman, 2000).  One approach to test for the presence of non 
response bias is the comparison of early to late respondents with late respondents serving as a 
proxy for non-respondents.  T-tests comparing demographics of first and second mailing 
respondents provided little evidence of non-response bias.  Out of 41 possible responses, only 4 
were significantly different between first and second mailing for Louisiana respondents.  There 
was slightly more evidence of non-response bias for Arkansas respondents as indicated by 11 of 
the 41 responses being significantly different.    
A more telling indicator of non-response bias and its possible influence on study results 
can be observed by examining responses to questions relating to the decision to allow fee-based 
recreation.  Respondents having a greater interest in alternative land uses tended to respond to 
 104
the first mailing while late respondents demonstrated less interest in alternative land uses (Table 
6.1.).   
Table 6.1.  Percentage of first and second mailing respondents indicating a willingness to allow 
fee-based recreation under the current and amended recreational use statutes. 
Arkansas 1st mailing 2nd mailing 
Willing to allow fee-based recreation (current RUS) n = 343 19.30% n = 142 0.70%
Willing to allow fee-based recreation (amended RUS) n = 340 27.90% n = 142 1.40%
Louisiana 1st mailing 2nd mailing 
Willing to allow fee-based recreation (current RUS) n = 448 18.10% n = 184 4.40%
Willing to allow fee-based recreation (amended RUS) n = 445 31.20% n = 184 5.40%
 
The willingness to accept values for allowing fee-based recreation were only supplied by first 
mailings respondents as second mailing respondents consistently bypassed the questions asking 
how much money they would be willing to accept to allow fee-based recreational use of their 
land.  This underscores that landowners not having an interest in alternative land uses were more 
likely not to respond to the survey.   
6.3. Discussion of Willingness to Accept and Transaction Cost 
It was hypothesized that an institutional change that reduced the potential for liability 
would reduce the transaction cost associated with offering fee-based recreation.  If this is true 
then a reduction in the willingness to accept for landowners allowing fee-based recreation pre 
and post institutional change should reflect this transaction cost savings.  The theory appears to 
hold for Louisiana landowners but not for Arkansas landowners.  For Louisiana landowners 
allowing fee-based recreation pre- and post-institutional change the mean WTA was reduced by 
$4.67 per acre per year.    For Arkansas respondents the change in mean WTA was an increase of 
$1.51 per acre pre year.  Evidence from the demographic responses suggests that Louisiana 
survey respondents are better educated than Arkansas respondents, perhaps indicating that 
Louisiana respondents better understood the implications of reduced liability risk such that the 
compensation they required would be less post institutional change.  The results of the Tobit 
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models discussed in the next section provide additional evidence of transaction cost reduction for 
both Louisiana and Arkansas that is based on expected value rather than simply comparing mean 
values.       
6.4. Discussion of Econometric Results  
 6.4.1. Decision to Allow Access  
 The potential effect of easing the liability concern of landowners was a very significant 
predictor for the probability of allowing fee-based recreation whether pre- or post-institutional 
change.  This is represented by the two variables that indicate if landowners disagree 
(CONCERNEASED2) or agree (CONCERNEASED3) with allowing recreational use of their 
land if their liability concerns were eased.  This provided a very consistent theme across all six 
probit models where if they disagreed the effect was negative and if they agreed the effect was 
positive for the decision to allow recreational access.  This provides a very clear indication that 
for many landowners the reason they chose not to allow fee-based recreational access is not 
related to liability concern but rather because of other exclusive uses whether it be purely 
agricultural application or because of the negative effect on their utility resulting from loss of 
exclusive use of their land for recreational purposes.     
 As for the positive effect of CONCERNEASED3 (i.e., agree with allowing recreational 
use of their land if their liability concerns were eased) and its significance in all six probit 
models, one would expect the magnitude of the positive effect to be greater in the post 
institutional change models, since the liability risk would be lower for landowners under the 
post-institutional change environment relative to the pre-institutional change conditions.  This 
appears to be true in the Louisiana and combined states models but not for the Arkansas model.  
In the combined states and Louisiana pre- and post-institutional change models the probabilities 
of allowing fee-based recreation increase from 11.8% to 15.9% and 6.9% to 11.9%, respectively.  
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This reflects the responsiveness of landowners to an institutional change, meaning that 
landowners would be much more likely to allow fee-based recreation following an institutional 
change that reduces their liability concerns.  However, in the Arkansas models this result is 
reversed.  The percentages are 15.7% in the pre-institutional change environment and only 3.2% 
post- institutional change.  This result for Arkansas is contrary to reason, similar to the 
transaction cost result noted previously, and may be attributable to some of the same reasons, 
such as a lack of understanding by Arkansas respondents proxied by their lower educational 
levels relative to Louisiana respondents.              
 The element of risk is inherent in allowing fee-based recreation.  This risk exists as 
liability with the ever looming potential of a lawsuit, which can be a potentially powerful 
disincentive to a landowner depending on how a landowner perceives risk.  The influence of risk 
preference was represented in the probit models by the two dummy variables of 
RISKPREFERENCE1, indicating risk seeking behavior, and RISKPREFERENCE2, indicating 
risk aversion.  Given that the risk is far greater under the current institutional arrangements, it is 
not surprising that these two variables are significant only in the pre-institutional change probit 
models and not in the post-institutional change model scenario where the riskiness of allowing 
fee-based recreational access is substantially lessened.  However, in the three pre-institutional 
change probit models these variables are significant and have the expected sign consistent with 
theory.  An individual that is a risk seeker would be more likely to allow fee-based recreation 
under the current institutional environment.  In the Arkansas and combined states probit models 
the probability of allowing fee-based recreation under the current institutional environment was 
21.5% and 9.8% greater for risk seekers.  However, in the Louisiana and combined states probit 
models the probability to allow fee-based recreation under the current institutional environment 
was 13.6% and 6.6% lower for risk averse landowners. 
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 The fact that the variable indicating if landowners are aware about the availability of 
commercial liability insurance (INSURACEKNOW) is significant and negative in sign only in 
the pre-institutional change probit and not significant in the post-institutional change models is 
interesting.  Being unsure about the availability of commercial liability insurance 
(INSURACEKNOW) has a negative effect on the decision to allow fee-based recreation and 
reduces the probability of allowing access by 4.6% for Louisiana, 5.1% for Arkansas, and 6.6% 
for both states combined.  Having such insurance would reduce the risk of allowing fee-based 
recreation under the current institutional environment.  The fact that this variable is not 
significant in the post-institutional change model is not surprising since the value of such 
insurance would be reduced following a change to the recreational use statute that extends 
liability protection to landowners charging a fee for recreational access.   
 It was hypothesized that marginal landowners might be more willing to use their land for 
fee-based recreation, since generating income through agricultural applications may not be 
practical or profitable.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the variable indicating ownership of 
marginal land is significant and positive in sign for both the Louisiana and combined states 
probit models.  In addition, marginal landowners appear to be very responsive to institutional 
change.  Under the current recreational use statute marginal landowners have a 5.4% higher 
probability of allowing fee-based recreation than non-marginal landowners, which increases to 
10.5% post-institutional change.  It appears that Louisiana marginal landowners are also 
responsiveness to institutional change, since they have an increased probability of 6.5% for pre-
institutional change and 11.4% post-institutional change.          
 Having land in government conservation programs, such as the Conservation Reserve 
Program and Wetland Reserve Program, has a positive effect on the probability of allowing fee 
based recreation under both the pre- and post-institutional change environments.  It was 
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hypothesized that such a relationship may exist since such landowners have a demonstrated 
willingness to use their land for non-traditional agricultural uses.  Therefore, it is not surprising 
to find that these landowners have a higher probability of adopting fee-based recreation and to 
find that these landowners are also responsive to an institutional change, which resulted in an 
increased probability of 6% pre-institutional change to 9.6% post-institutional change in the 
combined states model. Therefore individuals that use their land for alternative land applications 
such as conservation programs would be more likely to allow fee-based recreation.       
 The organization of land ownership seems to influence the decision to allow fee-based 
recreation.  Joint ownership as compared with single ownership appears to have a negative effect 
on the probability of allowing fee based recreation under both the pre- and post-institutional 
change environments, whereas limited liability ownership has a positive effect as compared with 
single ownership on the probability of allowing fee based recreation under the current 
institutional environment.  The negative effect of joint ownership may, as noted previously, be a 
result of joint owners having a lack of autonomy in the decision process and thus are not 
comfortable or able to make a decision regarding fee-based recreation.  The result that LLC 
landownership has a positive effect on allowing fee-based recreation may be related to the legal 
structure of LLCs, in that the personal wealth of the individual is better protected from liability 
as compared with either single or joint ownership.  Therefore, the higher probability of choosing 
to allow fee-based recreation under the current institutional setting by LLC landowners may 
likely result from that recognition on the part of the landowner.  Also, for that same reason it is 
not surprising that the same variable is not significant in the post-institutional change model 
where liability issues and associated risk are greatly reduced and the comparative benefit to LLC 
landowners over joint or single landowners is also greatly reduced.       
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 6.4.2. Willingness to Accept Compensation to Allow Access  
 
 The significance of the variable STATE and the result that the expected WTA for 
Louisiana landowners is $7.18 lower than the WTA of Arkansas landowners may be due in part 
the perceived higher value, quality, and use of Arkansas land as compared to the same 
perceptions of Louisiana landowners.  For example, Arkansas respondents indicated that they 
believed on average that only 25% of their land was marginal for agricultural purposes as 
compared to Louisiana landowners indicating that about 33% of their land could be considered 
marginal. So the volume of non-marginal land is higher on average for Arkansas respondents 
while the amount of land that both Arkansas and Louisiana landowners would consider using for 
recreational purposes is nearly identical at about 259 acres for Arkansas and 256 acres for 
Louisiana respondents.  Consider also that Arkansas landowners value their marginal land 
slightly higher than Louisiana landowners, which may also help explain the differential in 
expected WTA.  Arkansas landowners on average reported the value of their marginal land at 
$1.4 thousand as compared to $1.3 thousand.  Considering these factors it is not surprising that 
the expected WTA of Louisiana landowners is $7.18 per acre per year lower than the WTA of 
Arkansas landowners. 
 The significant and positive effect of the variables ACCESSCUR and WTACURRENT 
was a result that was consistent across all three of the post-institutional change tobit models.  The 
significant and positive effect of ACCESSCUR indicates that landowners who choose to allow 
fee-based recreation under both pre- and post-institutional change environments have higher 
WTA values than landowners only opting to allow fee-based recreation post-institutional change.  
Landowners allowing fee-based recreation under the current recreational use statute have an 
expected WTA that is $24.52 greater than landowners that did not allow fee-based recreation 
under the current recreational use statute.  This result suggests that the negative effect of liability 
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hypothesized in the theoretical model has a much higher impact on landowners choosing to allow 
recreation only under the post-institutional change environment as compared to those who would 
allow it pre- and post-institutional change.  Apparently the potential transaction cost for 
landowners not allowing fee-based recreation pre-institutional change is perceived as being 
greater than it is by landowners opting to allow fee-based recreation pre-institutional change.  
Thus, when the effect of that transaction cost associated with liability is reduced by an 
institutional change the WTA of pre-institutional change non-access granting landowners is 
much lower than pre-institutional change access granting landowners.  This implies that not only 
are transactions associated with liability evident but that transaction costs are perceived 
differently by pre-institutional change access and non-access granting landowners.  The 
significant and positive effect of WTACURRENT also provides indication of a reduction in 
transaction cost that would be afforded to landowners under a modified recreational use statute, 
since with each $1 increase in WTA indicated under the current recreational use statute results in 
an increase of $0.17 for expected WTA under the modified use statute.  These results imply that 
a modification to the recreational use statute that extended liability protection to fee-based 
recreational access granting landowner would reduce the transaction cost borne by landowners 
thus reducing the fee for recreation use of land and also potentially reducing the cost of fee-based 
recreation to the public.      
 Further possible evidence of a reduction in transaction costs can be seen in results for the 
variables CONCERNEASED3, MARGINALLAND, and RISKPREFERENCE2.  The WTA of 
landowners that agree with allowing recreational use of their land if their liability concerns were 
eased (CONCERNEASED3) have a WTA that is $15.10 higher than landowners that are unsure 
about allowing recreational use of their land if their liability concerns were eased.  The post-
institutional change expected WTA is $9.28 higher than landowners that are unsure about 
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allowing recreational use of their land if their liability concerns were eased.  The difference in 
the magnitude of the marginal effects seems to indicate that institutional change does reduce the 
transaction cost of fee-based recreation.  A similar result can be observed for marginal 
landowners.  Pre-institutional change marginal landowners have an expected WTA that is $7.61 
higher than landowners not owning marginal land.  Following an institutional change the WTA 
of marginal landowners is $5.57 higher than non-marginal landowners.  A possible better 
indicator of the reduction in transaction costs may captured by the variable 
RISKPREFERENCE2 which indicates if a landowner is a risk seeker.  Risk seekers derive 
greater utility from investments with higher returns and greater risk.  Allowing fee-based 
recreation under the current recreational use statute is riskier than under a modified recreational 
use statute that would extend liability protection to landowners charging a fee for recreational 
access.  Therefore, it is interesting to notice that under a pre-institutional change environment 
that risk seekers have an expected WTA that is $15.48 greater than risk neutral landowners, yet 
after an institutional change that substantially reduces the risk of liability it is observed that risk 
seekers have an expected WTA that is $9.83 lower than landowners considering themselves to be 
risk neutral.  This difference in magnitude of the marginal effects seems to indicate that 
institutional change does reduce the risk of liability and the transaction cost associated with 
offering fee-based recreation.   
 6.4.3. Preference for Organizational Form  
 The cooperative management option appears to be the least appealing to landowners as is 
evidenced by the negative sign for all significant variable coefficients in the multinomial logit 
model for choice of organizational form to manage fee-based recreation.  There is one exception, 
as indicated by the variable DISTANCE, which implies that the odds of choosing the cooperative 
management option increases by 1 with each one mile increase in distance.  In other words the 
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farther landowners’ nearest tract of land is from their home the more likely landowners would 
choose the cooperative management option over choosing to manage land independently.  As a 
contrast to this observation, notice that the variable ADJACENT has a negative effect on the 
odds of choosing the cooperative management option over independently managing for fee-
based recreation.  This means that the odds of choosing to manage cooperative rather than 
independently are 0.34 times lower if a landowner’s nearest tract of land is adjacent to their 
primary residence.   
 The variable GENDER indicates that the estimated odds of women choosing the 
cooperative over independent management option were 0.18 times lower than men and the odds 
of women choosing to manage cooperatively over using an outfitter were 0.16 lower then men.  
These results suggest that men rather than women would be more likely candidates for a 
cooperative approach to fee-based recreation.  ETHNIC indicates that the odds of whites 
choosing the outfitter management option rather than managing independently are 0.13 times 
lower compared to non-whites.  These results suggest that if the outfitter industry seeks to 
acquire private land to manage, they should target landowners that are women and of non-white 
ethnicity.  The results for variable INCOME1 indicate that landowners with annual household 
incomes of less than $25 thousand are much more likely to choose to manage for fee-based 
recreation cooperatively rather than using an outfitter.  In fact, the odds are 30 times higher that 
they would choose the cooperative option over using an outfitter as compared with landowners 
with annual household incomes in the $25 to $75 thousand range.  These results suggest that the 
best candidates for the cooperative approach to fee-based recreation, in terms of demographics, 
would be men in the income lower income ranges.   
 Any management option other than managing independently was not preferred by 
landowners that were unsure about legal issues associated with land ingress.  The odds of 
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choosing to manage for fee-based recreation cooperatively rather than independently is 
decreased by 0.21 if landowners are unsure about the recreational use statute, and the odds of 
choosing to manage for fee-based recreation using an outfitter rather than choosing to offer fee-
based recreation independently is decreased by 0.41 for landowners that disagree 
(WRITTENAGREE2) that a written agreement can protect them from liability as compared to 
landowners that are unsure about written agreements.  This suggests that educating landowners 
about legal issues associated with recreational use of their property might increase the 
willingness of landowners to consider a cooperative management approach.  However, managing 
for fee-based recreation cooperatively was thought to be an ideal approach for smaller 
landowners interested in offering fee-based recreation, yet the variable indicating size of 
landownership was not a significant predictor of management choice.  This may indicate a need 
for educational programs highlighting the value of increasing the volume of land used for 
wildlife management that could be achieved by managing cooperatively.  Interestingly, 
landowners are apparently not choosing the cooperative option not because they believe it to be 
risky, since individuals that are risk seekers are more likely to prefer the outfitter option over the 
cooperative.  The odds of selecting the cooperative management option over opting to use an 
outfitter are decreased by 0.17 if landowners consider themselves to be risk seeking as compared 
with landowners that consider themselves to be risk neutral.         
6.5. Summary  
 Land in Delta counties and parishes of Arkansas and Louisiana have traditionally been 
used for agricultural purposes; however, other non-agricultural land uses such as fee-based 
recreation may be of interest to landowners, particularly for owners of lower quality marginal 
agricultural land.  Such lands are often targeted for removal from agricultural applications by the 
U.S. Federal Government through incentive programs such as the Conservation Reserve 
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Program, Grassland Reserve Program, and the Wetland Reserve Program.  The primary 
objectives of this study were to understand potential willingness of landowners to use marginal 
agricultural or productive lands for fee-based recreational applications, to determine the factors 
serving as incentives or disincentives to the landowner, what form of wildlife based recreational 
enterprise would or do landowners prefer, how liability concerns and other possible disincentives 
collectively influence landowners’ access decisions, and how institutional change might 
influence landowners’ willingness to allow fee-based recreation.  
 All 50 states have recreational use statutes that are intended to encourage landowners to 
make their lands available for free public recreational use by providing liability protection to the 
landowner; however, there are an increasing number of states allowing landowners to charge a 
fee and retain the liability protection.  The recreational use statutes for Arkansas and Louisiana 
do not apply to landowners charging a fee for recreational use of their land.  Might landowners 
be responsive to changes in the recreational use statute that expand the liability protection to 
allow the charging of fees for recreational access?  Such an institutional change would reduce the 
risk to the landowners; thus, it was hypothesized that risk associated with liability would be a 
significant factor in the landowner decision to allow fee-based recreational use of their land.  
Does this risk create a cost to the landowner?  The potential for a lawsuit, whether real or 
perceived, creates a disincentive for fee-based recreation to the landowner and an opportunity 
cost. To mitigate the disincentive of liability the landowner may incur costs associated with 
seeking legal information, consulting lawyers, having contracts drafted to protect property rights 
and reduce liability, and/or securing commercial liability insurance. All of these actions create a 
transaction cost for fee-based recreation.  If this transaction cost exists there should be a 
reduction in the pre- and post-institutional change willingness to accept value to allow fee-based 
recreation.   
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 This study surveyed delta landowners in Arkansas and Louisiana on their willingness to 
allow fee-based recreational use of their land, their current recreational use and land access 
practices, ownership of marginal land, current land uses, and demographic information.  The data 
collected from the survey was analyzed descriptively and econometrically.   Econometric models 
utilized in this study include probits (to analyze factors related to the probability of allowing fee-
based recreation), tobits, (to analyze factors influencing the expected willingness to accept values 
associated with fee-based recreation) and multinomial logits (to examine factors that influence 
the probability of landowners choosing an organizational form to manage and market fee-based 
recreation).  
 Many landowners indicate that their family and friends use their land for recreational 
purposes; however, only slightly more than 11% of landowners had charged a fee for 
recreational use.  Over 14% of landowners indicated they would be willing to allow people to 
pay them a fee to access their land for recreational purposes.  So there is some existing potential 
for developing fee-based recreation on private land.  As far as using marginal land for 
recreational purposes, probit model results indicate that marginal landowners have a higher 
probability of allowing fee-based recreation as do landowners having land in conservation 
programs.  This indicates that landowners are desirous for alternatives ways to generate income 
using non-traditional non-agricultural means.     
 The perception of risk and liability seems to influence a landowner’s decision to allow 
fee-based recreation.  The vast majority of landowners indicated that they are concerned about 
the liability issues associated with allowing people on their land.  It is also interesting that a great 
majority of landowners (over 70%) consider themselves to be risk averse.  It would seem 
reasonable that a risk seeking landowner would be more likely and a risk averse landowner 
would be less likely to allow fee-based recreation under the current recreational use statute for 
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Louisiana and Arkansas, which does not extend liability protection to landowners that charge a 
fee for recreational access.  Probit model results seem to confirm this indicating that risk seeking 
landowners have a higher and risk averse landowners have lower probability of choosing to 
allowing fee-based recreation.   
 Given the landowners’ concern over liability, the inherent element of risk in allowing fee-
based recreation, and the fact that the vast majority of landowners consider themselves to be risk 
averse, it would seem that an institutional change resulting in greater liability protection for 
landowners would increase the willingness of landowners to allow fee-based recreation.  Survey 
results revealed that 26% of Arkansas and 36% of Louisiana respondents would be more likely 
to allow fee-based recreational access if their liability concerns were eased.  So how effective 
would a change in the recreational use statute be in terms of easing the liability concerns of 
landowners.  Probit models results indicate that landowners concerned about liability would have 
a much higher probability of allowing fee-based recreation under a modified recreational use 
statute with an 11.9% higher probability for Louisiana and only 3.2% higher probability for 
Arkansas landowners.  This seems to indicate that Louisiana landowners concerned about 
liability issues would be more responsive to a change in the recreational use statute than 
Arkansas landowners. 
 One of the primary questions sought to be answered by this study was whether a 
transaction cost exists for fee-based recreation, which is borne by delta landowners, and can 
transaction costs be reduced by adopting a modified recreational use statute as has been done by 
19 other states.  When looking at the mean values reported by survey respondents it appears that 
the theory holds for Louisiana but not for Arkansas.  However, results for the tobit models seem 
to indicate evidence of reduced transaction costs for both Louisiana and Arkansas landowners.  
Rather than examining simple means, the Tobit model results allow for a comparison of pre- and 
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post- institutional expected WTA by modeling post-institutional WTA as a function of pre-
institutional WTA and the decision to allow recreational access in the pre-institutional change 
environment.   Tobit model results indicate that landowners allowing fee-based recreation both 
pre- and post-institutional change have an expected WTA that is $24.52 greater than landowners 
that did not allow fee-based recreation under the current recreational use statute.  This results 
implies that the perceived transaction cost is so high under the pre institutional environment that 
many landowners do not allow fee-based recreation, and when this transaction cost associated 
with liability is eliminated the expected WTA for landowners allowing recreation post-
institutional change only is much lower than for landowners allowing both pre- and post-
institutional change.  Transaction costs are also evident in the relationship between expected 
WTA post-instructional change and WTA pre-institutional change.  Tobit model results indicate 
that with each $1 increase in WTA under the current recreational use statute results in an 
increase of $0.17 for expected WTA under the modified use statute.  This implies that there is a 
transaction cost savings resulting from the institutional change. 
 Study results indicated that the vast majority of landowners prefer to manage fee-based 
recreation themselves.  Using an outfitter was much less preferred followed by managing 
cooperatively with other local landowners, and there were no significant differences between 
Arkansas and Louisiana landowners in terms of management choice.  It appears that the only 
factor indicating a higher probability of preferring the cooperative management option was 
distance meaning that the farther a landowners nearest tract of land is from their home the more 
likely the landowner would choose the cooperative management option over choosing to manage 
the land independently.  A higher probability of choosing to use an outfitter to manage land for 
fee-based recreation exists for landowners that are women or of non-white ethnicity, which is a 





 Amending the Arkansas and Louisiana recreational use statute can increase the number of 
private landowners willing to use their land for fee-based recreational use.  About 14% of 
landowners indicated that they would be willing to allow fee-based recreation under the current 
institutional environment.  If the Arkansas and Louisiana recreational use statutes were amended 
giving greater liability protection landowners, the number of landowners willing to allow fee-
based recreation would increase to over 20% of Arkansas and nearly 24% of Louisiana 
landowners.  That is a 45% increases for Arkansas respondents and a 70% increase for 
Louisiana.  Clearly, an institutional change that reduces the liability risk to landowners can 
increase the potential amount of private land that could be used for fee-based recreation, again 
particularly so for Louisiana.   Over 40% of landowners have land that is marginal for 
agricultural purposes with the average ownership of marginal land being slightly more than 100 
acres.  Owners of marginal land were particularly responsive to an institutional change providing 
greater liability protection.  Amending the recreational use statute would increase the amount of 
land available for recreation by providing a needed incentive for landowners as landowners on 
average would be willing to allocate a little more than 250 acres for fee-based recreation.        
 A fee-based recreational enterprise under the current legal environment caries with it the 
risk of liability; thus, as expected, risk preference was a significant predictor of the decision to 
allow fee-based recreation.  Risk averse landowners were more unlikely and risk seeking 
landowners were much more likely to allow fee-based recreation under the current institutional 
environment.  Following an institutional change it was observed that risk preference was no 
longer a significant predictor of the willingness to allow fee-based recreation indicating that the 
element of risk was diminished.  Transaction costs associated with liability are evident and 
amending the recreational use statute appears to produce a reduction in expected WTA reflecting 
 119
a transaction cost savings to landowners.  However, the magnitude in the reduction of 
transactions cost is a matter of perception as landowners not allow recreation under the current 
recreational use statue have an expected willingness to accept post-institutional change that is 
lower than landowners opting to allow fee-based recreation under both pre- and post-institutional 
change environments.       
 Most landowners prefer to manage their land for fee-based recreation individually, with 
less than 30% and 20% of landowners indicating a preference for using an outfitter or working 
cooperatively with other landowners.  This implies that the potential benefits of cooperatively 
managing for fee-based recreation are not readily apparent to landowners, indicating that 
outreach programs targeted at landowners of smaller tracts of land could be developed to help 
smaller landowners or marginal landowners recognize the potential benefits of different 
management alternatives for fee-based recreation.  However, it is also possible that respondents 
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APPENDIX A:  PRENOTIFICATION POSTCARD  
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
A few days from now you will receive in the mail a request to fill out a brief 
questionnaire for an important research project being conducted by Louisiana State University. It 
concerns the use of private land for public recreation, and how landowners view using land for 
recreational purposes. I am writing in advance because we have found many people like to know 
ahead of time that they will be contacted.  
The study is an important one that will help government agencies understand the 
willingness of private landowners to allow the public use of their land and what incentives 
landowners require to do so. Upon receipt of a completed survey, we will check your name off 
our list to ensure that you do not receive subsequent surveys or phone calls. Thank you for your 
time and consideration. It’s only with the generous help of people like you that our research can 




James E. Henderson     Michael A. Dunn 
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APPENDIX C:  REMINDER AND THANK YOU POSTCARD  
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
Last week a questionnaire seeking your opinions about recreational land use in the Delta was 
mailed to you. Your name was drawn randomly from a list of landowners in the Delta. 
 
If you have already completed and returned the questionnaire to us, please accept our sincere 
thanks. If not, please consider completing it and mailing it back to us today. We are especially 
grateful for your help because it is only by asking people like you to share your experiences that 
we can understand landowner and land manager concerns regarding public recreational use of 
private land. 
 
If you did not receive a questionnaire, or if it was misplaced, please call us at 1-225-578-2758 




James E. Henderson     Michael A. Dunn 
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APPENDIX G:  SURVEY RESPONSE SUMMARY OF LOUISIANA LANDOWNERS 
Section I. Recreational Use and Land Access Practices  
1. Do you or any members of your household use your land for recreational purposes?   
n =631  No (40.73%) 
  Yes (55.7%) 
 
2. Do you or any members of your household use your land for any of the following recreational 
purposes?  
n =373   Hunting – big game (69.4%) 
    Hunting – small game (63.8%) 
    Hunting – migratory bird or waterfowl (40.5%) 
    Hunting – dove (54.4%) 
    Fishing (36.2%) 
    Hiking (14.5%) 
    ATV riding (53.6%) 
    Camping (16.1%) 
    Other (5.1%) 
 
3. Have you ever allowed individuals who are not part of your household to use your land for 
recreational purposes?  
n =632    No (43.67%))        
    Yes (56.33%) 
 
4. Please indicate which of the following types of individuals you have allowed access to your 
land for recreational purposes?  
n =356    Immediate family (son, father, brother) (64.89%) 
    Other relative (uncle, cousins, etc.) (53.37%) 
    Friends (73.88%) 
    Individuals you do not know personally (10.39%) 
      Other (4.20%) 
 
5. Have you ever leased your land for hunting or recreational access?  
n =632    No (88.77%)    
    Yes (11.23%) 
 
6. Please indicate the last year you leased your land, how many acres were leased, and the lease 
price for each of the following recreational use categories.  
 Hunting – big game (deer and/or turkey)  
 _______ (year) Mean =2005   Std. Dev. =2.3  n =37     
 _______ (number of leases) Mean =1.8 Std. Dev. =2.03   n =31     
 _______ (total number of acres leased) Mean =344.48   Std. Dev. =521.45  n =35   
 $____________ (total lease revenue) Mean =$2,719.21  Std. Dev. =$2976.25  n =38      
 
 Hunting – small game 
 _______ (year) Mean =1996 Std. Dev. =0   n =1     
 _______ (number of leases) Mean =0 Std. Dev. =0   n =0     
 _______ (total number of acres leased) Mean =0   Std. Dev. =0   n =0  
 $____________ (total lease revenue) Mean =$0   Std. Dev. =$0   n =0      
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 Hunting – migratory bird or waterfowl 
 _______ (year) Mean =2004  Std. Dev. =3.9 n =19     
 _______ (number of leases) Mean =1.65    Std. Dev. =1.22   n =17    
 _______ (total number of acres leased) Mean =328.35   Std. Dev. =264.64  n =17   
 $____________ (total lease revenue) Mean =$11,360  Std. Dev. =$11,844.05  n =20      
 
 Hunting – dove 
 _______ (year) Mean =2006   Std. Dev. =7.7  n =1     
 _______ (number of leases) Mean =1 Std. Dev. =0   n =1     
 _______ (total number of acres leased) Mean =20   Std. Dev. =14.14  n =2   
 $____________ (total lease revenue) Mean =$2,000  Std. Dev. =0   n =1      
 
 Other  
 _______ (year) Mean =2006    Std. Dev. =2.4     n =10     
 _______ (number of leases) Mean =1.45   Std. Dev. =0.69   n =11     
 _______ (total number of acres leased) Mean =627.58   Std. Dev. =683.17  n =12   
 $____________ (total lease revenue) Mean =$8,868.18  Std. Dev. =$9,663.8  n =11     
 
Section II. Risk and Liability Issues 
7. I am very concerned about the liability issues associated with allowing people on my land.   
n =630   Strongly Disagree (6.35%)           
Somewhat Disagree (4.29%)            
Not Sure (9.05%)            
Somewhat Agree (14.76%)            
Strongly Agree (65.40%) 
 
8. It is possible to obtain a written agreement from anyone coming onto my land that would 
protect me from liability.  
n =630   Strongly Disagree (18.73%)           
Somewhat Disagree (6.35%)            
Not Sure (40.16%)            
Somewhat Agree (11.43%)            
Strongly Agree (23.02%) 
 
9. If my liability concerns were eased I would be much more likely to allow people to use my 
land for recreational purposes.  
n =630   Strongly Disagree (30.48%)           
Somewhat Disagree (10.16%)            
Not Sure (22.06%)            
Somewhat Agree (20.95%)            
Strongly Agree (16.03%) 
 
10. To protect myself from liability associated with trespassers, Louisiana law requires me to 
post my land with “no trespassing” signs.  
n =631  True (22.19%)           
   False (31.38%)           
   Unsure (46.43%)           
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11. Louisiana law protects me from liability claims that may result from recreational use of my 
land so  long as I do not charge a fee.  
n =631  True (7.94%)           
   False (25.87%)           
   Unsure (66.19%)           
 
12. Commercial liability insurance is available specifically for private landowners who charge a 
fee for recreational access 
n =631  True (34.50%)           
   False (3.66%)           
   Unsure (61.84%)           
 
13. Compared to other landowners you know, how would you characterize yourself?  
n =619   I tend to take on substantial levels of risk in my financial decisions. (7.27%)           
   I tend to avoid risk when possible in my financial decisions. (75.44%)           
   I neither seek nor avoid risk in my financial decisions. (15.83%)            
 
Section III. Marginal Lands  
14. Would you consider any of your land to be “marginal” for agricultural purposes?  
n =632      No (55.38%)               
    Yes (44.62%)            
 
15. How many acres of your land would you consider to be marginal for agricultural purposes?  
 ________ # of acres 
n =274  Mean =106.8  Std. Dev. =176.6   
 
16. How many miles is your nearest tract of marginal land from your home? 
 ________ # of miles 
n =280  Mean =60.1  Std. Dev. =230.6   
 
17. Could any of the following land classifications be used to describe all or part of your 
marginal land?      
n =282   forest or wooded areas (81.21%)            
   pastureland (24.47%)            
   row crops or hay production (23.76%)            
   water bodies (42.55%)            
 
18.Which of these best describes your current land management:  
n =282   self-managed (61.35%)            
   jointly managed with partners (10.99%)             
   managed by hired professionals (1.42%)             
   leased (21.63%)               






19.On average how often do you visit or check on your marginal land?  
n =281  weekly (44.13%)            
   once each month (32.74%)            
   once every year (14.59%)            
   less than once every year (9.25%)            
 
20.If you were to sell your marginal land, how much do you think you could get per acre? 
 $____________ (per acre) 
n =193  Mean =$1,27740  Std. Dev. =$902.33 
 
Section IV. Fee Based Recreational Use of Land 
21. Would you be willing to let people pay you a fee to access your land for recreational 
purposes? (For example: hunting, camping, fishing, bird watching)  
n =632    No (85.92%)           
  Yes (14.08%)            
 
22. How much money per acre would you be willing to accept each year to allow someone to 
lease your land for recreational uses? (For example: hunting, camping, fishing, bird watching)?    
 $____________ (per acre per year) 
n =69  Mean =$175.99  Std. Dev. =$551.3   
 
23. How certain are you that you would accept the dollar value you indicated in the previous 
question?  (Where 0% indicates you are very uncertain and 100% indicates that you are very 
certain) n =69 
0% (0%)    10% (1.45%)    20% (1.45%)    30% (2.9%)   40% (1.45%)    50% (40.58%)    60% 
(2.86%)    70% (2.9%)    80% (20.29%)    90% (8.7%)    100% (17.39%)                  
 
24. If you selected a percentage less than 80% in question 23, write in the dollar value you would 
be willing to accept that you would be at least 80% certain of accepting.   
 $____________ (per acre per year) 
n =36  Mean =163.72  Std. Dev. =362.7   
 
25. IF current Louisiana law were changed to allow you to charge a fee and keep the liability 
protection, would you allow people to pay you for recreational use of your land?  
n =632    No (76.07%)           
  Yes (23.93%)            
 
26. How much money per acre would you be willing to accept each year to allow someone to 
lease your land for recreational uses? $____________ (per acre per year) 
n =126  Mean =132.76  Std. Dev. =430.78   
 
27. How certain are you that you would accept the dollar value you indicated in the previous 
question?  (Where 0% indicates you are very uncertain and 100% indicates that you are very 
certain)  n =126 
0% (0%)    10% (2.38%)    20% (1.59%)    30% (0.79%)   40% (2.38%)    50% (19.8%)    60% 




28. If you selected a percentage less than 80% in question 27, write in the dollar value you would 
be willing to accept that you would be at least 80% certain of accepting.   
 $____________ (per acre per year) 
n =50  Mean =106.92  Std. Dev. =191.63   
 
29.  How many acres of land would you be willing to use for fee-based recreational activities? 
 ________ # of acres 
n =137  Mean =256.55  Std. Dev. =494.4   
 
30.  Which of the following recreational activities would you NOT allow on your land?  
  n =151   Hunting – big game (15.89%)      
    Hunting – small game (7.95%)      
    Hunting – migratory bird or waterfowl (10.6%)      
    Hunting – dove (9.27%)      
    Fishing (14.57%)      
    Hiking (13.91%)      
    ATV riding (52.98%)      
    Camping (32.67%)      
    Other (3.31%)      
 
31. If you are interested in offering recreational opportunities on your land, which of the 
following management formats would you prefer?  
  n = 141  Independently (56.94%)       
Cooperatively (19.44%)      
Outfitter (23.61%)      
 
Section V. Current Land Uses  
32. Have you ever worked with any of your adjacent or local landowners in any way?  
n =629    No (72.24%)           
  Yes (25.76%)            
 
33. If yes, did you find your cooperation with other landowners to be effective?  
n =162    No (4.94%)           
  Yes (95.06%)            
 
34. Have you ever been involved with a cooperative?  
n =629    No (85.85%)           
  Yes (14.15%)            
 
35. If yes, did you find your involvement in the cooperative to be beneficial to you?  
n =87      No (3.45%)           
  Yes (96.55%)            
 
36. Have you ever enrolled land in a government conservation program such as the Conservation 
 Reserve Program or Wetland Reserve Program?  
n =627    No (31.88%)           
  Yes (58.33%)            
   I don’t know what these are (9.79%)            
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37. How many separate tracts of non-residential land do you own? 
 ________ # of tracts 
n =608  Mean =2.06  Std. Dev. =2.07   
 
38. Is your nearest tract of non-residential land adjacent to your primary residence?  
n =613    No (56.77%)           
  Yes (43.23%)            
 
39. How many miles is your primary residence from your nearest tract of land that is not adjacent 
to your primary residence? 
 ________ # of miles. 
n =602  Mean =70.3  Std. Dev. =238.1   
 
40. What is the total acreage of all tracts of land? 
 ________ # of acres 
n =601  Mean =324.8  Std. Dev. =634.08   
 
41. How many years have you been a land owner? 
 ________ years 
n =610  Mean =28  Std. Dev. =22.6   
 
42. How is the ownership of your land organized?  
n =623   corporation (7.54%)           
   limited liability corporation LLC (3.37%)           
    joint ownership (36.92%)           
    single ownership (64.21%)           
 
43. How did you acquire the majority of your non residence, non commercial land? 
n =623   Inherited it (46.71%)           
   By marriage (2.73%)           
   By purchasing it (55.52%)           
   Other (0.8%)           
 
44. Do you use any of your land for agricultural production of row crops? 
n =631   No (42.63%)           
  Yes (57.37%)            
 
45. Which of the following agricultural crops are historically produced on your land?   
n =364   Cotton (79.40%)           
   Corn (67.86%)           
   Sorghum (17.31%)           
   Rice (10.44%)           
   Soybeans (68.96%)           
   Wheat (36.81%)           




46. Have you ever leased any of your land for agricultural uses?   
n =632    No (32.59%)           
  Yes (67.41%)            
 
47. Do you own land for any of the following reasons?  
n =632   Hay production (22.15%)           
   Leasing to others (29.75%)           
   Personal recreational opportunities (26.11%)           
   Raising livestock (20.41%)           
   Timber production (30.38%)           
   To provide a place for wildlife (32.91%)           
   To provide recreational access for others (4.27%)           
   Other (6.80%)           
 
Section VI. Demographic Information  
48. Your Gender  
 n =616          Female (48.21%)                    
Male (51.79%)           
 
49. Your age in years? _______   
n =603  Mean =61.7  Std. Dev. =14.04   
 
50. Which of the following best describes your ethnic background?  
n =616           Caucasian (white) (94.16%)                  
African American (3.25%)                 
Asian (0%)           
    American Indian (0.65%)                   
Hispanic (0.65%)                  
Other (0.16%)            
 
51. Choose one category that most closely describes your primary occupation:  
n =616       Farming (13.98%)                   Business (10.55%)                   
Engineering (2.60%)                 Government (5.84%)           
         Housewife (4.06%)                Retired (36.69%)                      
Unemployed (0.16%)                   Education (5.84%)             
          Healthcare (3.76%)                   Student (0.16%)                     
Self-employed (10.88%)               Other (5.84%)            
 
52. How many individuals live in your household? (List):________________ 
n =606  Mean =2.13  Std. Dev. =1   
 
53. Indicate your highest level of education attained  
n =610             Less than high school (5.9%)           High school graduate (29.84%)           
Some college, no degree (20.82%)    Associate Degree (1.80%)              





54. Which best describes your annual household income?  
n =509        Less than $10,000 (2.36%)           $10,000 - $14,999 (3.14%)           
          $15,000 - $24,999 (9.04%)           $25,000 - $34,999 (10.81%)           
          $35,000 - $49,999 (15.52%)           $50,000 - $74,999 (19.65%)           
          $75,000 - $99,999 (12.97%)           $100,000 - $149,999 (15.32%)           























APPENDIX H:  SURVEY RESPONSE SUMMARY OF ARKANSAS LANDOWNERS 
Section I. Recreational Use and Land Access Practices  
1. Do you or any members of your household use your land for recreational purposes?   
n =485  No (55.7%%) 
  Yes (44.3%) 
 
2. Do you or any members of your household use your land for any of the following recreational 
purposes?  
n = 270   Hunting – big game (52.2%) 
    Hunting – small game (63%) 
    Hunting – migratory bird or waterfowl (53.7%) 
    Hunting – dove (44.8%) 
    Fishing (42.6%) 
    Hiking (17%) 
    ATV riding (51.9%) 
    Camping (7.8%) 
    Other (6.7%) 
 
3. Have you ever allowed individuals who are not part of your household to use your land for 
recreational purposes?  
n =485    No (55.6%%))        
    Yes (44.3%) 
 
4. Please indicate which of the following types of individuals you have allowed access to your 
land for recreational purposes?  
n =271      Immediate family (son, father, brother) (70.85%) 
    Other relative (uncle, cousins, etc.) (57.56%) 
    Friends (xx%) 
    Individuals you do not know personally (80.81%) 
      Other (11.44%) 
 
5. Have you ever leased your land for hunting or recreational access?  
n =485    No (11.5%)    
    Yes (88.5%) 
 
6. Please indicate the last year you leased your land, how many acres were leased, and the lease 
price for each of the following recreational use categories.  
 Hunting – big game (deer and/or turkey)  
 _______ (year) Mean =2005   Std. Dev. =3.4  n =11     
 _______ (number of leases) Mean =1.8 Std. Dev. =1.5   n =10     
 _______ (total number of acres leased) Mean =270.8   Std. Dev. =251.5  n =11   
 $____________ (total lease revenue) Mean =$1,362.10  Std. Dev. =$1,357.41  n =10      
 
 Hunting – small game 
 _______ (year) Mean =2006   Std. Dev. =1.4  n =2     
 _______ (number of leases) Mean =1 Std. Dev. =0   n =2     
 _______ (total number of acres leased) Mean =240   Std. Dev. =226.2  n =2   
 $____________ (total lease revenue) Mean =$750  Std. Dev. =$353.55  n =2      
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 Hunting – migratory bird or waterfowl 
 _______ (year) Mean =2004.5   Std. Dev. =3.3 n =27     
 _______ (number of leases) Mean =1.4 Std. Dev. =0.97   n =27    
 _______ (total number of acres leased) Mean =429.85   Std. Dev. =613.02  n =28   
 $____________ (total lease revenue) Mean =$8,659.62  Std. Dev. =$9,166.07  n =26      
 
 Hunting – dove 
 _______ (year) Mean =2000.5   Std. Dev. =7.7  n =2     
 _______ (number of leases) Mean =1 Std. Dev. =0   n =2     
 _______ (total number of acres leased) Mean =140   Std. Dev. =84.8  n =2   
 $____________ (total lease revenue) Mean =$3,750  Std. Dev. =$4,596.19  n =2      
 
 Other  
 _______ (year) Mean =2005.5   Std. Dev. =1.9  n =8     
 _______ (number of leases) Mean =2.4 Std. Dev. =4.3   n =9     
 _______ (total number of acres leased) Mean =1156.2   Std. Dev. =1348.9  n =9   
 $____________ (total lease revenue) Mean =$1,1275  Std. Dev. =$9,161.52  n =8     
 
Section II. Risk and Liability Issues 
7. I am very concerned about the liability issues associated with allowing people on my land.   
n =482  Strongly Disagree (6.43%)           
Somewhat Disagree (4.15%)            
Not Sure (13.9%)            
Somewhat Agree (21.4%)            
Strongly Agree (53.5%) 
 
8. It is possible to obtain a written agreement from anyone coming onto my land that would 
protect me from liability.  
n =482  Strongly Disagree (19.1%)           
Somewhat Disagree (7.1%)            
Not Sure (41.3%)            
Somewhat Agree (14.1%)            
Strongly Agree (17.8%) 
 
9. If my liability concerns were eased I would be much more likely to allow people to use my 
land for recreational purposes.  
n =483  Strongly Disagree (31.3%)           
Somewhat Disagree (12.42%)            
Not Sure (29%)            
Somewhat Agree (16.4%)            
Strongly Agree (9.7%) 
 
10. To protect myself from liability associated with trespassers, Arkansas law requires me to post 
my land with “no trespassing” signs.  
n =485   True (31.6%)           
   False (12.4%)           
   Unsure (56.1%)           
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11.  Arkansas law protects me from liability claims that may result from recreational use of my 
land so  long as I do not charge a fee.  
n = 483  True (7.05%)           
   False (19.29%)           
   Unsure (73.65%)           
 
12. Commercial liability insurance is available specifically for private landowners who charge a 
fee for recreational access 
n = 480  True (30.98%)           
   False (2.91%)           
   Unsure (66.11%)           
 
13. Compared to other landowners you know, how would you characterize yourself?  
n = 477  I tend to take on substantial levels of risk in my financial decisions. (7.13%)           
   I tend to avoid risk when possible in my financial decisions. (72.12%)           
   I neither seek nor avoid risk in my financial decisions. (19.50%)            
 
Section III. Marginal Lands  
14. Would you consider any of your land to be “marginal” for agricultural purposes?  
n = 484     No (59.92%)               
    Yes (40.08%)            
 
15. How many acres of your land would you consider to be marginal for agricultural purposes?  
 ________ # of acres 
n =192  Mean =108.7  Std. Dev. = 169.5   
 
16. How many miles is your nearest tract of marginal land from your home? 
 ________ # of miles 
n =193  Mean =81.06  Std. Dev. =248.5   
 
17. Could any of the following land classifications be used to describe all or part of your 
marginal land?      
n =195   forest or wooded areas (79.49%)            
   pastureland (26.15%)            
   row crops or hay production (38.97%)            
   water bodies (43.08%)            
 
18.Which of these best describes your current land management:  
n =195   self-managed (60%)            
   jointly managed with partners (13.33%)             
   managed by hired professionals (4.62%)             
   leased (23.08%)               






19.On average how often do you visit or check on your marginal land?  
n =195   weekly (46.67%)            
   once each month (27.98%)            
   once every year (17.95%)            
   less than once every year (7.96%)            
20.If you were to sell your marginal land, how much do you think you could get per acre? 
 $____________ (per acre) 
n =154  Mean = $1,368.51  Std. Dev. = $956.98   
 
Section IV. Fee Based Recreational Use of Land 
21. Would you be willing to let people pay you a fee to access your land for recreational 
purposes? (For example: hunting, camping, fishing, bird watching)  
n =485   No (85.77%)           
  Yes (14.23%)            
 
22. How much money per acre would you be willing to accept each year to allow someone to 
lease your land for recreational uses? (For example: hunting, camping, fishing, bird watching)?    
 $____________ (per acre per year) 
n =56  Mean =279.25  Std. Dev. =1,309.45   
 
23. How certain are you that you would accept the dollar value you indicated in the previous 
question?  (Where 0% indicates you are very uncertain and 100% indicates that you are very 
certain)   n =56   
0% (0%)    10% (3.57%)    20% (0%)    30% (1.79%)   40% (3.57%)    50% (33.93%)    60% 
(5.36%)    70% (7.14%)    80% (8.9%)    90% (10.7%)    100% (25%)                  
 
24. If you selected a percentage less than 80% in question 23, write in the dollar value you would 
be willing to accept that you would be at least 80% certain of accepting.   
 $____________ (per acre per year) 
n =30  Mean =$110.33  Std. Dev. =$88.65   
 
25. IF current  Arkansas law were changed to allow you to charge a fee and keep the liability 
protection, would you allow people to pay you for recreational use of your land?  
n =485   No (17.18%)           
  Yes (20.82%)            
 
26. How much money per acre would you be willing to accept each year to allow someone to 
lease your land for recreational uses? $____________ (per acre per year) 
n =87  Mean =38.89  Std. Dev. =471.14   
 
27. How certain are you that you would accept the dollar value you indicated in the previous 
question?  (Where 0% indicates you are very uncertain and 100% indicates that you are very 
certain)   n =87   
0% (0%)   10% (3.45%)   20% (1.15%)    30% (1.15%)   40% (0.00%)    50% (19.54%)    60% 





28. If you selected a percentage less than 80% in question 27, write in the dollar value you would 
be willing to accept that you would be at least 80% certain of accepting.   
 $____________ (per acre per year) 
n =33  Mean =$369.34  Std. Dev. =$792.59   
 
29.  How many acres of land would you be willing to use for fee-based recreational activities? 
 ________ # of acres 
n =94  Mean =259.34  Std. Dev. =419.33   
 
30.  Which of the following recreational activities would you NOT allow on your land?  
  n =96  Hunting – big game (17.71%)      
    Hunting – small game (8.33%)      
    Hunting – migratory bird or waterfowl (9.38%)      
    Hunting – dove (8.33%)      
    Fishing (16.67%)      
    Hiking (17.71%)      
    ATV riding (53.13%)      
    Camping (39.58%)      
    Other (2.08%)      
 
31. If you are interested in offering recreational opportunities on your land, which of the 
following management formats would you prefer?  
  n =97   Independently (58.76%)       
Cooperatively (13.40%)      
Outfitter (27.84%)      
 
Section V. Current Land Uses  
32. Have you ever worked with any of your adjacent or local landowners in any way?  
n =482    No (28.42%)           
  Yes (71.58%)            
 
33. If yes, did you find your cooperation with other landowners to be effective?  
n =138    No (96.38%)           
  Yes (3.62%)            
 
34. Have you ever been involved with a cooperative?  
n =482   No (68.67%)           
  Yes (31.33%)            
 
35. If yes, did you find your involvement in the cooperative to be beneficial to you?  
n =152    No (91.45%)           
  Yes (8.55%)            
 
36. Have you ever enrolled land in a government conservation program such as the Conservation 
 Reserve Program or Wetland Reserve Program?  
n =480    No (60%)           
  Yes (32.5%)            
   I don’t know what these are(7.5%)            
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37. How many separate tracts of non-residential land do you own? 
 ________ # of tracts 
n =462  Mean =2.67  Std. Dev. =3.85   
 
38. Is your nearest tract of non-residential land adjacent to your primary residence?  
n =473     No (65.54%)           
  Yes (34.46%)            
 
39. How many miles is your primary residence from your nearest tract of land that is not adjacent 
to your primary residence? 
 ________ # of miles. 
n =465  Mean =86.8  Std. Dev. =255.74   
 
40. What is the total acreage of all tracts of land? 
 ________ # of acres 
n =465  Mean =432.1  Std. Dev. =853.5   
 
41. How many years have you been a land owner? 
 ________ years 
n =474  Mean =27.36  Std. Dev. =31.38   
 
42. How is the ownership of your land organized?  
n =482      corporation (7.88%)           
   limited liability corporation LLC (3.94%)           
    joint ownership (45.44%)           
    single ownership (53.11%)           
 
43. How did you acquire the majority of your non residence, non commercial land? 
n =477     Inherited it (46.12%)           
   By marriage (3.35%)           
   By purchasing it (55.77%)           
   Other (0.63%)           
 
44. Do you use any of your land for agricultural production of row crops? 
n =485      No (18.35%)           
  Yes (81.64%)            
 
45. Which of the following agricultural crops are historically produced on your land?   
n =400    Cotton (40.50%)           
   Corn (29.25%)           
   Sorghum (21.75%)           
   Rice (59.25%)           
   Soybeans (89.50%)           
   Wheat (63%)           




46. Have you ever leased any of your land for agricultural uses?   
n =482      No (33.2%)           
  Yes (66.8%)            
 
47. Do you own land for any of the following reasons?  
n =484     Hay production (13.04%)           
   Leasing to others (36.16%)           
   Personal recreational opportunities (23.14%)           
   Raising livestock (12.81%)           
   Timber production (20.04%)           
   To provide a place for wildlife (29.13%)           
   To provide recreational access for others (4.96%)           
   Other (10.33%)           
 
Section VI. Demographic Information  
48. Your Gender  
 n =474          Female (28.9%)                    
Male (71.1%)           
 
49. Your age in years? _______   
n =464  Mean =63.6  Std. Dev. =13.6   
 
50. Which of the following best describes your ethnic background?  
n =468           Caucasian (white) (95.51%)                  
African American (3.63%)                 
Asian (0.21%)           
    American Indian (0.64%)                   
Hispanic (0%)                  
Other (0%)            
 
51. Choose one category that most closely describes your primary occupation:  
n =475       Farming (21.82%)                   Business (12.08%)                   
Engineering (0.85%)                 Government (2.75%)           
         Housewife (4.24%)                Retired (37.08%)                      
Unemployed (0%)                   Education (4.66%)             
          Healthcare (2.75%)                   Student (0%)                     
Self-employed (7.63%)               Other (5.08%)            
 
52. How many individuals live in your household? (List):________________ 
n =470  Mean =2.8  Std. Dev. =0.96   
 
53. Indicate your highest level of education attained  
n =471             Less than high school (8.49%)           High school graduate (25.90%)           
 Some college, no degree (25.05%)    Associate Degree (1.70%)              





54. Which best describes your annual household income?  
n =395        Less than $10,000 (1.27%)           $10,000 - $14,999 (0.76%)           
          $15,000 - $24,999 (11.14%)           $25,000 - $34,999 (9.62%)           
          $35,000 - $49,999 (11.14%)           $50,000 - $74,999 (21.52%)           
          $75,000 - $99,999 (10.38%)           $100,000 - $149,999 (20.76%)           































































Figure I.1. Question 1. Do you or any members of your household use your land for recreational purposes? (n=1116) (AR n=485) (LA 






































fishing hiking ATV riding † Camping Other
AR LA
 
Figure I.2. Question 2. Do you or any members of your household use your land for any of the following recreational purposes? (n=1116) 


















Figure I.3. Question 3. Have you ever allowed individuals who are not part of your household to use your land for recreational purposes? 


























Figure I.4. Question 4. Please indicate which of the following types of individuals you have allowed access to your land for recreational 
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Figure I.6. Question 7. I am very concerned about the liability issues associated with allowing people on my land. (n=1112) (AR n=482) 
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Figure I.7. Question 8. It is possible to obtain a written agreement from anyone coming onto my land that would protect me from liability. 
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Figure I.8. Question 9. If my liability concerns were eased I would by much more likely to allow people to use my land for recreational 



















Figure I.9. Question 10. To protect myself from liability associated with trespassers, Arkansas law requires me to post my land with “no 





















Figure I.10. Question 11.  Arkansas law protects me from liability claims that may result from recreational use of my land so long as I do 





















Figure I.11. Question 12. Commercial liability insurance is available specifically for private landowners who charge a fee for recreational 
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Figure I.13. Question 14. Would you consider any of your land to be “marginal” for agricultural purposes? (n=1116) (AR n=484) (LA 





















Figure I.14. Question 15. How many acres of your land would you consider to be marginal for agricultural purposes? (n=466) (AR n=192) 
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Figure I.16. Question 17. Could any of the following land classifications be used to describe all or part of you marginal land? (n=477) (AR 
n=195) (LA n=282) (Showing percentage of respondents selecting each category) († indicates statistically significant differences between 





























Figure I.17. Question 18. Which of these best described your current land management?  
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Figure I.19. Question 20.If you were to sell your marginal land, how much do you think you could get per acre? (n=347) (AR n=154) (LA 





















Figure I.20. Question 21. Would you be willing to let people pay you a fee to access your land for recreational purposes? (n=1117) (AR 


















Figure I.21. Question 22. How much money per acre would you be willing to accept each year to allow someone to lease your land for 


































Figure I.23. Question 23. How certain are you that you would accept the dollar value you indicated in the previous question? (n=125) (AR 



















Figure I.24. Question 24. If you selected a percentage less than 80% in question 23, write in the dollar value you would be willing to accept 




















Figure I.25. Question 25. IF current law were changed to allow you to charge a fee and keep the liability protection, would you allow people 

















Figure I.26. Question 26. How much money per acre would you be willing to accept each year to allow someone to lease your land for 































Figure I.28. Question 27. How certain are you that you would accept the dollar value you indicated in the previous question? (n=213) (AR 




















Figure I.29. Question 28. If you selected a percentage less than 80% in question 27, write in the dollar value you would be willing to accept 
that you would be at least 80% certain of accepting.  (n=83) (AR n=33) (LA n=50)   (‡ indicates statistically significant differences between 


















Figure I.30. Question 29. How many acres of land would you be willing to use for fee-based recreational activities? (n=291) (AR n=94) 
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Figure I.32. Question 31. If you are interested in offering recreational opportunities on your land, which of the following management 




















Figure I.33. Question 32. Have you ever worked with any of your adjacent or local landowners in any way? (n=1111) (AR n=482) (LA 






































Figure I.35. Question 34. Have you ever been involved with a cooperative? (n=1111) (AR n=482) (LA n=629)  († indicates statistically 
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Figure I.37. Question 36. Have you ever enrolled land in a government conservation program such as the Conservation Reserve Program or 




















Figure I.38. Question 37. How many separate tracts of non-residential land do you own? (n=1070) (AR n=462) (LA n=608)   († indicates 



















Figure I.39. Question 38. Is your nearest tract of non-residential land adjacent to your primary residence? (n=1086) (AR n=473) (LA 

















Figure I.40. Question 39. How many miles is your primary residence from your nearest tract of land that is not adjacent to your primary 




















Figure I.41. Question 40. What is the total acreage of all tracts of land? (n=1066) (AR n=465) (LA n=601)   (‡ indicates statistically 
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Figure I.43. Question 42. How is the ownership of your land organized? (n=1105) (AR n=482) (LA n=623) (Showing percentage of 
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Figure I.44. Question 43. How did you acquire the majority of you non residence, non commercial land? (n=1100) (AR n=477) (LA n=623) 




















Figure I.45. Question 44. Do you use any of your land for agricultural production of row crops? (n=1116) (AR n=485) (LA n=631)  († 
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Figure I.46. Question 45. Which of the following agricultural crops are historically produced on your land? (n=764) (AR n=400) (LA 
n=364) (Showing percentage of respondents selecting each category) († indicates statistically significant differences between mean values 





































































Figure I.48. Question 47. Do you own land for any of the following reasons? (n=1116) (AR n=484) (LA n=632) (Showing percentage of 




















Figure I.49. Question 48. Your Gender  (n=1090) (AR n=474) (LA n=616)   (‡ indicates statistically significant differences between mean 



















Figure I.50. Question 49. Your age in years  (n=1067) (AR n=464) (LA n=603)   (* indicates statistically significant differences between 
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Figure I.52. Question 51. Choose one category that most closely describes your primary occupation. (n=1088) (AR n=472) (LA n=616) (†, 
















































Figure I.54. Question 53. Indicate your highest level of education attained. (n=1081) (AR n=471) (LA n=610) (* indicates statistically 



















































Figure I.55. Question 54. Which best describes your annual household income? (n=904) (AR n=395) (LA n=509) (‡ and * indicates 
statistically significant differences between mean values at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively) 
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APPENDIX J:  T-TESTS FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ARKANSAS 
AND LOUISIANA RESPONSES AND BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND MAILNGS 




Table J.1. A summary of t-tests for difference between mean values for Arkansas and Louisiana survey responses. 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q1 
Do you or any members of your 
household use your land for 
recreational purposes?  631 0.5879556 0.4925935 485 0.556701 0.4972875 1.0464 0.2956  
  
Do you or any members of your 
household use your land for any of 
the following recreational 
purposes?                  
Q2a hunting big game 372 0.6854839 0.4649482 270 0.5222222 0.5004335 4.2527 0.0000 †
Q2b hunting big game 373 0.6380697 0.4812043 270 0.6296296 0.4838006 0.219 0.8267  
Q2c hunting small game 373 0.4048257 0.4915176 270 0.537037 0.4995523 -3.3433 0.0009 †
Q2d hunting migratory bird or waterfowl 373 0.5442359 0.4987083 270 0.4481481 0.4982276 2.4123 0.0161 ‡
Q2e hunting dove 373 0.3619303 0.4812043 270 0.4259259 0.4954008 -1.6439 0.1007 * 
Q2f fishing 373 0.1447721 0.3523436 270 0.1703704 0.376656 -0.8832 0.3775  
Q2g hiking 373 0.536193 0.4993582 270 0.5185185 0.5005848 0.4425 0.6583  
Q2h ATV riding 372 0.1612903 0.3682939 270 0.0777778 0.2683189 3.1655 0.0016 †
Q2i Camping 370 0.0513514 0.2210122 270 0.0666667 0.249907 -0.819 0.4131  
Q3 
Have you ever allowed individuals 
who are not part of your household 
to use your land for recreational 
purposes?  632 0.5632911 0.4963709 485 0.556701 0.4972875 0.2198 0.8261  
  
Please indicate which of the 
following types of individuals you 
have allowed access to your land 
for recreational purposes?                  
Q4a immediate family 356 0.6488764 0.4779933 271 0.7084871 0.4553 -1.5789 0.1149  
Q4b other relative 356 0.5337079 0.4995646 271 0.5756458 0.495159 -1.0453 0.2963  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q4c friends 356 0.738764 0.4399266 271 0.8081181 0.3945093 -2.0439 0.0414 ‡
Q4d individuals you do not know personally 356 0.1039326 0.3056026 271 0.1143911 0.3188746 -0.4166 0.6771  
Q4i other 357 0.0420168 0.2009091 271 0.0479705 0.2140992 -0.3575 0.7208  
Q5 Have you ever leased your land for hunting or recreational access? 632 0.1123418 0.3160366 485 0.1154639 0.319911 -0.1628 0.8707  
  
I am very concerned about the 
liability issues associated with 
allowing people on my land.                
Q7a strongly disagree 630 0.0634921 0.2440397 482 0.0643154 0.2455687 -0.0556 0.9557  
Q7b somewhat disagree 630 0.0428571 0.2026959 482 0.0414938 0.1996365 0.1119 0.9109  
Q7c not sure 630 0.0904762 0.2870907 630 0.0904762 0.2870907 0 1.0000  
Q7d somewhat agree 630 0.147619 0.3550038 482 0.2136929 0.4103384 -2.8736 0.0041 †
Q7e strongly agree 630 0.6539683 0.4760814 482 0.5352697 0.4992727 4.0338 0.0001 †
  
 It is possible to obtain a written 
agreement from anyone coming 
onto my land that would protect 
me from liability.                 
Q8a strongly disagree 630 0.1873016 0.3904634 482 0.1908714 0.3933962 -0.1506 0.8803  
Q8b somewhat disagree 630 0.0634921 0.2440397 482 0.0705394 0.2563199 -0.4669 0.6407  
Q8c not sure 630 0.4015873 0.4906088 482 0.4128631 0.4928601 -0.379 0.7047  
Q8d somewhat agree 630 0.1142857 0.3184108 482 0.1410788 0.3484645 -1.3345 0.1823  
Q8e strongly agree 630 0.2301587 0.4212688 482 0.1784232 0.3832664 2.1097 0.0351 ‡




Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
If my liability concerns were eased 
I would by much more likely to 
allow people to use my land for 
recreational purposes.                
Q9a strongly disagree 630 0.3047619 0.4606723 483 0.3126294 0.4640454 -0.2815 0.7784  
 
         
Q9b somewhat disagree 630 0.1015873 0.3023449 483 0.1242236 0.3301784 -1.1893 0.2346  
Q9c not sure 630 0.2206349 0.4150043 483 0.2898551 0.4541653 -2.6468 0.0082 †
Q9d somewhat agree 630 0.2095238 0.4072921 483 0.1635611 0.3702603 1.9404 0.0526 * 
Q9e strongly agree 630 0.1603175 0.3671918 483 0.0973085 0.2966847 3.0786 0.0021 †
  
 To protect myself from liability 
associated with trespassers, the 
law requires me to post my land 
with "no trespassing" signs.                
Q10a true 338 0.4142012 0.4933139 213 0.7183099 0.4508827 -7.2818 0.0000 †
Q10b unsure 631 0.4643423 0.4991226 484 0.5619835 0.4966565 -3.2446 0.0012 †
  
State law protects me from 
liability claims that may result 
from my land so long as I do not 
charge a fee.                 
Q11a true 213 0.2347418 0.4248358 127 0.2677165 0.4445226 -0.6804 0.4967  
Q11b unsure 631 0.6608558 0.4737944 483 0.7349896 0.4417963 -2.6645 0.0078 †





Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
Liability insurance is available 
specifically for private landowners 
who charge a fee for recreational 
access.                
Q12a true 240 0.9041667 0.2949777 163 0.9141104 0.2810644 -0.3385 0.7352  
Q12b unsure 629 0.618442 0.4861556 480 0.6625 0.4733503 -1.5124 0.1307  
  
Compared to other landowners 
you know, how would you 
characterized yourself?                
Q13a risk seeker 619 0.0726979 0.25985 477 0.0712788 0.2575601 0.09 0.9283  
Q13b risk averse 619 0.7544426 0.4307653 477 0.721174 0.4488925 1.2446 0.2136  
 
 
         
Q13c risk neutral 619 0.1583199 0.3653359 477 0.1949686 0.3965924 -1.5861 0.1130  
Q14 
Would you consider any of your 
land to be "marginal" for 
agricultural purposes?  632 0.4462025 0.4974911 484 0.4008264 0.490573 1.5192 0.1290  
Q15 
How many acres of your land 
would you consider to be marginal 
for agricultural purposes? 274 106.7555 176.5857 192 108.6927 169.5404 -0.1185 0.9057  
Q16 
How many miles is your nearest 
tract of marginal land from you 
home?  280 60.08929 230.5976 193 81.06218 248.5087 -0.9417 0.3468  





Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
Could any of the following land 
classifications be used to describe 
all or part of you marginal land?                
Q17a forest or wooded areas 282 0.8120567 0.3913614 195 0.7948718 0.4048346 0.4649 0.6422  
Q17b pastureland 282 0.2446809 0.4306621 195 0.2615385 0.4406037 -0.4163 0.6774  
Q17c row crops or hay production 282 0.2375887 0.4263624 195 0.3897436 0.4889474 -3.6066 0.0003 †
Q17d water bodies 282 0.4255319 0.4953024 195 0.4307692 0.4964585 -0.1134 0.9097  
  Which of these best described your current land management?                 
Q18a self-managed 282 0.6134752 0.4878189 195 0.6 0.4911589 0.2958 0.7675  
Q18b jointly managed with partners 282 0.1099291 0.3133574 195 0.1333333 0.3408096 -0.7736 0.4396  
Q18c managed by hired professionals 282 0.0141844 0.1184608 195 0.0461538 0.2103583 -2.1136 0.0351 ‡
Q18d leased 282 0.2163121 0.4124614 195 0.2307692 0.4224095 -0.3726 0.7096  
Q18e non currently managed for any particular purpose 282 0.1382979 0.3458261 195 0.0923077 0.2902049 1.5228 0.1285  
  On average how often do you visit or check on your marginal land?                 
Q19a weekly 281 0.4412811 0.497426 195 0.4666667 0.5001718 -0.5463 0.5851  
Q19b once each month 281 0.3274021 0.4701026 193 0.2797927 0.4500648 1.1021 0.2710  
Q19c once every year 281 0.1459075 0.3536433 195 0.1794872 0.3847475 -0.9825 0.3263  
Q19d less than once every year 281 0.0925267 0.290285 195 0.0769231 0.2671552 0.5957 0.5517  






Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q20 
If you were to sell your marginal 
land, how much do you think you 
could get per acre?  193 1277.409 902.3335 154 1368.506 956.9824 -0.9095 0.3637  
Q21 
Would you be willing to let people 
pay you a fee to access your land 
for recreational purposes? 632 0.1408228 0.3481142 485 0.142268 0.3496855 -0.0686 0.9453  
Q22 
How much money per acre would 
you be willing to accept each year 
to allow someone to lease your 
land for recreational uses?  612 19.8415 192.1668 472 33.62754 469.7677 -5.823 0.0000 †
Q23a  How certain are you? 10% 67 0.0149254 0.1221694 53 0.0377358 0.1923802 -0.7902 0.4310  
Q23b  How certain are you? 20% 67 0.0149254 0.1221694 53 0 0 0.8886 0.3760  
Q23c  How certain are you?  30% 67 0.0298507 0.1714598 53 0.0188679 0.1373606 0.3797 0.7048  
Q23d  How certain are you?  40% 67 0.0149254 0.1221694 53 0.0377358 0.1923802 -0.7902 0.4310  
Q23e  How certain are you?  50% 67 0.4179104 0.4969377 53 0.3584906 0.4841463 0.6579 0.5119  
Q23f   How certain are you?  60% 68 0.0294118 0.1702139 53 0.0566038 0.2332953 -0.7411 0.4601  
Q23g  How certain are you?  70% 67 0.0298507 0.1714598 53 0.0754717 0.2666788 -1.1353 0.2585  
Q23h  How certain are you?  80% 67 0.1940299 0.3984366 53 0.0943396 0.2950978 1.5207 0.1310  
Q23i   How certain are you?  90% 67 0.0746269 0.2647716 53 0.0943396 0.2950978 -0.385 0.7009  
Q23k  How certain are you?  100% 67 0.1791045 0.3863337 53 0.2264151 0.4225158 -0.6391 0.5240  
Q24    Dollar value that you are 80% certain of accepting 36 163.7222 362.6922 30 110.3333 88.64821 0.786 0.4348  
Q25 
If current laws were changed to 
allow you to charge a fee and deep 
the liability protection would you 
allow people to pay you for 
recreational use of your land? 629 0.2368839 0.4255089 482 0.2012448 0.4013471 1.4179 0.1565  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q26 
How much money per acre would 
you be willing to accept each year 
to allow someone to lease your 
land for recreational uses? 605 17.73223 93.03263 469 12.93177 39.03192 1.0482 0.2948  
Q27a  How certain are you? 10% 126 0.0241935 0.154273 87 0.0365854 0.1888969 -0.5155 0.6067  
Q27b  How certain are you? 20% 126 0.016129 0.1264828 87 0 0 1.1538 0.2499  
Q27c  How certain are you?  30% 126 0.0080645 0.0898027 87 0.0121951 0.1104315 -0.2946 0.7686  
Q27d  How certain are you?  40% 126 0.0241935 0.154273 87 0 0 1.4189 0.1574  
Q27e  How certain are you?  50% 126 0.2016129 0.4028322 87 0.2073171 0.4078793 -0.099 0.9212  
Q27f   How certain are you?  60% 126 0.0322581 0.1774015 87 0.0487805 0.2167344 -0.5984 0.5502  
Q27g  How certain are you?  70% 126 0.0483871 0.2154533 87 0.0121951 0.1104315 1.4033 0.1620  
Q27h  How certain are you?  80% 126 0.3306452 0.472354 87 0.3306452 0.472354 0 1.0000  
Q27i   How certain are you?  90% 126 0.1370968 0.3453448 87 0.097561 0.2985461 0.848 0.3975  
Q27j   How certain are you?  100% 126 0.1612903 0.3692906 87 0.2195122 0.4164634 -1.0523 0.2939  
Q28    Dollar value that you are 80% certain of accepting 50 106.92 191.63 33 369.64 792.59 -2.324 0.0231 ‡
Q29 
How many acres of land would 
you be willing to use for fee-based 
recreational activities? 137 256.60 494.40 94 259.3 419.30 0.3608 0.7186  
 
Which of the following 
recreational activities would you 
NOT allow on you land?         
Q30a hunting big game 151 0.1589404 0.3668372 96 0.1875 0.3923613 -0.5804 0.5622  
Q30b hunting small game 151 0.0794702 0.2713713 96 0.0833333 0.2778363 -0.1081 0.9140  
Q30c hunting migratory bird or waterfowl 151 0.1059603 0.308811 96 0.09375 0.2930107 0.3089 0.7576  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q30d hunting dove 151 0.0927152 0.2909981 96 0.0833333 0.2778363 0.2513 0.8018  
Q30e fishing 151 0.1456954 0.3539746 96 0.1666667 0.3746343 -0.4437 0.6577  
Q30f hiking 151 0.1390728 0.347174 96 0.1770833 0.3837431 -0.8049 0.4217  
Q30g ATV riding 151 0.5298013 0.500772 96 0.53125 0.501642 -0.0221 0.9823  
Q30h camping 150 0.3266667 0.4705654 96 0.3958333 0.491596 -1.1051 0.2702  
Q30i other 151 0.0331126 0.179526 96 0.0208333 0.1435759 0.5649 0.5726  
  
If you are interested in offering 
recreational opportunities on your 
land, which of the following 
management formats would you 
prefer?                
Q31a independently  144 0.5694444 0.4968823 97 0.5876289 0.4948185 -0.2791 0.7804  
Q31b cooperatively 144 0.1944444 0.3971538 97 0.1340206 0.3424442 1.223 0.2225  
Q31c outfitter 144 0.2361111 0.4261736 97 0.2783505 0.4505152 -0.7374 0.4616  
Q32 
Have you ever worked with any of 
your adjacent or local landowners 
in any way?  629 0.2575517 0.4376337 482 0.2842324 0.4515167 -0.9933 0.3208  
Q33 
 Did you find your cooperation 
with other landowners to be 
effective?  162 0.9506173 0.2173376 138 0.9637681 0.1875474 -0.556 0.5786  
Q34 Have you ever been involved with a cooperative?  629 0.1414944 0.3488082 482 0.313278 0.4643083 -7.0417 0.0000 †
Q35 
Did you find your involvement in 
the cooperative to be beneficial to 
you?  87 0.9655172 0.1835234 152 0.9144737 0.2805878 1.5202 0.1298  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
Have you ever enrolled land in a 
government conservation program 
such as the Conservation Reserve 
Program or Wetland Reserve 
Program?                 
Q36a yes 631 0.446571 0.4975341 480 0.3263598 0.4693719 4.0773 0.0000 †
Q36b I don’t know what these are 631 0.0750799 0.2637309 480 0.075 0.2636661 0.005 0.9960  
Q37 How many separate tracts of non-residential land do you own?  608 2.065789 2.076529 462 2.675325 3.85454 -3.3172 0.0009 †
Q38 
Is your nearest tract of non-
residential land adjacent to your 
primary residence?  613 0.4323002 0.4958001 473 0.3446089 0.4757437 2.9412 0.0033 †
Q39 
How many miles is your primary 
residence from your nearest tract 
of land that is not adjacent to your 
primary residence?  602 70.31894 238.1102 465 86.8086 255.7322 -1.086 0.2777  
Q40 What is the total acreage of all tracts of land? 601 324.8087 634.0845 465 432.0688 853.5366 -2.3537 0.0188 ‡
Q41 How many years have you been a land owner? 610 28.00984 22.63743 476 27.29832 31.33989 0.4341 0.6643  
  How is the ownership of your land organized?                
Q42a corporation 623 0.011236 0.1054873 482 0.0311203 0.1738233 -2.3503 0.0189 ‡
Q42b limited liability corporation 623 0.0337079 0.1806212 482 0.0394191 0.1947921 -0.5037 0.6146  
Q42c joint ownership 623 0.3691814 0.4829709 482 0.4543568 0.4984297 -2.8669 0.0042 †
Q42d single ownership 623 0.6420546 0.4797812 482 0.5311203 0.4995491 3.7436 0.0002 †
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
How did you acquire the majority 
of you non residence, non 
commercial land?                 
Q43a inherited  623 0.4670947 0.499317 477 0.4612159 0.4990169 0.1936 0.8466  
Q43b by marriage 623 0.0272873 0.1630503 477 0.033543 0.1802386 -0.6023 0.5471  
Q43c by purchasing 623 0.5521669 0.4976707 477 0.557652 0.4971866 -0.1812 0.8562  
Q43d other 623 0.0080257 0.0892976 477 0.0062893 0.0791384 0.3356 0.7372  
Q44 
 Do you use any of your land for 
agricultural production of row 
crops?  631 0.5736926 0.4949319 485 0.8164948 0.3874798 -8.9073 0.0000 †
  
Which of the following 
agricultural crops are historically 
produced on your land?                 
Q45a cotton 364 0.793956 0.4050191 400 0.405 0.4915068 11.8696 0.0000 †
Q45b corn 364 0.6785714 0.4676677 400 0.2925 0.4554804 11.553 0.0000 †
Q45c sorghum 364 0.1730769 0.3788345 400 0.2175 0.4130621 -1.5442 0.1229  
Q45d rice 364 0.1043956 0.3061939 400 0.5925 0.4919846 -16.2755 0.0000 †
Q45e soybeans 364 0.6895604 0.4633104 400 0.895 0.3069373 -7.2843 0.0000 †
Q45f wheat 364 0.3681319 0.4829613 400 0.63 0.4834089 -7.4816 0.0000 †
Q45g other 364 0.0549451 0.2281866 399 0.0651629 0.247123 -0.5916 0.5543  
Q46 Have you ever leased any of your land for agricultural uses?  632 0.6740506 0.4690997 482 0.6680498 0.4714025 0.2111 0.8329  
  Do you own land for any of the following reasons?                 
Q47a hay production 632 0.221519 0.4155979 484 0.1304348 0.3371303 3.9289 0.0001 †
Q47b leasing to others 632 0.2974684 0.4575064 484 0.3615702 0.4809523 -2.2685 0.0235 ‡
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q47c personal recreation 632 0.2610759 0.4395691 484 0.2252066 0.4181505 1.3797 0.1680  
Q47d raising livestock 632 0.2041139 0.4033719 484 0.1280992 0.334546 3.3552 0.0008 † 
Q47e timber production 632 0.3037975 0.4602605 484 0.2004132 0.4007238 3.9307 0.0001 † 
Q47f provide a place for wildlife 632 0.3291139 0.4702636 484 0.2913223 0.4548418 1.3495 0.1775  
Q47g provide recreational access for others 632 0.0427215 0.2023887 484 0.0495868 0.2173143 -0.5438 0.5867  
Q47h other 632 0.068038 0.2520105 484 0.1033058 0.3046728 -2.1149 0.0347 ‡ 
Q48 Your gender (female = 1, male=0) 616 0.349026 0.4770496 474 0.2890295 0.4537906 2.1023 0.0358 ‡ 
Q49 Your age in years 603 61.87231 13.66587 464 63.28664 13.61654 -1.6785 0.0935 * 
  Which of the following best describes your ethnic background?                
Q50a Caucasian 616 0.9448052 0.2285457 468 0.9380342 0.2413514 0.4716 0.6373  
Q50b African American 616 0.0324675 0.1773823 468 0.0363248 0.1872972 -0.3461 0.7293  
Q50c Asian 616 0 0 468 0.0021368 0.046225 -1.1474 0.2515  
Q50d American Indian 616 0.0064935 0.0803855 468 0.0064103 0.0798924 0.0169 0.9865  
Q50e Hispanic 616 0.0016234 0.0402911 468 0 0 0.8715 0.3837  
Q50f other 616 0 0 468 0 0              .        .   
  
Choose one category that most 
closely describes your primary 
occupation.                 
Q51a farming 616 0.1398374 0.3471006 472 0.2182203 0.413476 -3.3945 0.0007 † 
Q51b business 616 0.1022727 0.3032529 472 0.1165254 0.3211944 -0.7488 0.4541  
Q51c engineering 616 0.025974 0.159187 472 0.0084746 0.0917638 2.1321 0.0332 ‡ 
Q51d government 616 0.0584416 0.2347672 472 0.0275424 0.1638312 2.4401 0.0148 ‡ 
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q51e housewife 616 0.0405844 0.1974858 472 0.0423729 0.2016521 -0.1467 0.8834  
Q51f retired 616 0.3668831 0.4823459 472 0.3707627 0.4835215 -0.1313 0.8955  
Q51g unemployed 616 0.0016234 0.0402911 472 0 0 0.8753 0.3816  
Q51h education 616 0.0584416 0.2347672 472 0.0466102 0.2110261 0.8605 0.3897  
Q51i healthcare 616 0.0373377 0.1897419 472 0.0275424 0.1638312 0.8947 0.3711  
Q51j student 616 0.0016234 0.0402911 472 0 0 0.8753 0.3816  
Q51k self-employed 616 0.1087662 0.3115987 472 0.0762712 0.2657131 1.8156 0.0697 * 
Q51l other 616 0.0584416 0.2347672 472 0.0508475 0.2199192 0.5434 0.5869  
Q52 How many individuals live in your 
household?  606 2.127063 1.005124 470 2.080851 0.960774 0.7625 0.4459  
  Indicate your highest level of 
education attained.                  
Q53a less than high school 610 0.0590164 0.2358488 471 0.0849257 0.2790675 -1.6527 0.0987 * 
Q53b high school graduate 610 0.2967213 0.4571875 471 0.2590234 0.4385643 1.3683 0.1715  
Q53c some college, no degree 610 0.2081967 0.4063515 471 0.2505308 0.4337795 -1.6491 0.0994 * 
Q53d associate degree 610 0.0180328 0.1331791 471 0.0169851 0.1293529 0.1299 0.8967  
Q53e bachelor degree 610 0.2245902 0.4176546 471 0.2420382 0.4287727 -0.6732 0.5010  
Q53f graduate or professional degree 610 0.1770492 0.3820236 471 0.1380042 0.3452712 1.737 0.0827 * 
  Which best describes your annual 
household income?                  
Q54a less than $10K 509 0.0235756 0.1518721 395 0.0126582 0.1119362 1.1982 0.2311  
Q54b $10K to $14.9K 509 0.0314342 0.1746597 395 0.0075949 0.0869275 2.4842 0.0132 ‡
Q54c $15K to $24.9K 509 0.0903733 0.2869979 395 0.1113924 0.3150165 -1.0464 0.2956  
Q54d $25K to $34.9K 509 0.108055 0.3107553 395 0.0962025 0.2952428 0.5813 0.5612  
Q54e $35K to $49.9K 509 0.1552063 0.3624574 395 0.1113924 0.3150165 1.9075 0.0568 * 
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.1. (continued) 
  Louisiana Arkansas    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q54f $50K to $74.9K 509 0.1964637 0.397714 395 0.2151899 0.4114752 -0.6916 0.4893  
Q54g $75K to $99.9K 509 0.129666 0.3362661 395 0.1037975 0.3053844 1.1939 0.2328  
Q54h $100K to $149.9K 509 0.1532417 0.3605746 395 0.2075949 0.4060995 -2.1268 0.0337 ‡
Q54i $150K to $199.9K  509 0.0275049 0.1637102 395 0.0303797 0.1718476 -0.2562 0.7978  
Q54j $200K or more 508 0.0787402 0.2695983 395 0.0835443 0.2770541 -0.2624 0.7930  













Table J.2. A summary of t-tests for difference between mean values for first and second mailngs sent to Louisiana landowners. 
  first maligns second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q1 
Do you or any members of your 
household use your land for 
recreational purposes?  447 0.5951 0.4914 184 0.5707 0.4963 0.5658 0.5717  
  
Do you or any members of your 
household use your land for any of 
the following recreational 
purposes?                
Q2a hunting big game 267 0.6929 0.4622 105 0.6667 0.4737 0.4890 0.6251  
Q2b hunting big game 268 0.6493 0.4781 105 0.6095 0.4902 0.7167 0.4740  
Q2c hunting small game 268 0.4067 0.4921 105 0.4000 0.4922 0.1185 0.9057  
Q2d hunting migratory bird or waterfowl 268 0.5373 0.4995 105 0.5619 0.4985 -0.4278 0.6690  
Q2e hunting dove 268 0.3694 0.4835 105 0.3429 0.4769 0.4787 0.6325  
Q2f fishing 268 0.1343 0.3416 105 0.1714 0.3787 -0.9144 0.3611  
Q2g hiking 268 0.5485 0.4986 105 0.5048 0.5024 0.7605 0.4475  
Q2h ATV riding 268 0.1679 0.3745 104 0.1442 0.3530 0.5560 0.5785  
Q2i Camping 268 0.0560 0.2303 102 0.0392 0.1951 0.6511 0.5154  
Q3 
Have you ever allowed individuals 
who are not part of your household 
to use your land for recreational 
purposes?  448 0.6027 0.4899 184 0.4674 0.5003 3.1344 0.0018 †
  
Please indicate which of the 
following types of individuals you 
have allowed access to your land 
for recreational purposes?                
Q4a immediate family 270 0.6556 0.4761 86 0.6279 0.4862 0.4666 0.6410  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.2. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q4b other relative 270 0.5259 0.5003 86 0.5581 0.4995 -0.5202 0.6032  
Q4c friends 270 0.7444 0.4370 86 0.7209 0.4512 0.4312 0.6666  
Q4d individuals you do not know personally 270 0.1000 0.3006 86 0.1163 0.3224 -0.4297 0.6677  
Q4i other 271 0.0406 0.1977 86 0.0465 0.2118 -0.2378 0.8122  
Q5 Have you ever leased your land for hunting or recreational access? 448 0.1228 0.3285 184 0.0870 0.2825 1.2948 0.1959  
  
I am very concerned about the 
liability issues associated with 
allowing people on my land.                
Q7a strongly disagree 447 0.0537 0.2257 183 0.0874 0.2832 -1.5773 0.1152  
Q7b somewhat disagree 447 0.0470 0.2118 183 0.0328 0.1786 0.7976 0.4254  
Q7c not sure 447 0.0783 0.2689 447 0.0783 0.2689 0.0000 1.0000  
Q7d somewhat agree 447 0.1521 0.3595 183 0.1366 0.3444 0.4976 0.6189  
Q7e strongly agree 447 0.6644 0.4727 183 0.6284 0.4846 0.8618 0.3891  
  
 It is possible to obtain a written 
agreement from anyone coming 
onto my land that would protect 
me from liability.                 
Q8a strongly disagree 447 0.1767 0.3819 183 0.2131 0.4106 -1.0618 0.2887  
Q8b somewhat disagree 447 0.0805 0.2724 183 0.0219 0.1466 2.7542 0.0061 †
Q8c not sure 447 0.4139 0.4931 183 0.3716 0.4846 0.9821 0.3264  
Q8d somewhat agree 447 0.1186 0.3236 183 0.1038 0.3059 0.5273 0.5982  
Q8e strongly agree 447 0.2058 0.4048 183 0.2896 0.4548 -2.2742 0.0233 ‡
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
 
 233
Table J.2. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
If my liability concerns were eased 
I would by much more likely to 
allow people to use my land for 
recreational purposes.                
Q9a strongly disagree 447 0.2864 0.4526 183 0.3497 0.4782 -1.5694 0.1171  
Q9b somewhat disagree 447 0.0984 0.2982 183 0.1093 0.3129 -0.4089 0.6828  
Q9c not sure 447 0.1946 0.3964 183 0.2842 0.4522 -2.4680 0.0139 †
Q9d somewhat agree 447 0.2394 0.4272 183 0.1366 0.3444 2.8917 0.0040 †
Q9e strongly agree 447 0.1767 0.3819 183 0.1202 0.3261 1.7567 0.0795 *
  
 To protect myself from liability 
associated with trespassers, the 
law requires me to post my land 
with "no trespassing" signs.                
Q10a true 244 0.3893 0.4886 94 0.4787 0.5022 -1.4952 0.1358  
Q10b unsure 448 0.4554 0.4986 183 0.4863 0.5012 -0.7073 0.4797  
  
State law protects me from 
liability claims that may result 
from my land so long as I do not 
charge a fee.                 
Q11a true 160 0.2688 0.4447 53 0.1321 0.3418 2.0451 0.0421 ‡
Q11b unsure 448 0.6406 0.4804 183 0.7104 0.4548 -1.6807 0.0933 *
  
Liability insurance is available 
specifically for private landowners 
who charge a fee for recreational 
access.                
Q12a true 183 0.9071 0.2911 57 0.8947 0.3096 0.2759 0.7829  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.2. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q12b unsure 447 0.5906 0.4923 182 0.6868 0.4651 -2.2580 0.0243 ‡
  
Compared to other landowners 
you know, how would you 
characterized yourself?                
Q13a risk seeker 443 0.0790 0.2701 176 0.0568 0.2322 0.9583 0.3383  
Q13b risk averse 443 0.7472 0.4351 176 0.7727 0.4203 -0.6653 0.5061  
Q13c risk neutral 443 0.1535 0.3609 176 0.1705 0.3771 -0.5206 0.6029  
Q14 
Would you consider any of your 
land to be "marginal" for 
agricultural purposes?  448 0.4643 0.4993 184 0.4022 0.4917 1.4270 0.1541  
Q15 
How many acres of your land 
would you consider to be marginal 
for agricultural purposes? 203 112.2660 185.1824 71 91.0000 149.3771 0.8731 0.3834  
Q16 
How many miles is your nearest 
tract of marginal land from you 
home?  207 60.7488 205.8973 73 58.2192 291.1293 0.0804 0.9359  
  
Could any of the following land 
classifications be used to describe 
all or part of you marginal land?                
Q17a forest or wooded areas 208 0.8221 0.3833 74 0.7838 0.4145 0.7230 0.4703  
Q17b pastureland 208 0.2404 0.4283 74 0.2568 0.4398 -0.2804 0.7794  
Q17c row crops or hay production 208 0.2115 0.4094 74 0.3108 0.4660 -1.7262 0.0854 *
Q17d water bodies 208 0.4327 0.4966 74 0.4054 0.4943 0.4064 0.6848  
  Which of these best described your current land management?                 
Q18a self-managed 208 0.6154 0.4877 74 0.6081 0.4915 0.1100 0.9125  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.2. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q18b jointly managed with partners 208 0.1154 0.3203 74 0.0946 0.2947 0.4895 0.6249  
Q18c managed by hired professionals 208 0.0192 0.1377 74 0.0000 0.0000 1.2003 0.2310  
Q18d leased 208 0.2019 0.4024 74 0.2568 0.4398 -0.9821 0.3269  
Q18e non currently managed for any particular purpose 208 0.1394 0.3472 74 0.1351 0.3442 0.0914 0.9272  
  On average how often do you visit or check on your marginal land?                 
Q19a weekly 208 0.4279 0.4960 73 0.4795 0.5030 -0.7615 0.4470  
Q19b once each month 208 0.3365 0.4737 73 0.3014 0.4620 0.5492 0.5833  
Q19c once every year 208 0.1538 0.3617 73 0.1233 0.3310 0.6345 0.5263  
Q19d less than once every year 208 0.0865 0.2818 73 0.1096 0.3145 -0.5830 0.5603  
Q20 
If you were to sell your marginal 
land, how much do you think you 
could get per acre?  151 1237.1520 935.1637 42 1422.1430 765.4635 -1.1764 0.2409  
Q21 
Would you be willing to let people 
pay you a fee to access your land 
for recreational purposes? 448 0.1808 0.3853 184 0.0435 0.2045 4.5759 0.0000 †
Q22 
How much money per acre would 
you be willing to accept each year 
to allow someone to lease your 
land for recreational uses?  434 14.1544 79.2146 176 0.0000           2.3694 0.0181 ‡
Q25 
If current laws were changed to 
allow you to charge a fee and deep 
the liability protection would you 
allow people to pay you for 
recreational use of your land? 445 0.3124 0.4640 184 0.0543 0.2273 7.1922 0.0000 †
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.2. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q26 
How much money per acre would 
you be willing to accept each year 
to allow someone to lease your 
land for recreational uses? 431 24.8910 109.4475 174 0.0000 0.0000 2.9984 0.0028 †
Q29 
How many acres of land would 
you be willing to use for fee-based 
recreational activities? 130 276.2154 510.3076 7 185.0000 206.4986 0.4695 0.6395  
  
Which of the following 
recreational activities would you 
NOT allow on you land?                 
Q30a hunting big game 141 0.1348 0.3427 10 0.5000 0.5270 -3.1305 0.0021 †
Q30b hunting small game 141 0.0709 0.2576 10 0.2000 0.4216 -1.4589 0.1467  
Q30c hunting migratory bird or waterfowl 141 0.0993 0.3001 10 0.2000 0.4216 -0.9965 0.3206  
Q30d hunting dove 141 0.0922 0.2903 10 0.1000 0.3162 -0.0817 0.9350  
Q30e fishing 141 0.1418 0.3501 10 0.2000 0.4216 -0.5008 0.6173  
Q30f hiking 141 0.1348 0.3427 10 0.2000 0.4216 -0.5730 0.5675  
Q30g ATV riding 141 0.5106 0.5017 10 0.8000 0.4216 -1.7784 0.0774 *
Q30h camping 141 0.3262 0.4705 9 0.3333 0.5000 -0.0437 0.9652  
Q30i other 141 0.0213 0.1448 10 0.2000 0.4216 -3.1300 0.0021 †
  
If you are interested in offering 
recreational opportunities on your 
land, which of the following 
management formats would you 
prefer?                
Q31a independently  136 0.5882 0.4940 8 0.2500 0.4629 1.8878 0.0611 *
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.2. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q31b cooperatively 136 0.1765 0.3826 8 0.5000 0.5345 -2.2715 0.0246 ‡
Q31c outfitter 136 0.2353 0.4258 8 0.2500 0.4629 -0.0945 0.9248  
Q32 
Have you ever worked with any of 
your adjacent or local landowners 
in any way?  448 0.2746 0.4468 181 0.2155 0.4123 1.5345 0.1254  
Q33 
 Did you find your cooperation 
with other landowners to be 
effective?  123 0.9431 0.2326 39 0.9744 0.1601 -0.7820 0.4354  
Q34 Have you ever been involved with a cooperative?  448 0.1674 0.3738 181 0.0773 0.2679 2.9496 0.0033 †
Q35 
Did you find your involvement in 
the cooperative to be beneficial to 
you?  73 0.9589 0.1999 14 1.0000 0.0000 -0.7656 0.4460  
  
Have you ever enrolled land in a 
government conservation program 
such as the Conservation Reserve 
Program or Wetland Reserve 
Program?                 
Q36a yes 447 0.4743 0.4999 180 0.3778 0.4862 2.2038 0.0279 ‡
Q36b I don’t know what these are 446 0.0561 0.2303 180 0.1222 0.3285 -2.8575 0.0044 †
Q37 How many separate tracts of non-residential land do you own?  440 2.1295 2.2056 168 1.8988 1.6870 1.2257 0.2208  
Q38 
Is your nearest tract of non-
residential land adjacent to your 
primary residence?  441 0.4104 0.4925 172 0.4884 0.5013 -1.7516 0.0803 *




Table J.2. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q39 
How many miles is your primary 
residence from your nearest tract 
of land that is not adjacent to your 
primary residence?  436 77.5436 245.2761 166 51.3434 217.7333 1.2070 0.2279  
Q40 What is the total acreage of all tracts of land? 427 354.5059 684.6005 174 251.9310 482.5293 1.8020 0.0720 *
Q41 How many years have you been a land owner? 435 27.9172 22.5686 175 28.2400 22.8709 -0.1591 0.8736  
  How is the ownership of your land organized?                
Q42a corporation 444 0.0090 0.0946 179 0.0168 0.1287 -0.8297 0.4070  
Q42b limited liability corporation 444 0.0383 0.1921 179 0.0223 0.1482 0.9969 0.3192  
Q42c joint ownership 444 0.3784 0.4855 179 0.3464 0.4771 0.7483 0.4546  
Q42d single ownership 444 0.6396 0.4806 179 0.6480 0.4789 -0.1977 0.8433  
  
How did you acquire the majority 
of you non residence, non 
commercial land?  444 0.4617 0.4991 179 0.4804 0.5010 -0.4235 0.6721  
Q43a inherited  444 0.0248 0.1556 179 0.0335 0.1805 -0.6055 0.5451  
Q43b by marriage 444 0.5563 0.4974 179 0.5419 0.4996 0.3267 0.7440  
Q43c by purchasing 444 0.0090 0.0946 179 0.0056 0.0747 0.4326 0.6655  
Q43d other                
Q44 
 Do you use any of your land for 
agricultural production of row 
crops?  448 0.5826 0.4937 183 0.5519 0.4987 0.7062 0.4803  




Table J.2. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
Which of the following 
agricultural crops are historically 
produced on your land?                 
Q45a cotton 263 0.7985 0.4019 101 0.7822 0.4148 0.3434 0.7315  
Q45b corn 263 0.6730 0.4700 101 0.6931 0.4635 -0.3661 0.7145  
Q45c sorghum 263 0.1787 0.3838 101 0.1584 0.3670 0.4571 0.6479  
Q45d rice 263 0.1179 0.3231 101 0.0693 0.2552 1.3565 0.1758  
Q45e soybeans 263 0.7186 0.4505 101 0.6139 0.4893 1.9391 0.0533 ‡ 
Q45f wheat 263 0.3802 0.4864 101 0.3366 0.4749 0.7707 0.4414  
Q45g other 263 0.0532 0.2249 101 0.0594 0.2376 -0.2308 0.8176  
Q46 Have you ever leased any of your land for agricultural uses?  448 0.6964 0.4603 184 0.6196 0.4868 1.8750 0.0613 * 
  Do you own land for any of the following reasons?                 
Q47a hay production 448 0.2031 0.4028 184 0.2663 0.4432 -1.7389 0.0825 * 
Q47b leasing to others 448 0.3192 0.4667 184 0.2446 0.4310 1.8667 0.0624 * 
Q47c personal recreation 448 0.2679 0.4433 184 0.2446 0.4310 0.6049 0.5455  
Q47d raising livestock 448 0.1920 0.3943 184 0.2337 0.4243 -1.1819 0.2377  
Q47e timber production 448 0.3237 0.4684 184 0.2554 0.4373 1.6954 0.0905 * 
Q47f provide a place for wildlife 448 0.3326 0.4717 184 0.3207 0.4680 0.2897 0.7721  
Q47g provide recreational access for others 448 0.0402 0.1966 184 0.0489 0.2163 -0.4926 0.6225  
Q47h other 448 0.0670 0.2502 184 0.0707 0.2569 -0.1670 0.8674  
Q48 Your gender (female = 1, male=0) 439 0.3554 0.4792 177 0.3333 0.4727 0.5181 0.6046  
Q49 Your age in years 430 61.8744 13.1459 173 61.8671 14.9203 0.0060 0.9952  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
 240
Table J.2. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  Which of the following best describes your ethnic background?                
Q50a Caucasian 439 0.9453 0.2276 177 0.9435 0.2315 0.0897 0.9285  
Q50b African American 439 0.0342 0.1819 177 0.0282 0.1662 0.3746 0.7081  
Q50c Asian 439 0.0000 0.0000 177 0.0000 0.0000                  .            .   
Q50d American Indian 439 0.0068 0.0825 177 0.0056 0.0752 0.1653 0.8688  
Q50e Hispanic 439 0.0000 0.0000 177 0.0056 0.0752 -1.5768 0.1154  
Q50f other 439 0.0000 0.0000 177 0.0000 0.0000                 .          .   
  
Choose one category that most 
closely describes your primary 
occupation.                 
Q51a farming 437 0.1281 0.3346 178 0.1685 0.3754 -1.3095 0.1908  
Q51b business 438 0.1027 0.3040 178 0.1011 0.3023 0.0599 0.9522  
Q51c engineering 438 0.0297 0.1699 178 0.0169 0.1291 0.9063 0.3651  
Q51d government 438 0.0662 0.2489 178 0.0393 0.1949 1.2890 0.1979  
Q51e housewife 438 0.0434 0.2039 178 0.0337 0.1810 0.5506 0.5821  
Q51f retired 438 0.3676 0.4827 178 0.3652 0.4828 0.0562 0.9552  
Q51g unemployed 438 0.0023 0.0478 178 0.0000 0.0000 0.6372 0.5242  
Q51h education 438 0.0616 0.2408 178 0.0506 0.2197 0.5307 0.5958  
Q51i healthcare 438 0.0479 0.2139 178 0.0112 0.1057 2.1832 0.0294 ‡ 
Q51j student 438 0.0000   178 0.0056 0.0750 -1.5705 0.1168  
Q51k self-employed 438 0.0982 0.2979 178 0.1348 0.3425 -1.3243 0.1859  
Q51l other 438 0.0525 0.2233 178 0.0730 0.2609 -0.9834 0.3258  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.2. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q #     Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q52 
How many individuals live in 
your household?  431 2.1299 0.9844 175 2.1200 1.0572 0.1101 0.9123  
  
Indicate your highest level of 
education attained.                  
Q53a less than high school 437 0.0503 0.2189 173 0.0809 0.2735 -1.4448 0.1490  
Q53b high school graduate 437 0.2632 0.4409 173 0.3815 0.4872 -2.8992 0.0039 †
Q53c some college, no degree 437 0.2105 0.4081 173 0.2023 0.4029 0.2249 0.8222  
Q53d associate degree 437 0.0229 0.1497 173 0.0058 0.0760 1.4309 0.1530  
Q53e bachelor degree 437 0.2380 0.4263 173 0.1908 0.3940 1.2597 0.2083  
Q53f graduate or professional degree 437 0.1968 0.3980 173 0.1272 0.3341 2.0343 0.0424 ‡
  
Which best describes your annual 
household income?                  
Q54a less than $10K 373 0.0188 0.1359 136 0.0368 0.1889 -1.1835 0.2372  
Q54b $10K to $14.9K 373 0.0241 0.1537 136 0.0515 0.2218 -1.5650 0.1182  
Q54c $15K to $24.9K 373 0.0912 0.2882 136 0.0882 0.2847 0.1014 0.9193  
Q54d $25K to $34.9K 373 0.1126 0.3165 136 0.0956 0.2951 0.5461 0.5852  
Q54e $35K to $49.9K 373 0.1448 0.3523 136 0.1838 0.3888 -1.0758 0.2826  
Q54f $50K to $74.9K 373 0.1903 0.3931 136 0.2132 0.4111 -0.5741 0.5662  
Q54g $75K to $99.9K 373 0.1314 0.3383 136 0.1250 0.3319 0.1889 0.8503  
Q54h $100K to $149.9K 373 0.1689 0.3752 136 0.1103 0.3144 1.6252 0.1047 * 
Q54i $150K to $199.9K  373 0.0295 0.1694 136 0.0221 0.1474 0.4528 0.6509  
Q54j $200K or more 373 0.0804 0.2723 135 0.0741 0.2629 0.2345 0.8147  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.3. A summary of t-tests for difference between mean values for first and second mailngs sent to Arkansas landowners. 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q1 
Do you or any members of your 
household use your land for 
recreational purposes?  343 0.556851 0.497483 142 0.556338 0.498575 0.0103 0.992  
  
Do you or any members of your 
household use your land for any of the 
following recreational purposes?                  
Q2a hunting big game 191 0.497382 0.501307 79 0.582279 0.496335 -1.2697 0.205  
Q2b hunting big game 191 0.643979 0.48008 79 0.594937 0.494041 0.7572 0.450  
Q2c hunting small game 191 0.565445 0.497001 79 0.468354 0.502186 1.456 0.147  
Q2d hunting migratory bird or waterfowl 191 0.455497 0.499324 79 0.43038 0.498293 0.3763 0.707  
Q2e hunting dove 191 0.434555 0.497001 79 0.405063 0.494041 0.4444 0.657  
Q2f fishing 191 0.188482 0.392124 79 0.126582 0.334629 1.2297 0.220  
Q2g hiking 191 0.539267 0.499766 79 0.468354 0.502186 1.0592 0.290  
Q2h ATV riding 191 0.052356 0.223329 79 0.139241 0.34841 -2.4429 0.015 †
Q2i Camping 191 0.08377 0.27777 79 0.025317 0.158088 1.7553 0.080 *
Q3 
Have you ever allowed individuals 
who are not part of your household to 
use your land for recreational 
purposes?  343 0.574344 0.495164 142 0.514085 0.501571 1.2149 0.225  
  
Please indicate which of the following 
types of individuals you have allowed 
access to your land for recreational 
purposes?                  




Table J.3. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q4a immediate family 198 0.707071 0.45626 73 0.712329 0.45581 -0.0842 0.933  
Q4b other relative 198 0.590909 0.492912 73 0.534247 0.502278 0.8353 0.404  
Q4c friends 198 0.80303 0.398717 73 0.821918 0.38523 -0.3491 0.727  
Q4d 
individuals you do not know 
personally 198 0.106061 0.308696 73 0.136986 0.346212 -0.7076 0.480  
Q4i other 198 0.060606 0.239211 73 0.013699 0.117041 1.6047 0.110  
Q5 
Have you ever leased your land for 
hunting or recreational access? 343 0.134111 0.341269 142 0.070423 0.256764 2.0012 0.046 ‡
  
I am very concerned about the liability 
issues associated with allowing people 
on my land.                
Q7a strongly disagree 342 0.067252 0.250824 140 0.057143 0.232949 0.4099 0.682  
Q7b somewhat disagree 342 0.035088 0.184271 140 0.057143 0.232949 -1.1013 0.271  
Q7c not sure 342 0.122807 0.328697 342 0.122807 0.328697 0 1.000  
Q7d somewhat agree 342 0.207602 0.406185 140 0.228571 0.42142 -0.5089 0.611  
Q7e strongly agree 342 0.55848 0.497296 140 0.478571 0.501334 1.5977 0.111  
  
 It is possible to obtain a written 
agreement from anyone coming onto 
my land that would protect me from 
liability.                 
Q8a strongly disagree 342 0.192983 0.395218 140 0.185714 0.390272 0.184 0.854  
Q8b somewhat disagree 342 0.078947 0.270052 140 0.05 0.218728 1.1259 0.261  
Q8c not sure 342 0.418129 0.493974 140 0.4 0.491657 0.3663 0.714  
Q8d somewhat agree 342 0.134503 0.341692 140 0.157143 0.365242 -0.6472 0.518  
Q8e strongly agree 342 0.166667 0.373224 140 0.207143 0.406714 -1.0527 0.293  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.3. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
If my liability concerns were eased I 
would by much more likely to allow 
people to use my land for recreational 
purposes.                
Q9a strongly disagree 343 0.291545 0.455138 140 0.364286 0.482957 -1.5653 0.118  
Q9b somewhat disagree 343 0.122449 0.328283 140 0.128571 0.335927 -0.1847 0.854  
Q9c not sure 343 0.291545 0.455138 140 0.285714 0.453376 0.1279 0.898  
Q9d somewhat agree 343 0.183674 0.387783 140 0.114286 0.3193 1.8734 0.062 *
Q9e strongly agree 343 0.102041 0.303144 140 0.085714 0.280947 0.5483 0.584  
  
 To protect myself from liability 
associated with trespassers, the law 
requires me to post my land with "no 
trespassing" signs.                
Q10a true 151 0.688742 0.464549 62 0.790323 0.410402 -1.498 0.136  
Q10b unsure 342 0.561404 0.496942 142 0.56338 0.497722 -0.0398 0.968  
  
State law protects me from liability 
claims that may result from my land so 
long as I do not charge a fee.                 
Q11a true 90 0.255556 0.438617 37 0.297297 0.463373 -0.4794 0.633  
Q11b unsure 343 0.734694 0.442141 140 0.735714 0.442535 -0.023 0.982  
  
Liability insurance is available 
specifically for private landowners 
who charge a fee for recreational 
access.                
Q12a true 124 0.91129 0.285478 39 0.923077 0.269953 -0.2277 0.820  
Q12b unsure 341 0.639296 0.48091 139 0.719425 0.450905 -1.6854 0.093 *
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.3. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
Compared to other landowners you 
know, how would you characterized 
yourself?                
Q13a risk seeker 340 0.073529 0.261388 137 0.065693 0.248655 0.3004 0.764  
Q13b risk averse 340 0.714706 0.45222 137 0.737226 0.441756 -0.4954 0.621  
Q13c risk neutral 340 0.197059 0.398363 137 0.189781 0.393567 0.1812 0.856  
Q14 
Would you consider any of your land 
to be "marginal" for agricultural 
purposes?  343 0.422741 0.494717 141 0.347518 0.47788 1.5349 0.126  
Q15 
How many acres of your land would 
you consider to be marginal for 
agricultural purposes? 143 120.2448 186.6084 49 74.97959 99.00515 1.6197 0.107  
Q16 
How many miles is your nearest tract 
of marginal land from you home?  144 102.6319 284.2531 49 17.67347 28.5054 2.0851 0.038 ‡
  
Could any of the following land 
classifications be used to describe all 
or part of you marginal land?                
Q17a forest or wooded areas 145 0.793103 0.406485 50 0.8 0.404061 -0.1036 0.918  
Q17b pastureland 145 0.255172 0.437469 50 0.28 0.453557 -0.3428 0.732  
Q17c row crops or hay production 145 0.372414 0.485124 50 0.44 0.501427 -0.8422 0.401  
Q17d water bodies 145 0.455172 0.499713 50 0.36 0.484873 1.17 0.243  
  
Which of these best described your 
current land management?                 
Q18a self-managed 145 0.593103 0.492958 50 0.62 0.490314 -0.3331 0.739  
Q18b jointly managed with partners 145 0.131035 0.338608 50 0.14 0.35051 -0.16 0.873  
Q18c managed by hired professionals 145 0.062069 0.242117 50 0 0 1.8097 0.072 *
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.3. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q18d leased 145 0.255172 0.437469 50 0.16 0.370328 1.377 0.170  
Q18e 
non currently managed for any 
particular purpose 145 0.089655 0.286677 50 0.1 0.303046 -0.2168 0.829  
  
On average how often do you visit or 
check on your marginal land?                 
Q19a weekly 145 0.413793 0.49422 50 0.62 0.490314 -2.5492 0.012 †
Q19b once each month 144 0.291667 0.456116 49 0.244898 0.434483 0.6273 0.531  
Q19c once every year 146 0.212329 0.410364 49 0.081633 0.276642 2.075 0.039 ‡
Q19d less than once every year 146 0.082192 0.275602 49 0.061225 0.242226 0.4744 0.636  
Q20 
If you were to sell your marginal land, 
how much do you think you could get 
per acre?  120 1228.333 861.2755 34 1863.235 1116.902 -3.5413 0.001 †
Q21 
Would you be willing to let people pay 
you a fee to access your land for 
recreational purposes? 343 0.198251 0.399265 142 0.007042 0.083918 5.6521 0.000 †
Q22 
How much money per acre would you 
be willing to accept each year to allow 
someone to lease your land for 
recreational uses?  343 14.82507 47.70583 142 0 0 3.7009 0.000 †
Q25 
If current laws were changed to allow 
you to charge a fee and deep the 
liability protection would you allow 
people to pay you for recreational use 
of your land? 340 0.279412 0.449372 142 0.014085 0.118257 6.9325 0.000 †
Q26 
How much money per acre would you 
be willing to accept each year to allow 
someone to lease your land for 
recreational uses? 329 18.43465 45.51932 140 0 0 4.7889 0.000 †
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.3. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q29 
How many acres of land would you be 
willing to use for fee-based 
recreational activities? 91 312.0659 480.6857 2 55 21.2132 0.7523 0.454  
  
Which of the following recreational 
activities would you NOT allow on 
you land?                 
Q30a hunting big game 94 0.191489 0.395583 2 0 0 0.681 0.498  
Q30b hunting small game 94 0.085106 0.280536 2 0 0 0.4268 0.671  
Q30c hunting migratory bird or waterfowl 94 0.095745 0.295819 2 0 0 0.4554 0.650  
Q30d hunting dove 94 0.085106 0.280536 2 0 0 0.4268 0.671  
Q30e fishing 94 0.170213 0.377835 2 0 0 0.6338 0.528  
Q30f hiking 94 0.180851 0.386959 2 0 0 0.6575 0.512  
Q30g ATV riding 94 0.531915 0.501656 2 0.5 0.707107 0.0886 0.930  
Q30h camping 94 0.393617 0.491171 2 0.5 0.707107 -0.3014 0.764  
Q30i other 94 0.021277 0.145079 2 0 0 0.2063 0.837  
  
If you are interested in offering 
recreational opportunities on your land, 
which of the following management 
formats would you prefer?                
Q31a independently  95 0.578947 0.496347 2 1 0 -1.1935 0.236  
Q31b cooperatively 95 0.136842 0.345504 2 0 0 0.5573 0.579  
Q31c outfitter 95 0.284211 0.45343 2 0 0 0.8819 0.380  
Q32 
Have you ever worked with any of 
your adjacent or local landowners in 
any way?  342 0.295322 0.456856 140 0.257143 0.438628 0.8425 0.400  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.3. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q33 
 Did you find your cooperation with 
other landowners to be effective?  102 0.960784 0.195066 36 0.972222 0.166667 -0.3136 0.754  
Q34 
Have you ever been involved with a 
cooperative?  343 0.349854 0.477621 139 0.223022 0.417778 2.735 0.007 †
Q35 
Did you find your involvement in the 
cooperative to be beneficial to you?  121 0.892562 0.310957 31 1 0 -1.919 0.057 *
  
Have you ever enrolled land in a 
government conservation program 
such as the Conservation Reserve 
Program or Wetland Reserve Program?                
Q36a yes 339 0.333333 0.472101 139 0.309353 0.463898 0.5069 0.613  
Q36b I don’t know what these are 341 0.070381 0.256164 139 0.086331 0.281868 -0.6007 0.548  
Q37 
How many separate tracts of non-
residential land do you own?  333 2.882883 4.379729 129 2.139535 1.831769 1.8646 0.063 *
Q38 
Is your nearest tract of non-residential 
land adjacent to your primary 
residence?  339 0.327434 0.469971 134 0.38806 0.489137 -1.2496 0.212  
Q39 
How many miles is your primary 
residence from your nearest tract of 
land that is not adjacent to your 
primary residence?  337 102.2641 284.4388 128 46.11719 150.2868 2.1226 0.034 ‡
Q40 
What is the total acreage of all tracts of 
land? 333 485.012 919.8754 132 298.5076 640.9599 2.1326 0.034 ‡
Q41 
How many years have you been a land 
owner? 339 27.30383 35.41903 137 27.28467 17.68098 0.006 0.995  
  
How is the ownership of your land 
organized?                
Q42a corporation 342 0.038012 0.191505 140 0.014286 0.119092 1.3616 0.174  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.3. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q42b limited liability corporation 342 0.049708 0.217659 140 0.014286 0.119092 1.8167 0.070 *
Q42c joint ownership 342 0.447368 0.497951 140 0.471429 0.500975 -0.4807 0.631  
Q42d single ownership 342 0.526316 0.500039 140 0.542857 0.499949 -0.3297 0.742  
  
How did you acquire the majority of 
you non residence, non commercial 
land?                 
Q43a inherited  342 0.491228 0.500656 135 0.385185 0.488452 2.0981 0.036 ‡
Q43b by marriage 342 0.023392 0.151366 135 0.059259 0.236989 -1.9637 0.050 ‡
Q43c by purchasing 342 0.52924 0.499876 135 0.62963 0.484702 -1.9927 0.047 ‡
Q43d other 342 0.002924 0.054074 135 0.014815 0.121261 -1.4801 0.140  
Q44 
 Do you use any of your land for 
agricultural production of row crops?  343 0.830904 0.375385 142 0.78169 0.414561 1.2736 0.203  
  
Which of the following agricultural 
crops are historically produced on your 
land?                 
Q45a cotton 286 0.437063 0.496893 114 0.324561 0.470278 2.075 0.039 ‡
Q45b corn 286 0.304196 0.460872 114 0.263158 0.442292 0.8131 0.417  
Q45c sorghum 286 0.237762 0.426459 114 0.166667 0.374323 1.5567 0.120  
Q45d rice 286 0.615385 0.487357 114 0.535088 0.500969 1.4757 0.141  
Q45e soybeans 286 0.881119 0.324216 114 0.929825 0.25657 -1.4345 0.152  
Q45f wheat 286 0.625874 0.484745 114 0.640351 0.482016 -0.2701 0.787  
Q45g other 285 0.066667 0.249883 114 0.061404 0.241129 0.192 0.848  
Q46 
Have you ever leased any of your land 
for agricultural uses?  343 0.690962 0.462772 139 0.611511 0.48917 1.6794 0.094 *
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.3. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
Do you own land for any of the 
following reasons?                 
Q47a hay production 343 0.131195 0.338107 140 0.128571 0.335927 0.0775 0.938  
Q47b leasing to others 343 0.390671 0.488614 141 0.29078 0.455741 2.0833 0.038 ‡
Q47c personal recreation 343 0.241983 0.428909 141 0.184397 0.38919 1.3779 0.169  
Q47d raising livestock 343 0.122449 0.328283 141 0.141844 0.350134 -0.5791 0.563  
Q47e timber production 343 0.206997 0.405745 141 0.184397 0.38919 0.5634 0.573  
Q47f provide a place for wildlife 343 0.306122 0.461555 141 0.255319 0.437595 1.1168 0.265  
Q47g provide recreational access for others 343 0.049563 0.217357 141 0.049645 0.217986 -0.0038 0.997  
Q47h other 343 0.102041 0.303144 141 0.106383 0.309426 -0.1423 0.887  
Q48 Your gender (female = 1, male=0) 337 0.284867 0.452022 137 0.29927 0.459619 -0.313 0.755  
Q49 Your age in years 329 62.1155 13.79351 135 66.14074 12.78068 -2.9155 0.004 †
  
Which of the following best describes 
your ethnic background?                 
Q50a Caucasian 334 0.937126 0.243101 134 0.940299 0.237822 -0.1284 0.898  
Q50b African American 334 0.026946 0.162169 134 0.059702 0.237822 -1.7138 0.087 *
Q50c Asian 334 0.002994 0.054718 134 0 0 0.633 0.527  
Q50d American Indian 334 0.008982 0.094489 134 0 0 1.0997 0.272  
Q50e Hispanic 334 0 0 134 0 0         .   
Q50f other 334 0 0 134 0 0         .   
  
Choose one category that most closely 
describes your primary occupation.                 
Q51a farming 336 0.199405 0.400149 136 0.264706 0.442807 -1.5563 0.120  
Q51b business 336 0.119048 0.324328 136 0.110294 0.314414 0.2679 0.789  
† indicates significance at the 1% level, ‡ indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Table J.3. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
Q51c engineering 336 0.011905 0.108619 136 0 0 1.2773 0.202  
Q51d government 336 0.029762 0.170183 136 0.022059 0.147418 0.4622 0.644  
Q51e housewife 336 0.038691 0.193144 136 0.051471 0.221772 -0.6232 0.534  
Q51f retired 336 0.363095 0.481609 136 0.389706 0.489486 -0.5411 0.589  
Q51g unemployed 336 0 0 136 0 0          .         
Q51h education 336 0.047619 0.213277 136 0.044118 0.206116 0.1631 0.871  
Q51i healthcare 336 0.038691 0.193144 136 0 0 2.3346 0.020 ‡
Q51j student 336 0 0 136 0 0          .         
Q51k self-employed 336 0.074405 0.26282 136 0.080882 0.273662 -0.2396 0.811  
Q51l other 336 0.059524 0.236955 136 0.029412 0.169582 1.3484 0.178  
Q52 
How many individuals live in your 
household?  336 2.104167 0.916441 134 2.022388 1.065286 0.8328 0.405  
  
Indicate your highest level of 
education attained.                  
Q53a less than high school 336 0.0625 0.242423 135 0.140741 0.349049 -2.7709 0.006 †
Q53b high school graduate 336 0.226191 0.418988 135 0.340741 0.475724 -2.5786 0.010 †
Q53c some college, no degree 336 0.241071 0.428372 135 0.274074 0.447708 -0.7463 0.456  
Q53d associate degree 336 0.017857 0.13263 135 0.014815 0.121261 0.2306 0.818  
Q53e bachelor degree 336 0.279762 0.449552 135 0.148148 0.35657 3.0386 0.003 †
Q53f graduate or professional degree 336 0.163691 0.370546 135 0.074074 0.262867 2.5622 0.011 †





Table J.3. (continued) 
  first mailings second mailings    
Q # Variables  obs mean Std. Dev. obs mean Std. Dev. t-value  p-value  
  
Which best describes your annual 
household income?                  
Q54a less than $10K 290 0.006897 0.082902 105 0.028571 0.167398 -1.7042 0.089 *
Q54b $10K to $14.9K 290 0.003448 0.058722 105 0.019048 0.137348 -1.5786 0.115  
Q54c $15K to $24.9K 290 0.086207 0.281155 105 0.180952 0.386825 -2.661 0.008 †
Q54d $25K to $34.9K 290 0.086207 0.281155 105 0.12381 0.330944 -1.1186 0.264  
Q54e $35K to $49.9K 290 0.103448 0.30507 105 0.133333 0.341565 -0.8326 0.406  
Q54f $50K to $74.9K 290 0.213793 0.410691 105 0.219048 0.415585 -0.112 0.911  
Q54g $75K to $99.9K 290 0.12069 0.326329 105 0.057143 0.233229 1.8325 0.068 *
Q54h $100K to $149.9K 290 0.231035 0.422223 105 0.142857 0.351605 1.9128 0.057 *
Q54i $150K to $199.9K  290 0.034483 0.182781 105 0.019048 0.137348 0.7882 0.431  
Q54j $200K or more 290 0.089655 0.286181 105 0.066667 0.25064 0.7281 0.467  
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